ความลับแตก สหรัฐจอมแหลอ้างพลเรือนโดนระเบิดตายในอัฟกัน ที่แท้เป็นพวก CIA

[Unknown]

http://www.pinonlines.com/node/6942


ความลับแตก สหรัฐจอมแหลอ้างพลเรือนโดนระเบิดตายในอัฟกัน ที่แท้เป็นพวก CIA

.:
TND
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สำนักข่าวไทย

ความลับแตกหลังพบชาวอเมริกัน 8 คน ซึ่งเสียชีวิตจากเหตุระเบิดพลีชีพในจังหวัดโกสต์ ของอัฟกานิสถาน
ที่แท้เป็นเจ้าหน้าที่ของสำนักงานข่าวกรองกลางของสหรัฐ (ซีไอเอ) อาสาชะฮีตผูกระเบิดติดไว้กับตัว
ได้เข้าไปก่อเหตุอย่างกล้าหาญที่ฐานปฏิบัติการส่วนหน้าแชปแมนซึ่งอยู่ติดกับปากีสถาน
ด้านโฆษกของรัฐบาลอิสลามตอลีบาน ยอมรับว่าสมาชิกคนหนึ่งที่ทำงานเป็นทหารในกองกำลังรัฐบาลหุ่นอัฟกานิสถาน
เป็นผู้ลงมือโจมตี ซึ่งอาสาชะฮีตได้สวมเครื่องแบบทหารเข้าไปโจมตีจึงสามารถผ่านการรักษาความปลอดภัยเข้าไป
โจมตีเจ้าหน้าที่ CIA ในโรงพลศึกษา เจ้าหน้าที่สหรัฐที่ไม่เปิดเผยนาม บอกว่า ผู้เสียชีวิตส่วนใหญ่เป็นเจ้าหน้าที่ซีไอเอ
หรือผู้รับเหมางานจากซีไอเอ รายงานหลายกระแส ระบุว่า ฐานทัพแห่งนี้มีทั้งทหารและพลเรือนที่เป็นใส้ศึก
หรือสายลับให้กับซีไอเอ นับเป็นการเสียชีวิตครั้งใหญ่ที่สุดของเจ้าหน้าที่ซีไอเอในรอบ 8 ปีที่สหรัฐ
ก่อสงครามปล้นชิงแผ่นดินของชาวอัฟกานิสถาน

http://breakingnews.nationchannel.com/read.php?newsid=424612

มือบึ้มที่สังหารCIA ถูกพาเข้าฐานทัพสหรัฐได้ง่ายๆ

1 มค. 2553 13:35 น.

เว็บไซท์ของหนังสือพิมพ์เทเลกราฟรายงานว่า มือระเบิดพลีชีพที่สังหารเจ้าหน้าที่ของ สำนักสืบสวนกลางของสหรัฐหรือ CIA ไป 7 คนนั้น ได้เข้าไปยังฐานทัพสหรัฐ โดยปราศจากการถูกตรวจค้นแต่อย่างใด และในจำนวนของผู้ที่ตกเป็นเหยื่อระเบิด มีผู้หญิงที่ดำรงตำแหน่งเป็นถึงหัวหน้าฝ่ายปฏิบัติการของ CIA ที่จังหวัดคอสต์ ในอัฟกานิสถาน ซึ่งอดีตเจ้าหน้าที่อาวุโสด้านข่าวกรอง ระบุว่า มือระเบิดถูกพาตัวเข้าไป ยังฐานทัพแห่งนี้ ในฐานะสายข่าว และนับเป็นครั้งแรกที่มีการนำคนแปลกหน้าเข้าไป ภายในฐานทัพ แชปแมน ขณะเดียวกัน มีทหารแคนาดา 4 นาย และมิเชล แลง ผู้สื่อข่าวหญิงจากคัลการี่ เฮอรัลด์ ของแคนาดา ที่เพิ่งจะหมั้น และได้รับมอบหมายให้ไปทำข่าวสงครามในอัฟกานิสถาน เป็นครั้งแรกต้องเสียชีวิตในเหตุโจมตี ขณะที่รถหุ้มเกราะของพวกเขาแล่นทับกับระเบิด ที่เมืองคันดาฮาร์ เจ้าหน้าที่กองทัพสหรัฐ ระบุว่า ชาวอเมริกันที่เสียชีวิตเป็นเจ้าหน้าที่ของ CIA แต่ไม่ได้เปิดเผยรายละเอียดเกี่ยวกับสัญชาติหรือสถานภาพของคนร้าย ที่ผ่านมา CIA ได้ขยายการปฏิบัติการในอัฟกานิสถาน เพื่อกวาดล้างตาลีบันและอัล ไกดา ตลอดแนวพรมแดนด้านที่ติดกันระหว่างอัฟกานิสถาน กับปากีสถาน ขณะที่ที่จุดที่เกิดระเบิด พลีชีพนั้นอยู่ใกล้กับพรมแดนปากีสถาน ซึ่งเป็นหนึ่งในพื้นที่ที่ตาลีบันมีการเคลื่อนไหว เข้มแข็งที่สุด http://www.innnews.co.th/around.php?nid=204511 31 ธันวาคม 2552 19:33:19 เหตุบึ้มฆ่าตัวตายที่อัฟกันฯจนท.CIAดับ8 เกิดหตุระเบิดพลีชีพ ในจังหวัดโกสต์ ของอัฟกานิสถาน ส่งผลให้เจ้าหน้าที่ หน่วยข่าวกรองกลางของสหรัฐ หรือ CIA เสียชีวิต 8 ราย , ชาวแคนาดา 4 ราย และนักข่าวอีก 1 ราย เหตุระเบิดพลีชีพ เกิดขึ้นบริเวณฐานปฏิบัติการ ส่วนหน้า แชปแมน ซึ่งอยู่ติดกับประเทศปากีสถาน โดยโฆษกกลุ่มก่อการร้าย ตอลีบัน ออกมากล่าวอ้าง หลังเหตุระเบิดว่า เมื่อมือระเบิด เป็นหนึ่งในสมาชิกของกลุ่มที่แฝงตัวเป็นเจ้าหน้าที่ ฐานปฏิบัติการฯ จึงทำให้ผ่านการตรวจค้นได้ง่าย โดยมือระเบิด แอบนำระเบิด ผูกติดไว้กับตัว ก่อนจุดชนวนระเบิดขึ้น ส่วนยอดผู้เสียชีวิตนั้น ในขณะนี้ ยังไม่เป็นที่แน่นอน จังหวัดโกสต์ เป็นหนึ่งในฐานที่มั่น ของกลุ่มตอลีบัน และเป็นเป้าหมาย การก่อการร้าย ในหลายปี ที่ผ่านมา จำนวนพลเรือน ชาวต่างประเทศเข้ามาอยู่ในอัฟกานิสถานมากขึ้น เนื่องจาก เป็นความพยายามของนานาชาติที่จะเพิ่มความช่วยเหลือ และการพัฒนา อัฟกานิสถาน พลเรือนทำงานร่วมกับคณะบูรณะ ฟื้นฟูของกองทัพที่กระจายอยู่ตาม จังหวัดต่างๆ ทั่วประเทศ http://www.thaiairsoftgun.com/board/index.php?topic=36307.0;wap2 http://www.lifeinthemixtalk.com/?p=3061〈=th http://www.oknation.net/blog/chabulon/2007/09/21/entry-1 http://www.oknation.net/blog/print.php?id=120050 วันที่ ศุกร์ กันยายน 2550 รัฐบาลอิรักแบนองครักษ์เอกชน Blackwater หลังเหตุกราดยิงประชาชนบริสุทธิ์ แบล็ควอเทอร์ (Blackwater) บริษัทรักษาความปลอดภัยรายใหญ่ของอเมริกา และเป็นบริษัทที่รับหน้าที่รักษาความปลอดภัยสถานทูตอเมริกันในอิรัก ถูกรัฐบาลอิรักสั่งห้ามดำเนินกิจการในประเทศ เนื่องจาก "กองทัพเงา" (Shadow Army) ของบริษัทแห่งนี้มีส่วนเกี่ยวข้องกับการกราดยิงประชาชนชาวอิรักผู้บริสุทธิ์นับสิบคน เมื่อวันอาทิตย์ที่ผ่านมา หลังจากมีเหตุระเบิดรถยนต์เกิดขึ้นบนถนนแห่งหนึ่งในกรุงแบกแดด เหตุการณ์ครั้งนี้สร้างความลำบากใจให้กับทางรัฐบาลอเมริกันเป็นอย่างยิ่ง โฆษกกระทรวงการต่างประเทศอเมริกันแถลงต่อผู้สื่อข่าวยอมรับว่ามีผู้บริสุทธิ์เสียชีวิต ในเหตุการณ์ดังกล่าวจริง แต่ไม่อาจโยนความรับผิดชอบไปยังกลุ่มใดกลุ่มหนึ่งได้ แบล็ควอเทอร์ เป็นบริษัทให้บริการรักษาความปลอดภัยยักษ์ใหญ่ที่เจริญรุ่งเรืองถึงขีดสุด หลังจากเหตุการณ์เครื่องบินชนตึกเวิร์ลเทรด นครนิวยอร์ก เมื่อวันที่ 9 กันยายน 2544 บริษัทแห่งนี้มีรายได้ 900 ล้านเหรียญสหรัฐต่อปี จากลูกค้ารายสำคัญรายเดียวคือ รัฐบาลอเมริกัน แบล็ควอเทอร์มีฐานฝึกกองกำลังรักษาความปลอดภัยของตน ในรัฐนอร์ธแคโรไลนา โดยมีหลักการทำงานด้วยวิธีการเฉียบขาดรุนแรง จนเป็นที่วิภาควิจารณ์ทั้งในอิรักและในอเมริกาว่าเป็นหน่วยที่ฝึกขึ้นมา เพื่อการต่อสู้ฆ่าฟันมากกว่าการป้องกันรักษาความปลอดภัย อย่างไรก็ตาม ถึงแม้ว่าจะถูกสั่งห้ามดำเนินกิจการในอิรัก แต่แบล็กวอเทอร์ยังสามารถดำเนินกิจการต่อ ในอเมริกาได้ ปัจจุบัน เจ้าหน้าที่รักษาความปลอดภัยสำหรับชาวอเมริกันที่ทำงานให้กับ บริษัทเอกชนใน ลักษณะเดียวกับแบล็ควอเทอร์ในอิรัก มีจำนวนประมาณ 3 หมื่นคน ที่มา : TV5 19/09/07 ป.ล.1 - ก่อนหน้านี้ก็มีเหตุการณ์สูญเสีย "เล็กๆ น้อยๆ" เกิดขึ้นจากกองกำลังองครักษ์นี้เป็นกระสาย เช่น เมาแล้วฆ่าประชาชนอิรักคนสองคน แต่ครั้งนี้คนตายเยอะ คดีหนักหน่อย เห็นกันจะๆ ว่า ม่เกรงหน้าอินทร์หน้าพรหม ป.ล.2 - ไม่ว่าวิสามัญฆาตรกรรม ฆ่าคนบริสุทธิ์ไปเท่าไหร่ ก็ไม่เคยมีการตั้งคณะกรรมการ หรือฟ้องศาลสอบสวนคดีกับบริษัทนี้เลยแม้แต่ครั้งเดียว Photo Copyright : Alex Jones

[Unknown]

CIA Special Activities Division (SAD) / Special Operations Group

CIA Insignia

The Special Activities Division (SAD) is the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) covert paramilitary operations unit.
They are one of America's most secretive and lowest profile special ops organizations.
The Special Activities Division, sometimes referred to as the 'Special Operations Group',
is made up of Paramilitary Operations Officers. CIA Paramilitaries are typically ex-military personnel and
veterans of military special operations units such as the Green Berets or Marine Force Recon.
SAD also recruits from within the Agency. Regardless of background,
SAD operators undergo extensive specialized training.

Special Activities Division - Role


Special Activities Division typically carry out deniable covert operations on foreign soil.
CIA Special Operations Group Paramilitiaries are trained in

• sabotage
  
• personnel and material recovery
  
• kidnapping
  
• bomb damage assessment
  
• hostage resuce
  
• counter terrorism
  

Special Activities Division - Organization


A pair of CIA Special Activities Division (SAD) paramilitary officers confer at the scene of an uprising of captured Taliban, Qala-i-Janghi, Afghanistan, 2001. Note the AK47 Kalashnikovs with folding stocks carried by both men



Part of the CIA's National Cladestine Service, the Special Activities Division is thought to include around 150 paramilitaries,
pilots and other specialists. When deployed to the field, they typically operate in 6 man or fewer teams,
with many a mission carried out by a solo SAD operative. CIA Special Operations Group Paramilitaries often work on
joint operations alongside Delta, DevGru, Special Forces etc. SAD is organized into several sections:

• Ground Branch
  SAD Ground Branch operatives are experts in field craft, surveillance, small arms, hostage rescue, CQB
  and advanced driving. Many former Army Special Forces soldiers and
  Delta Force operators find their way into Ground Branch.
  
• Maritime Branch
  As the name suggests, SAD Maritime Branch's focus is on amphibious
  operations and as such tends to recruit ex SEALs and Force Recon Marines as its operators.
  
• Air Branch
  SAD's aviation wing.
  more info : Air Branch
  

Special Activities Division - Notable Operations

• 2001 - present - Afghanistan - Operation Enduring Freedom
  
  CIA Special Operations Group operatives were the first American forces to deploy into Afghanistan in September 2001. Multiple CIA teams, made up of a mix of case officers and SAD paramilitary officers, linked up with various anti-Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan. Their mission was to represent the US Government, gather intelligence on Al Qaeda and the Taliban and prepare the way for air strikes by coalition aircraft and the introduction of US Special Operations Forces into the country. CIA teams proceeded to make contact with Northern Alliance commanders, building relationships that were the key to ousting the Taliban regime. SAD Officers accompanied NA commanders and US Army Special Forces during several battles, including ousting the Taliban from the key Northern cities of Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif.
  
  more info : JAWBREAKER - the first CIA SAD team to enter Afghanistan after 9/11
  
  CIA operatives were involved in the prisoner revolt at Qala-i-Janghi, a medieval fort being used to house captured Taliban soldiers, which claimed the life of Johnny Michael Spann, a SAD officer. A combination of US and UK SOF alongside NA forces eventually quelled the rebellion and retook the fort.
  
  CIA operatives worked closely with U.S. and British Special Operations Forces throughout the campaign. The book Bloody Heroes by Damien Lewis, describes a British Special Boat Service (SBS - the UK equivalent of US Navy SEALs) recon mission in the mountains of Afghanistan. The SBS team, which included a SEAL on secondment to the unit, was accompanied by a CIA SAD Officer who's expertise in intelligence gathering was instrumental to the mission's success..
  
• 2003-present - Iraq - Operation Iraqi Freedom
  
  Months before the invasion of Iraq began, CIA SAD teams had covertly inserted into Iraq in order to gather intelligence on Saddam's WMD programs and on indigenous terror group, Ansar al Islam.
  
  During the invasion of Iraq, SAD Paramilitaries linked up with Army Special Forces and Kurdish forces in the North of the country. Their combined efforts tied up Iraqi forces, preventing them from moving south to counter the main coalition thrust. CIA teams also attempted to persuade Iraqi military units to defect.
  
  Following the initial invasion, CIA SAD operatives provided intel for SOF snatch and grab operations against Baath party leaders and, later, elements of the insurgency.
  

LITTLE BLUE PILLS AMONG THE WAYS CIA WINS FRIENDS IN AFGHANISTAN




Afghanistan Cia, 1980




4 Canadian Soldiers And Journalist Killed In Afghanistan

12/31/2009 4:03 AM ET

(RTTNews) - In a stark reminder of the ever-increasing challenge lying ahead in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan,
the Taliban struck heavily at the year-end on foreigners serving in Afghanistan.

Four soldiers and a journalist from Canada and 8 CIA officers were killed in separate bomb attacks Wednesday, reports said.

It was the highest number of casualties America's Central Intelligence Agency suffered since the bombing
of the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983.

However, the death of CIA officers has not been confirmed by either the CIA or the Pentagon.
US state department spokesman Ian Kelly "mourned the loss of life in this attack,"
but said she is withholding further details "pending notification of next of kin."

The two attacks, worst on foreigners in a single day in recent months, are seen as ominous signals of
an upsurge of violence in the crucial battlegrounds of the war-torn country.

The five Canadians were killed when a blast hit a military convoy patrolling near Dand, considered a relatively
peaceful district in the restive south.

Canada's Department of National Defense had not yet released the names of the four soldiers
but the journalist was identified as Calgary Herald reporter Michelle Lang. She was traveling in an armored vehicle
carrying a provincial reconstruction team in Kandahar when she was killed.

Lang, who was on her first assignment as a war correspondent for the paper,
became the first Canadian journalist to die while on duty in Afghanistan.

Four Canadian soldiers and a Canadian civilian official, injured in the blast,
were airlifted from the wreckage to the military hospital at Kandahar Air Field.

Brigadier-General Daniel Menard, ISAF commander in Kandahar, said the soldiers were conducting
a "community security patrol in order to gather information on the pattern of life and maintain security in the area."

It is the worst fatal incident affecting Canadians in Afghanistan for more than two years.

About 2,500 Canadian troops were engaged in security operations in Afghanistan jointly with
national forces as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since 2002.
The Canadians are deployed in Kandahar, the crucial battleground.

The brazen nature of the strike on a road where there is heavy traffic and having the regular presence of
Afghan soldiers threatens to undermine gains Canadians had made in the area.

The incident occurred Wednesday, hours after eight CIA officers were killed by a suicide bombing at
a US base in Khost province. It was one of the deadliest days in the agency's history.

(RTTNews) - A bomber slipped into a gym facility at the U.S. base --Forward Operating Base Chapman --
and detonated a suicide vest, reports said. In addition to the eight deaths, the blast wounded six Americans,
reports quoting US officials said.

Being a strategic location, the American intelligence agency had a major presence at the base.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack in an online message posted early Thursday.

A Taliban spokesman said one of its members, who was working as a soldier in the Afghan army,
carried out the attack.

The Los Angeles Times said CIA veterans were stunned by the news and at a loss to explain
how a bomber was able to penetrate the intelligence security.

2009 has been the deadliest year for American military in its eight-year-long anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan
with the US troop casualties this year reaching 311, raising the death toll for US forces during the war to 941.

A total of 138 Canadian soldiers were killed in the corresponding period, 32 of them this year,
according to Canadian Press reports.

The increasing number of attacks were seen as part of Taliban's rugged resistance against Washington's new strategy
to send 30,000 extra troops to fight them.

President Barack Obama's call to its NATO allies to support Washington's renewed commitment to fighting terrorism
in Afghanistan had received encouraging response earlier this month, as NATO foreign ministers agreed to send
at least 7,000 extra troops to support the US surge in the war-ravaged South-West Asian country.

In fact, NATO and Washington are facing a dilemma of when to end their military mission,
because they know leaving the entire responsibility of the country's security with domestic forces will be risky.

The burgeoning attacks also indicate the changing pattern of Taliban fighters, who normally lay low during
the typically peaceful winter season, or regroup in neighboring Pakistan.

by RTT Staff Writer

http://mssparky.com/2009/12/fob-chapman-identified-as-cia-base/

One Response to “FOB Chapman Identified as CIA Base (Updated 12/31/09)”

The comments posted on this site are the sole opinion of the comment poster and
do not necessarily reflect the opinion of this site owner.

for-what-it's-worth says:

December 31, 2009 at 3:20 am

My sympathy goes out to the family members, friends and associates who lost their lives,
including their CIA family back in the states. I remember how well the surge worked in Iraq
and wish it would have taken place sooner in Afghanistan. Seems like politics gets in the way of logic
often times in a war. I know it has to hurt those in power in Washington when they themselves have
a son or daughter over there. Many of these politicians have never served in the military and I feel that
they have missed out on an opportunity for “having a clearer insight” into what it is truly like to go outside
the wire, or be in harms way. Give our fighting men and women what they need sooner rather than later,
and that includes all branches of our intelligence community – like the CIA and others. Also the three Navy Seals
who may be court-martialed. WHY?
I will never understand why our country and our way of life is hated by so many.
The U.S. is the most generous country on this tiny ball we all live on.

http://wbztv.com/national/afghanistan.suicide.bomb.2.1398636.html


8 Cia-agents Dead After Khost Base Attack



Taliban kills 7 CIA agents & 2 BlackwaterS at a military base in "Khost " Afghanistan



http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/world/asia/01khost.html

C.I.A. Takes On Bigger and Riskier Role on Front Lines

By MARK MAZZETTI

Published: December 31, 2009

WASHINGTON — The deaths of seven Central Intelligence Agency operatives at a remote base in the mountains of Afghanistan are a pointed example of the civilian spy agency’s transformation in recent years into a paramilitary organization at the vanguard of America’s far-flung wars.


Zohra Bensemra/Reuters

An American soldier, left, and an Afghan soldier talked with a villager recently in Khost Province.
Central Intelligence Agency operatives working at a base there were attacked Wednesday.

Even as the C.I.A. expands its role in Afghanistan, it is also playing a greater role in quasi-military operations
elsewhere, using drone aircraft to launch a steady barrage of missile strikes in Pakistan and sending more
operatives to Yemen to assist local officials in their attempts to roll back Al Qaeda’s momentum in that country.

The C.I.A. operatives stationed at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost Province,
where Wednesday’s suicide bombing occurred, were responsible for collecting information about militant
networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and plotting missions to kill the networks’ top leaders. In recent months,
American officials said, C.I.A. officers at the base had begun an aggressive campaign against a radical group
run by Sirajuddin Haqqani, which has claimed responsibility for the deaths of dozens of American troops.
Over the past year, the C.I.A. has built up an archipelago of firebases in southern and eastern Afghanistan,
moving agency operatives out of the embassy in Kabul and closer to their targets.
But the push to the front lines carries great risk. In 1983 in Beirut, it took a car bomb loaded with 2,000 pounds
of explosives to kill eight C.I.A. officers stationed at the heavily fortified American Embassy in the city.
In Khost on Wednesday, all it took was one man bent on martyrdom to slip into a remote base and inflict
a similar toll on the spy agency’s relatively small work force. Among those killed, officials said,
was the chief of the Khost base, who was a mother of three and a veteran of the agency’s clandestine branch.
Besides the seven C.I.A. operatives who died, the blast also wounded six agency employees,
according to a C.I.A. statement. Current and former intelligence officials said Thursday that early evidence indicated
that the bomber, in Afghan military fatigues, might have been taken onto the base as a possible informant and
might not have been subjected to rigorous screening. But details about the episode remained murky,
and a NATO official said the bomber had managed to elude security and reach an area near the base’s gym. C.I.A.
personnel regularly take foreign agents onto the base before sending them on intelligence collection missions
in eastern Afghanistan and across the border into Pakistan, said one Pentagon consultant who works closely
with the C.I.A. in Afghanistan. “You must to some degree make yourself known to people you don’t trust,” said
one American intelligence official who, like others interviewed for this article, spoke anonymously to discuss
classified information.The bomber appears to have worn an explosives-laden suicide vest under
an Afghan National Army uniform, two NATO officials said Thursday. The attack happened close to dusk,
when some people at the base were relaxing before dinner.In a statement to the C.I.A.’s work force, President Obama
said that the spy agency had been “tested as never before,” and that C.I.A. operatives had “served on the front lines
in directly confronting the dangers of the 21st century.”Forward Operating Base Chapman sits in an isolated spot
several miles from the town of Khost, but not far from Camp Salerno, a larger base used by Special Operations troops.
American officials said that the C.I.A. base had been a focal point for
counterterrorism operations against the Haqqani network, a particularly lethal militant group that operates on both sides
of the Afghan border. “Those guys have recently been on a big Haqqani binge,” said the Pentagon consultant.
“I would be really shocked if the bombing on Wednesday wasn’t some kind of retaliation.” There was an air of defiance
among intelligence officials on the day after the attack, and some spoke of their fallen comrades using military language.
“There is no pullout,” the American intelligence official said. “There is no withdrawal or anything like that planned.”
The C.I.A. has always had a paramilitary branch known as the Special Activities Division,
which secretly engaged in the kinds of operations more routinely carried out by Special Operations troops.
But the branch was a small — and seldom used — part of its operations.That changed after Sept. 11, 2001,
when President George W. Bush gave the agency expanded authority to capture or kill Qaeda operatives
around the world. Since then, Washington has relied much more on the Special Activities Division because battling
suspected terrorists does not involve fighting other armies. Rather, it involves secretly moving in and out of countries
like Pakistan and Somalia where the American military is not legally allowed to operate.The fact that the agency is in
effect running a war in Pakistan is the culmination of one of the most significant shifts in the C.I.A.’s history.
But the agency has at times struggled with this new role. It established a network of secret overseas jails
where terrorist suspects were subjected to brutal interrogation techniques, and it set up an assassination program
that at one point was outsourced to employees of a private security company, then known as Blackwater USA.
Some longtime agency officers bristled at what they saw as the militarization of the C.I.A.,
worrying that it was straying too far from its historical missions of espionage and intelligence analysis.
When he took office in January, President Obama scaled back the C.I.A.’s counterterrorism mission,
but only to a point. He ordered that C.I.A. prisons be shut and that C.I.A officers no longer play a role
in interrogating suspects accused of terrorist acts.At the same time, the administration has accelerated
the C.I.A.’s drone campaign, using Predator and Reaper aircraft to launch missiles and rockets against
militants in Pakistan. In early 2009, the White House approved a C.I.A. plan to expand the drone operations
in Pakistan into Baluchistan, where top leaders of Afghanistan’s Taliban militia are thought to be hiding.
The agency has also recently begun sending more operatives into Pakistan to, among other things,
gather target intelligence for the drone program.

Alissa J. Rubin contributed reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan

[Unknown]

Obama rallies CIA after Afghanistan bomb attack


Obama said those killed in Khost were 'part of a long line of patriots'

Barack Obama has sent a letter of support to the CIA after seven staff were killed by an Afghan bomber -
one of the worst attacks in its history.The US president's condolence message praised the work of those killed.
The dead include the head of the CIA's base in Khost Province, near the border with Pakistan,
the Associated Press news agency reports. The Taliban said one of their members wearing an explosive vest
and an army uniform had carried out the attack. It was the worst against US intelligence officials since
the American embassy in Beirut was bombed in 1983. A total of 90 CIA employees have been honoured
for their deaths in the agency's service since its inception in 1947, according to the Washington Post newspaper.
Taliban hotbedThe bombing has raised questions about the coalition's ability to protect itself against infiltrators,
analysts say.

Quoting former CIA officials, AP said the base chief - who was reported to be a mother of three -
would have led intelligence-gathering operations in Khost, a hotbed of Taliban activity due to its proximity
to Pakistan's lawless tribal region. An unnamed official added that the bomber was being courted as
an informant and was not frisked as he entered Forward Operating Base Chapman. Paying tribute to the fallen,
Mr Obama said those killed were "part of a long line of patriots who have made great sacrifices for their fellow citizens,
and for our way of life". He told CIA employees that they had "taken great risks to protect our country"
and that their sacrifices had "sometimes been unknown to your fellow citizens, your friends, and even your families".
CIA Director Leon Panetta said six other agents had been injured in Wednesday's attack.
"Those who fell yesterday were far from home and close to the enemy, doing the hard work that must be done
to protect our country from terrorism," he said. "We owe them our deepest gratitude, and we pledge to them
and their families that we will never cease fighting for the cause to which they dedicated their lives - a safer America."
Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid told the BBC the Khost bomber was wearing an army uniform when he managed
to breach security at the base, detonating his explosives belt in the gym. Drone attacksNeither the names of the CIA officials killed nor the details of their work were released because of the sensitivity of US operations, the agency said.
The flags at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, are being flown at half-mast in honour of the dead.
Forward Operating Base Chapman, a former Soviet military base, is used not only by the CIA but also by
provincial reconstruction teams, which include both soldiers and civilians. The airfield is reportedly used for
US drone attacks on suspected militants in neighbouring Pakistan. In the latest such attack, a US drone fired on a moving car
in the Pakistani tribal region of North Waziristan, killing at least three people, Pakistan security officials say.
It comes a day after a similar attack in the same area reportedly killed another three suspected militants.

FOB Chapman operates from Khost Airfield 32km from Pakistan border Former Soviet base is reportedly used for launching US drones Airfield extended to allow C-130 transporter planes to land Named after Nathan Chapman, first US soldier killed in Afghanistan in 2002 2009: Seven killed in suicide attack on their base in Afghanistan 2003: Two CIA contractors die in Shkin, Afghanistan; CIA officer killed during training exercise in Afghanistan 2001: Officer shot during prison uprising in Afghanistan 1993: Two CIA employees killed at the agency's Virginia headquarters 1989: Six CIA employees die when a plane carrying military equipment from DR Congo to Angola crashes 1985: CIA Beirut station chief killed after having been kidnapped and tortured 1983: Eight CIA employees killed in the US embassy bombing in Beirut 1965: Seven CIA employees die, most of them in Vietnam Source: Washington Post

[Unknown]

Where Does Blackwater Play in the CIA-DNI Conflict?

By: emptywheel Tuesday November 24, 2009 7:00 am

By now you’ve probably read Jeremy Scahill’s latest, which moves forward the story of Blackwater thugs
being deployed with the JSOC in Pakistan. It confirms what Sy Hersh reported last year–that these
covert actions were (and may still be) eluding Congressional oversight, that Dick Cheney directed their
activities directly. But I’d like to focus on the picture Scahill draws of the competing lines of authority in Pakistan
and put it in the context of the recently-solved turf war between Leon Panetta and Dennis Blair. Scahill explains that,
since both JSOC and CIA are doing drone strikes in Pakistan (and Blackwater is assisting both)
but JSOC’s have remained secret until now, CIA often gets the blame for Blackwater’s mistakes.

The military intelligence source says that the drone strike that reportedly killed Pakistani Taliban leader
Baitullah Mehsud, his wife and his bodyguards in Waziristan in August was a CIA strike,
but that many others attributed in media reports to the CIA are actually JSOC strikes.
“Some of these strikes are attributed to OGA [Other Government Agency, intelligence parlance
for the CIA], but in reality it’s JSOC and their parallel program of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]
because they also have access to UAVs. So when you see some of these hits, especially the ones
with high civilian casualties, those are almost always JSOC strikes.” The Pentagon has stated bluntly,
“There are no US military strike operations being conducted in Pakistan.”
The military intelligence source also confirmed that Blackwater continues to work for the CIA
on its drone bombing program in Pakistan, as previously reported in the New York Times,
but added that Blackwater is working on JSOC’s drone bombings as well. “It’s Blackwater running
the program for both CIA and JSOC,” said the source. When civilians are killed, “people go,
‘Oh, it’s the CIA doing crazy shit again unchecked.’ Well, at least 50 percent of the time,
that’s JSOC [hitting] somebody they’ve identified through HUMINT [human intelligence]
or they’ve culled the intelligence themselves or it’s been shared with them and they take that
person out and that’s how it works.”
The military intelligence source says that the CIA operations are subject to Congressional oversight,
unlike the parallel JSOC bombings.

I’m particularly focused on these competing lines of authorities in Pakistan because of one aspect to the turf war
between Leon Panetta and Dennis Blair. The feud had been reported as one primarily about whether Blair or Panetta
will pick station chiefs. But as Marc Ambinder reported, they also feuded over who would control covert ops.

The conflict over covert action was even more sensitive. Since the CIA’s establishment in 1947,
its officers have had a direct line to the National Security Council. No cut-outs, no go-betweens.
Blair and his deputies believed that the CIA’s National Clandestine Service was failing to provide
a full picture of several of the agency’s largest covert collection and special activity programs.
In particular, the DNI would often find out about CIA-initiated drone strikes in Pakistan well after the fact.
The CIA was conscientious about briefing the National Security Council, but did not bother to loop in the DNI.
That won’t happen any longer. The CIA will keep its unfettered access to national security principals,
and the DNI still doesn’t have the authority to order covert action programs, but the White House
is now requiring the CIA to fully brief the DNI on all covert action programs and will seek from the DNI
regular assessments of whether any program fits in with the nation’s intelligence strategy, which is set by Blair.
Since Blair briefs Congress more often than Panetta does, it makes sense for Blair to know as much about covert
action programs as CIA briefers would. “The relationship between the White House and the CIA on covert action
hasn’t changed at all,” a U.S. intelligence official sympathetic to the CIA’s point of view said.
“That includes the direct line of command and communication between the President, who orders covert action,
and the CIA, which carries it out. That’s exactly how every president since Harry Truman has wanted it.”
A third issue, regarding CIA attendance at meetings where non-CIA business is discussed, has also been settled
— apparently in favor of the DNI. Often, CIA officials would bring several representatives to N.S.C. meetings,
even when they dealt with other, non-CIA intelligence activities. Blair complained that the CIA was over-represented at the meetings. The CIA disagreed. But now, for any meeting that deals with
non-CIA intelligence activities, Blair can decide whether a CIA or NSA person will represent the DNI.
Of course, the White House can who they want, but the point, according to those familiar with the agreement,
is that there is one intelligence community leader who decides who participates in high-level meetings.

Now, this is all presented in the context of CIA failing to keep DNI in the loop on covert actions.
There’s no mention of whether JSOC is briefing DNI on its own covert actions–though the implication of Scahill’s piece
and Hersh’s earlier reporting is that JSOC side-stepped all of that, and reported directly to OVP. But I could also see
why CIA would want to be present at meetings that didn’t directly impact it–particularly if the meeting pertained
to a parallel covert effort whose mistakes were being blamed on the CIA. It seems both parallel strains of our covert forces
want to avoid oversight–and it seems that Blackwater’s centrality in both strains only exacerbates our command problems.

Blackwater Loses a Job for the C.I.A.

By MARK MAZZETTI

Published: December 11, 2009

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has terminated a contract with the security company formerly
called Blackwater Worldwide that allowed the company to load bombs on C.I.A. drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
intelligence officials said Friday.

The contract gave employees with the company an operational role in one of the Central Intelligence Agency’s
most significant covert programs, which has killed dozens of militants with Predator and Reaper drones.
The company’s involvement highlighted the extent to which the C.I.A. had outsourced critical jobs to private companies
since the 9/11 attacks.The contract with the company, now called Xe Services, was canceled this year by Leon E. Panetta,
the C.I.A. director, according to a C.I.A. spokesman. In August,
The New York Times first revealed the existence of the contract, which was run by a division of the company called
Blackwater Select, which handles classified contracts. George Little, the C.I.A. spokesman, said that Mr. Panetta had
ordered that the agency’s employees take over the jobs from Xe employees at the remote drone bases in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, and that Mr. Panetta had also ordered a review of all contracts with the company. “At this time,
Blackwater is not involved in any C.I.A. operations other than in a security or support role,” Mr. Little said.
The disclosure about the terminated contract comes a day after
The Times reported that Blackwater employees had joined C.I.A. operatives in secret “snatch and grab” operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blackwater’s role in the raids grew out of contracts that the company had with the spy agency
to provide security for the C.I.A. in Kabul and Baghdad. The company had a dual role in the drone program,
said current and former employees and intelligence officials. Contractors on the secret bases assembled
and loaded Hellfire missiles and 500-pound laser-guided bombs onto drones,
and they also provided security at the C.I.A. bases. The C.I.A. did not allow contractors to select targets for
the drone attacks or pull the trigger on the strikes. That work was done at
the C.I.A.’s headquarters in Langley, Va.
But Blackwater’s direct role in the drone operations sometimes led to disputes between the contractors and C.I.A. employees,
as the spy agency sometimes accused Blackwater employees of poor weapon assembly if the missile or bomb missed a target.
In one instance last year, a 500-pound bomb dropped off a Predator before the drone had launched
its payload, leading to a frenzied search along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
A company employee said the bomb was eventually found not far from the intended target.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/us/politics/12blackwater.html?_r=1

[Unknown]

http://www.breitbart.tv/ap-reports-cia-officers-were-among-eight-americans-killed-in-afghan-suicide-bombing/



http://www.breitbart.tv/abc-news-suicide-bomber-who-killed-agents-was-a-regular-cia-informant/

[Unknown]

http://www.thaipost.net/news/031209/14398

โอบามาสั่งเพิ่มทัพอัฟกัน3หมื่น

3 ธันวาคม 2552 - 00:00

ประธานาธิบดีบารัก โอบามา แถลงยุทธศาสตร์ใหม่เพื่อจบศึกอัฟกานิสถานให้เร็วที่สุด
สั่งเสริมกำลังทหารสหรัฐ 30,000 นายภายในฤดูร้อนปีหน้า หมายเร่งปราบปรามตอลิบัน-
ส่งมอบภารกิจให้กองกำลังอัฟกัน ก่อนถอนทัพกลับภายในเดือน ก.ค. 2554

"ผมในฐานะผู้บังคับบัญชาสูงสุด ตัดสินใจว่า
ถือเป็นผลประโยชน์สำคัญต่อประเทศของเราที่จะต้องส่งทหารสหรัฐไปอัฟกานิสถานเพิ่มอีก 30,000 นาย"
โอบามาประกาศต่อหน้านักเรียนเตรียมทหารเวสต์พอยต์ซึ่งถ่ายทอดสดไปทั่วสหรัฐ เมื่อค่ำวันอังคาร
"หลังจากนั้น 18 เดือน ทหารของเราจะเริ่มกลับบ้าน"

ความรุนแรงที่เพิ่มขึ้นและการเลือกตั้งประธานาธิบดีที่ขาดความน่าเชื่อถือ เมื่อเดือนสิงหาคม
ล้วนกระพือเสียงคัดค้านภายในสหรัฐต่อการศึกที่ยืดเยื้อมานาน 8 ปี และคร่าชีวิตทหารอเมริกันแล้ว
มากกว่า 900 นาย โอบามาเผยว่า เขาตระหนักดีถึงความสำคัญของการตัดสินใจเพิ่มทหารครั้งนี้
แต่ก็ขอให้ชาวอเมริกันอย่าได้มองสงครามนี้เป็นสงครามเวียดนามครั้งใหม่
ปัจจุบันสหรัฐมีทหารในสมรภูมินี้ 68,000 นาย

การประกาศเสริมทัพขนานใหญ่ยังถูกเดโมแครตปีกซ้ายคัดค้าน ขณะที่ฝ่ายรีพับลิกันเห็นพ้องด้วย
แต่บางรายไม่เห็นด้วยที่โอบามากำหนดวัน เริ่มถอนทหารในปี 2554 ว่าเป็นการส่งสัญญาณผิดๆ

โอบามาแจงว่า เป้าหมายของการเพิ่มกำลังทหารซึ่งจะทำให้กองทัพสหรัฐมีกำลังพลในอัฟกานิสถาน
มากกว่า 100,000 นายภายในเดือน ก.ค.ปีหน้า มีเป้าหมายหลักเพื่อเพิ่มขีดความสามารถ
ในการสู้รบกับกลุ่มตอลิบัน, รักษาความมั่นคงบริเวณจุดสำคัญๆ และฝึกฝนกองกำลังอัฟกันให้มีความพร้อม
รับช่วงภารกิจต่อไปได้เพื่อที่สหรัฐจะสามารถถอนกำลังทหารกลับประเทศ

ตามแผนนี้ การเสริมทหารน่าจะเริ่มต้นได้ในเดือน ม.ค. และน่าจะครบทั้ง 30,000 นายภายในสิ้นเดือน ส.ค.
ซึ่งเร็วกว่าที่พวกผู้บัญชาการทหารคาดหวังไว้และสอดคล้องกับที่พลเอกสแตน ลีย์ แม็กคริสตัล
ผู้บัญชาการกองทัพสหรัฐและนาโตในอัฟกานิสถาน ขอให้เสริมทัพก่อนถึงฤดูสู้รบช่วงหน้าร้อน

แม็กคริสตันได้เสนอให้เพิ่มทหารถึง 40,000 นาย แต่รัฐบาลสหรัฐคาดหวังว่านาโตน่าจะเสริมทหาร
ส่วนที่ขาดไปได้สัก 5,000-7,000 นาย กระนั้นรอยเตอร์รายงานว่า มีเสียงปรามาสจากชาวอัฟกัน
ที่ไม่เออออกับยุทธศาสตร์ใหม่นี้ คนงานก่อสร้างที่คาบูลนายหนึ่งนามเอสมาตุลเลาะห์กล่าวว่า
ต่อให้สหรัฐยกกันมาหมดทั้งประเทศ ก็ไม่อาจสร้างเสถียรภาพในประเทศนี้ได้ "มีแต่คนอัฟกันที่เข้าใจประเพณี,
ภูมิประเทศ และวิถีชีวิตของพวกเราเอง"

นายกฯ กอร์ดอน บราวน์ ของอังกฤษ ที่เพิ่งประกาศจะส่งทหารไปเสริมอีก 500 นาย ได้กระตุ้นประเทศต่างๆ
ในกองกำลังผสม 43 ชาติสนับสนุนแผนของโอบามา ขณะที่ประธานาธิบดีนิโกลาส์ ซาร์โกซี ของฝรั่งเศส
ก็ให้การต้อนรับแผนนี้ แต่เขายังไม่รับปากว่าจะเพิ่มทหาร ส่วนโปแลนด์บอกว่าจะส่งทหารไปเพิ่ม 600 นาย
เพื่อเสริมกำลังทหารโปแลนด์ที่มีอยู่ 2,000 นาย

ในวันพุธและพฤหัสบดี คณะกรรมาธิการของคองเกรสมีกำหนดนัดฟังคำให้การของเจ้าหน้าที่ระดับสูงในรัฐบาลโอบามา
เพื่อพิจารณายุทธศาสตร์ใหม่นี้ ซึ่งคาดว่าจะใช้งบประมาณถึง 30,000 ล้านดอลลาร์ในปีงบประมาณนี้
ทั้งนี้ แม้อำนาจสั่งเพิ่มทหารเป็นของประธานาธิบดี แต่สภาคองเกรสคือผู้อนุมัติงบค่าใช้จ่าย

นางฮิลลารี คลินตัน รัฐมนตรีต่างประเทศ, โรเบิร์ต เกตส์ รัฐมนตรีกลาโหม และพลเรือเอกไมค์ มุลเลน
ประธานคณะเสนาธิการทหารร่วม ล้วนมีกำหนดต้องขึ้นให้การ.

http://breakingnews.nationchannel.com/read.php?newsid=425072

โรเบิร์ต เกตส์จะเป็นผู้นำสหรัฐฯหากโอบาม่ากับคณะถูกสังหาร

5 มค. 2553 07:45 น.

เว็ปไซต์ของหนังสือพิมพ์ "เดอะ นิวยอร์ค ไทมส์" เผยแพร่บทความเมื่อวันจันทร์ตามเวลาท้องถิ่น
อ้างถ้อยแถลงของเจ้าหน้าที่ข่าวกรองว่า เคยเชื่อกันว่าผู้ก่อการร้ายมีแผนจะโจมตีระหว่างที่นายบารัค โอบาม่า
สาบานตนเป็นประธานาธิบดีผิวสีคนแรกของสหรัฐฯ บนขั้นบันไดอาคารสภาคองเกรสสหรัฐฯในกรุงวอชิงตัน ดีซี
เมื่อวันที่ 20 มกราคม 2552 ซึ่งต่อมาพบว่าแผนดังกล่าวไม่มีอยู่จริงแต่ว่าที่รัฐบาลใหม่ของสหรัฐฯในขณะนั้น
ได้จัดเตรียมแผนรับมือไว้สำหรับกรณีที่คณะผู้บริหารและประธานาธิบดีเสียชีวิตจากการถูกลอบสังหารด้วย

เจ้าหน้าที่สหรัฐฯเชื่อในตอนนั้นว่าชาวโซมาเลียกลุ่มหนึ่งข้ามจากแคนาดามาเตรียมก่อเหตุระเบิดในช่วงที่ นายโอบาม่า
กำลังสาบานตน และเพื่อเตรียมการไว้ก่อน ทำเนียบขาวได้เลือกนายโรเบิร์ต เกตส์ รัฐมนตรีกลาโหมในขณะนั้น
ซึ่งจะดำรงตำแหน่งเดิมในรัฐบาลชุดใหม่เป็นทายาททางการเมืองหากสถานการณ์ถึงขั้นเลวร้ายและได้เก็บตัวนายเกตส์ไว้
ในสถานที่ลับในระหว่างพิธีสาบานตนด้วย

บทความข่าวอ้างถ้อยแถลงของนายฮวน คาร์ลอส ซาราเต้ อดีตรองที่ปรึกษาด้านความมั่นคงแห่งชาติด้านลัทธิก่อการร้าย
ของอดีตประธานาธิบดีจอร์ช ดับเบิ้ลยู บุช ที่ว่า ข้อมูลทั้งหมดในช่วงนั้นบ่งชี้ว่ากำลังมีภัยคุกคามจากภายนอกประเทศจริงๆ
และนายจอห์น เบรนแนน ที่ปรึกษาด้านต่อต้านการก่อการร้ายของนายโอบาม่าก็เปิดเผยกับ "เดอะ ไทมส์"
ว่ายิ่งวันงานใกล้เข้ามา แผนการยิ่งดูน่าเชื่อถือและสอดคล้องกัน ซึ่งเขาสงสัยว่าเป็นแผนการทำลายชื่อเสียง
โดยกลุ่มนักรบที่เปิดเผยข้อมูลเพื่อให้เกิดผลเสียต่อกลุ่มศัตรู ทั้งนี้ "เดอะ ไทมส์" อ้างถ้อยแถลงของบรรดาเจ้าหน้าที่ด้วยว่า
ภายใน 72 ชั่วโมงหลังมีการเปิดเผยแผนการนี้ ก็มีการประกาศว่าเป็นการแจ้งเตือนที่ผิดพลาด

[Unknown]

Context of '1980-1989: CIA and British Train Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and Help Arm Bin Laden'

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1980-1989: CIA and British Train Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and Help Arm Bin Laden.
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1980-1989: CIA and British Train Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and Help Arm Bin Laden

Fearing a diplomatic incident, CIA and other US agents rarely venture into Afghanistan.
Generally speaking, soldiers from the British elite Special Air Service (SAS) work with
and train the mujaheddin instead. The SAS provides weapons training in Afghanistan until 1982
when Russian soldiers find the passports of two British instructors in a training camp.
After that, mujaheddin are trained in secret camps in remote parts of Scotland.
When the US decides to supply Stinger missiles to the mujaheddin in 1986,
it is the SAS who provide the training in how to use them (see September 1986).
But the SAS is taking orders from the CIA. The CIA also indirectly gives weapons to Osama bin Laden
and other mujaheddin leaders. One former US intelligence official will say in 1999, “[US agents] armed
[bin Laden’s] men by letting him pay rock-bottom prices for basic weapons.”
But this person notes the relationship will later prove to be embarrassing to bin Laden and the CIA.
“Of course it’s not something they want to talk about.” [Reeve, 1999, pp. 168]

Early 1983-Late 1984: Afghan Arab Purchases Equipment for Mujaheddin in US and Britain

After being recruited by Abdullah Azzam, an Arab Afghan leader and Osama bin Laden’s mentor,
Essam al Ridi travels to Pakistan to join the mujaheddin fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
He works for the mujaheddin for about 18 months, mostly as a purchaser of equipment abroad.
He buys two sets of scuba diving equipment and six range finders in Britain, as well as night vision goggles
and six night vision scopes from the US. He also purchases video equipment and batteries,
and acquires equipment in Japan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Al Ridi will later say, as a witness in a US trial,
that he travels “extensively almost every 15 days to 20 days” and that he has so many stamps his passport
is nearly full by 1985. Al Ridi leaves Asia to return to the US in late 1984 or early 1985, apparently due to
an argument about Osama bin Laden’s role in the jihad, but he will continue to send equipment to the mujaheddin.
For example, he will later purchase assassination rifles for the jihad, apparently with the CIA’s knowledge,
but it is unclear whether the CIA knows about these earlier transactions (see Early 1989).
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001]

1984: Bin Laden and Other Mujaheddin Leaders Meet Mysterious Europeans in Pakistan

Osama bin Laden, his mentor Abdullah Azzam, and Afghan warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf meet two
unnamed men in Peshawar, Pakistan. The two men are “supposed to be from somewhere in Europe”
and cannot speak Arabic.As a result, Essam al Ridi, an Egyptian who has lived in the US,
attends the meeting as a translator. Al Ridi will later say that the two men speak English “with an accent”
and that he was invited to the meeting to translate between the men on the one hand and Sayyaf and
Azzam on the other, indicating that bin Laden did not need a translator and could speak English.
This is the first of several meetings between bin Laden and al Ridi, who purchases equipment for
anti-Soviet fighters (see Early 1983-Late 1984 and Early 1989).
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001]

Mid-1980s: US Officials Allegedly Meet Directly with Bin Laden

Journalist Simon Reeve will claim in the 1999 book The New Jackals that US officials directly met with
bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s. He will write, “American emissaries are understood to have traveled to
Pakistan for meetings with mujaheddin leaders… [A former CIA official] even suggests the US emissaries met directly
with bin Laden, and that it was bin Laden, acting on advice from his friends in Saudi intelligence,
who first suggested the mujaheddin should be given Stingers.” [Reeve, 1999, pp. 167, 176]
The CIA begins supplying Stinger missiles to the mujaheddin in 1986 (see September 1986).
After 9/11, the CIA will state, “Numerous comments in the media recently have reiterated a widely circulated
but incorrect notion that the CIA once had a relationship with Osama bin Laden.
For the record, you should know that the CIA never employed, paid, or maintained
any relationship whatsoever with bin Laden.” [US State Department, 1/14/2005]

1986-October 1999: New Jersey Firm Investors List Is ‘Who’s Who of Designated Terrorists’


Soliman Biheiri. [Source: US Immigrations and Customs]

BMI Inc., a real estate investment firm based in Secaucus, New Jersey, is formed in 1986.
Former counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will state in 2003, “While BMI [has] held itself out publicly as
a financial services provider for Muslims in the United States, its investor list suggests the possibility
this facade was just a cover to conceal terrorist support. BMI’s investor list reads like a who’s who of designated
terrorists and Islamic extremists.” Investors in BMI include: [US Congress, 10/22/2003]

Soliman Biheiri. He is the head of BMI for the duration of the company’s existence. US prosecutors will later
call him the US banker for the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Egyptian militant group. Biheiri’s computer will
eventually be searched and found to have contact information for Ghaleb Himmat and Youssef Nada,
leaders of the Al Taqwa Bank, which is founded two years after BMI (see 1988).
After 9/11, the US and UN will designate both Himmat and Nada and the Al Taqwa Bank as terrorist financiers,
and the bank will be shut down (see November 7, 2001). US prosecutors say there are other ties between
BMI and Al Taqwa, including financial transactions. Biheiri also has close ties with Yousuf Abdullah Al-Qaradawi.
Qaradawi is said to be a high-ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a shareholder in Al Taqwa,
and has made statements supporting suicide bombings against Israel. In 2003, US investigators will accuse Biheiri of ties
to terrorist financing. He will be convicted of immigration violations and lying to a federal agent (see June 15, 2003).
[Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003; Forward, 10/17/2003] Biheiri will be convicted of immigration fraud in 2003
and then convicted of lying to federal investigators in 2004 (see June 15, 2003).

Abdullah Awad bin Laden, a nephew of Osama bin Laden. He invests about a half-million dollars in
BMI real estate ventures, earning a profit of $70,000. For most of the 1990s he runs the US branch of a Saudi charity called
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). He is investigated by the FBI in 1996 (see February-September 11, 1996),
and WAMY will be raided by US agents in 2004 (see June 1, 2004). The raid is apparently part of a larger investigation
into terrorism financing. In 2001, at least two of the 9/11 hijackers will live three blocks away from the WAMY office
(see March 2001 and After). [Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003; Washington Post, 4/19/2004]

Nur and Iman bin Laden, two female relatives of Osama bin Laden. Abdullah Awad bin Laden will invest some of
their money in a BMI real estate project. While their bin Laden family ties are intriguing, neither have been accused of
any knowing connections to terrorist financing. [Washington Post, 4/19/2004]

Mousa Abu Marzouk. He has identified himself as a top leader of Hamas. The US declares him a terrorist in 1995
(see July 5, 1995-May 1997). BMI makes at least two transactions with Marzouk after he is declared a terrorist.
[Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003]

Yassin al-Qadi, a Saudi multimillionaire. His lawyers will later claim he has no terrorism ties and had only
a passing involvement with BMI and liquidated his investment in it in 1996. However, another company operating
from the same office as BMI is called Kadi International Inc. and lists its president as al-Qadi. Al-Qadi is also
a major investor in the suspect computer company Ptech (see 1994; 1999-After October 12, 2001).
Al-Qadi and BMI head Biheiri have financial dealings with Yaqub Mirza, a Pakistani who manages a group of
Islamic charities in Virginia known as the SAAR network (see July 29, 1983). These charities will be raided in March 2002
on suspicions of terrorism ties (see March 20, 2002). Shortly after 9/11, the US will officially declare al-Qadi
a terrorist financier (see October 12, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003]

Saleh Kamel. BMI allegedly receives a $500,000 investment from the Dallah Al-Baraka banking conglomerate,
which is headed by Kamel. For many years before 9/11, Omar al-Bayoumi, an associate of 9/11 hijackers
Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, will receive a salary from Dallah, despite apparently doing no work.
Some will accuse al-Bayoumi of involvement in funding the 9/11 plot, but that remains to been proven
(see August 1994-July 2001). Kamel reportedly founded a Sudanese Islamic bank which housed accounts
for senior al-Qaeda operatives. He is a multi-billionaire heavily involved in promoting Islam, and his name appears
on the Golden Chain, a list of early al-Qaeda supporters (see 1988-1989). He denies supporting terrorism.
[US Congress, 10/22/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/21/2004]

The Kuwait Finance House. According to Clarke, this organization is alleged to be a BMI investor and
the “financial arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. Several al-Qaeda operatives have allegedly been associated
with the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Suliman abu Ghaith, Wadih El-Hage,
and Ramzi Yousef.” In 2003, an apparent successor entity to the Kuwait Finance House will be designated
as a terrorist entity by the US. A lawyer for the Kuwait Finance House will later say the bank has never let its
accounts be used for terrorism. [Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003; US Congress, 10/22/2003; Wall Street Journal, 4/20/2005]

Tarek Swaidan. He is a Kuwaiti, an associate of al-Qadi, and a leading member of the Kuwaiti branch of
the Muslim Brotherhood. It is unknown if he has made any denials about his alleged associations.
[Wall Street Journal, 9/15/2003]

Abdurahman Alamoudi. For many years he runs the American Muslim Council, a lobby group founded by
a top Muslim Brotherhood figure. US prosecutors say he also is in the Brotherhood, and has alleged ties to Hamas.
In 2004, the US will sentence him to 23 years in prison for illegal dealings with Libya (see October 15, 2004).
[Wall Street Journal, 6/21/2004; Washington Post, 10/16/2004]

The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League, closely connected Saudi charities
suspected of financing terrorism. They give BMI $3.7 million out of a $10 million endowment from unknown Saudi donors.
The Financial Times will later note, “While it is not clear whether that money came from the Saudi government, [a 2003]
affidavit quotes a CIA report that says the Muslim World League ‘is largely financed by the government of Saudi Arabia.’”
Both organizations consistently deny any support of terrorism financing, but in early 2006 it will be reported that
US officials continue to suspect them of such support (see January 15, 2006). [Financial Times, 8/21/2003]
In 1992, a branch of the IIRO gives $2.1 million to BMI Inc. to invest in real estate. The money disappears from BMI’s books.
In October 1999, BMI goes defunct after it is unable to repay this money to the IIRO branch. The IIRO branch gives BMI
the rest of the $3.7 million between 1992 and 1998. BMI will use the money to buy real estate (see 1992).
Eventually, some of this money will be given to Hamas operatives in the West Bank and spent on violent actions against
Israel. This will eventually lead to legal action in the US and a seizure of some of the money.
[Wall Street Journal, 11/26/2002; Washington Post, 8/20/2003; Washington Times, 3/26/2004; Washington Post, 4/19/2004]
By 1992, BMI has projected revenues in excess of $25 million, based largely on their real estate investments in the US.
[US Congress, 10/22/2003] In early 1999, months before BMI goes defunct, the FBI hears evidence potentially tying BMI
to the 1998 US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), but an investigation into this will not be pursued
(see Early 1999). It should be noted that BMI had many investors, and presumably most BMI investors would have
had no suspicions that their money might be used to fund terrorism or other types of violence.

September 1986: CIA Provides Afghan Rebels Stinger Missiles


Mujaheddin preparing to fire a stinger missile. [Source: National Geographic]

Worried that the Soviets are winning the war in Afghanistan, the US decides to train and arm the mujaheddin
with Stinger missiles. The Soviets are forced to stop using the attack helicopters that were being used to
devastating effect. Some claim the Stingers turn the tide of the war and lead directly to Soviet withdrawal.
Now the mujaheddin are better trained and armed than ever before. [Coll, 2004, pp. 11, 149-51; Clarke, 2004, pp. 48-50]
The British Special Air Service (SAS) train the mujaheddin in how to use the Stingers (see 1980-1989).

(Shortly After September 26, 1986): Bin Laden Associate Obtains Photos for CIA

Essam al Ridi, a US-based Muslim who supports the mujaheddin in the Soviet-Afghan War, helps the CIA
obtain photographs of a downed Russian helicopter, according to a statement al Ridi will later make to
the New York Times.
Al Ridi is an associate of leading Islamists Abdullah Azzam (see Early 1983-Late 1984 and Early 1989)
and Osama bin Laden (see 1984 and Early 1993), and helps them purchase weapons. Al Ridi will help the FBI
after the 1998 African embassy bombings (see October 1998). [New York Times, 6/3/2002]
The CIA introduced stinger missiles into the war in late September 1986 to great effect against Soviet helicopters
(see September 1986). [Coll, 2004, pp. 149-151] Presumably therefore, the CIA is asking al Ridi to get photos of
a helicopter downed by a stinger shortly after they were introduced.

1987 or 1988: Arab Afghans Purchase Night Vision Goggles in US

Afghan Arab Essam al Ridi purchases more equipment in the US for the mujaheddin fighting against
the Soviets in Afghanistan. He had previously worked as a buyer for the mujaheddin, traveling the world to
acquire items for the anti-Soviet jihad (see Early 1983-Late 1984). However, in 1985 he fell out with the others over
Osama bin Laden’s influence in the movement, which he thought was excessive, and returned to
the US to work as a flight instructor. Al Ridi buys eleven pairs of night vision goggles and gives them to
Wadih El-Hage, who will later become Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary (see October 1995).
El-Hage takes them to Pakistan for use in his passenger luggage.
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001]
Al Ridi will later purchase assassination rifles for the fighters linked to bin Laden, apparently with the CIA’s knowledge,
but it is unclear whether the CIA knows about this transaction (see Early 1989).

Late 1980s: A. Q. Khan Supplies North Korea with Basic Technology for Nuclear Program

Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan supplies North Korea with some basic technology for its nuclear program.
The equipment is to be used for enriching uranium, but the Koreans are unable to make full use of the technology
as they do not have the technical expertise to master the process alone. This causes co-operation between
Pakistan and North Korea on nuclear matters to stall, until it is revived some years later
(see Late 1990 or After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 220]

December 2, 1988-August 6, 1990: Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto Pressured to Visit North Korea, but Refuses


Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto refuses to visit North Korea during her first term in office.
Bhutto will later say that she is pressured to go by her party, the Pakistan People’s Party, and there may be some link
to co-operation on the two countries’ nuclear programs (see Late 1980s). Bhutto resists the pressure for fear it will
generate adverse publicity in Western countries. However, Bhutto will go to North Korea in her second term in order to
facilitate nuclear proliferation (see December 29, 1993 and Shortly After). [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 244]

Early 1989: US Supplies Sniper Rifles to Bin Laden’s Mentor

The US government sends 25 high-powered sniper rifles to a group of fighters in Afghanistan that includes bin Laden.
The armor-piercing weapons have range-finding equipment and night-vision scopes. In an early 2001 US court trial,
Essam al Ridi, a pilot for bin Laden in the early 1990s (see Early 1993), will recall that he helped ship the weapons to
Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor. Azzam and bin Laden are close to each other at this time, and al Ridi will later
testify he sometimes saw the two of them together. The president of the US company that made the rifles will later state
that the rifles “were picked up by US government trucks, shipped to US government bases, and shipped to those
Afghan freedom fighters.” The rifles are considered ideal for assassination. [Associated Press, 10/16/2001]
The order, worth about $150,000 at the time, is a significant one for the manufacturer, accounting for 15-25%
of its annual turnover on the guns. Their export would usually require an end user certificate from
the US Department of State, but the circumstances of the sale are unknown, as al Ridi is not asked how he manages
to purchase such a large number of rifles. [New York Times, 10/7/2001; Sunday Tribune, 10/15/2001]
The CIA will deny being involved in the transfer. [Central Intelligence Agency, 3/7/2002] However,
al Ridi will say that the CIA was aware that bin Laden ended up with some of the guns. [New York Times, 6/3/2002]
This shipment is especially significant because there was a protracted debate within the Reagan administration
about sending sniper rifles to Afghanistan due to worries that it could violate a US law against assassinations
and put US officials in legal jeopardy. In the end, the US gave less than 100 of such rifles without night-vision scopes
to the government of Pakistan to pass on to mujaheddin, but the ones sent to Azzam had night-vision scopes.
The timing is also significant since theSoviet Union agreed to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in 1988 and
complete the pull out in February 1989, around when these rifles are sent. The rifles given to Pakistan appear
to have arrived before 1987. [Washington Post, 7/20/1992]

[Unknown]

Early 1990s: US Intelligence Uses Hi-Tech to Track Bin Laden

The National Imagery Office, which coordinates all US satellite activity, begins satellite surveillance of
bin Laden’s bases and training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan. Also, bin Laden’s voice print,
a computerized record of his voice is made from tapes of his speeches that were distributed in Saudi Arabia
around the time of the Gulf War. The NSA is able to use the voice print to scan satellite and cell phone calls
for a match. As a result, “on numerous occasions the NSA and CIA” are able to monitor bin Laden’s calls
even if he is not using his usual satellite phone. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 206]

Late 1990 or After: Pakistan Sends Stinger Missile to North Korea to Revive Cooperation

Pakistan sends a Stinger missile to North Korea. Pakistan obtained the Stinger from the US,
which provided them to Pakistani-backed rebels during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s (see September 1986).
The missile is partly intended as a gift for the North Koreans—an incentive for the revival of co-operation between
the two countries, which has been stalled for some time (see Late 1980s). In addition, the Stingers held by
Pakistan are becoming useless, because their batteries are failing, and the Pakistanis hope that the North Koreans
will be able to help them reverse engineer the batteries. The mission to North Korea is undertaken by ISI Director
Javed Nasir at the behest of Pakistani army chief Mirza Aslam Beg and nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan,
who will later become closely involved in co-operation with the North Koreans. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 220]

February 1991- July 1992: CIA Already Spying on Bin Laden in Sudan


Billy Waugh. [Source: Billy Waugh]

The CIA monitors bin Laden in Khartoum, Sudan, where he has just moved (see Summer 1991). Billy Waugh,
an independent contractor working for the CIA, moves to Khartoum and is given the task of spying on him.
Waugh is a legendary fighter already in his sixties who has performed special operations for the US Army
and CIA for many years and will continue to do so until he is in his seventies. The Associated Press will later
report that Waugh “played a typecast role as an aging American fitness enthusiast and would regularly jog past
bin Laden’s home. He said he often came face-to-face with bin Laden, who undoubtedly knew the CIA was tailing him.
Neither said anything, but Waugh recalled exchanging pleasantries with bin Laden’s Afghan guards.”
[Waugh and Keown, 2004, pp. 121; Associated Press, 6/4/2005] Waugh will later recall, “I was on a tracking team
in Sudan keeping track of [bin Laden] in his early days as a possible terrorist network leader. Our CIA Chief of Station
there told me upon arrival that [he] was one of our targets, that he was a wealthy Saudi financier and possible supporter
of the terrorist outfit called al-Qaeda. He ran companies there and even owned an entire street block in the al-Riyadh
section of the city.… At the time of our surveillance operations against him in 1991-92, [he] was not a particularly
high priority, though evidence was gathering about him. At the time, it would have been very easy to take him out.”
Waugh also claims that he saw bin Laden “in the mountains of the Pakistan/Afghanistan border in the late 1980’s
when we were training the [mujaheddin] resistance.”
[Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, 6/2005]

March 1991: FBI Begins Investigating Bin Laden’s Future Personal Secretary



Wadih El-Hage’s US passport. His face is overly dark due to a poor photocopy.
[Source: US Justice Department] (click image to enlarge)

The FBI begins to investigate Wadih El-Hage, who will soon work as bin Laden’s personal secretary.
The FBI is investigating the February 1991 murder of Mustafa Shalabi (see (February 28, 1991)),
the head of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, a charity with ties to both bin Laden and the CIA. El-Hage,
a US citizen living in Texas, came to New York to briefly run Al-Kifah so Shalabi could take a trip overseas,
and happened to arrive the same day that Shalabi was murdered. Investigators find a message from
El-Hage on Shalabi’s answer machine.They learn El-Hage had been connected to the 1989 murder of an imam
in Tucson, Arizona. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 148-149; Lance, 2006, pp. 67-68] Further,
he visited El Sayyid Nosair, who assassinated Meir Kahane the year before (see November 5, 1990), in prison,
and left his name in the visitor’s log. [Lance, 2003, pp. 50-51] However, the FBI decides there is not enough evidence
to charge El-Hage with any crime. They lose track of him in early 1992, when he moves to Sudan and begins working
there as bin Laden’s primary personal secretary. He will help bin Laden run many of his businesses, and will
frequently take international trips on bin Laden’s behalf. [PBS Frontline, 4/1999; New York Times, 1/22/2000]

Early 1990s: US Intelligence Monitoring Bin Laden in Sudan


Bin Laden’s house in Khartoum, Sudan. [Source: PBS]

It has not been revealed when US intelligence begins monitoring bin Laden exactly, though the CIA was tailing him
in Sudan by the end of 1991 (see February 1991- July 1992). But in late 1995 the FBI is given forty thick files on bin Laden
from the CIA and NSA, mostly communications intercepts (see October 1995). The sheer amount of material suggests
the surveillance had been going on for several years. Dan Coleman, an FBI agent working with the CIA’s bin Laden unit,
will begin examining these files and finds that many of them are transcripts from wiretapped phones tied to
bin Laden’s businesses in Khartoum, Sudan, where bin Laden lives from 1991 to 1996.
[Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 148-149; Wright, 2006, pp. 242-244]
CIA Director George Tenet will later comment, “The then-obscure name ‘Osama bin Laden’ kept cropping up
in the intelligence traffic.… [The CIA] spotted bin Laden’s tracts in the early 1990s in connection with funding
other terrorist movements. They didn’t know exactly what this Saudi exile living in Sudan was up to,
but they knew it was not good.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 100] The London Times will later report that in Sudan,
“bin Laden used an $80,000 satellite phone and al-Qaeda members used radios to avoid being bugged…”
[London Times, 10/7/2001] Bin Laden is mistaken in his belief that satellite phones cannot be monitored;
a satellite phone he buys in 1996 will be monitored as well (see November 1996-Late August 1998).

August 1992-1993: El-Hage and US Associate Discuss Purchase of Aircraft for Bin Laden; Stingers Discussed Openly on Phone

High-ranking al-Qaeda operative Wadih El-Hage contacts Essam al Ridi, a militant who had previously helped
the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan (see Early 1983-Late 1984), to discuss buying a jet plane for Osama bin Laden.
El Hage is at bin Laden’s base in Sudan, and al Ridi is in Texas, where he works as a flight instructor. The two men know
each other from the 1980s, when they shipped equipment from the US to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan
(see 1987 or 1988). The FBI has been aware of El-Hage’s terrorist connections for some time (see March 1991),
and the CIA is monitoring bin Laden in Sudan (see February 1991- July 1992). There are “quite a few” communications,
in which the two men discuss the price of the aircraft, the fact that the plane is for bin Laden, and the plane’s range.
El-Hage says that the plane has to be able to fly 2,000 miles, as he and bin Laden want to use it to ship Stinger missiles
from Peshawar, Pakistan, to Khartoum, Sudan, and al Ridi and El-Hage discuss the technicalities of shipping the missiles.
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001] Bin Laden sends money for the plane
to al Ridi in the US (see Between August 1992 and 1993), and al Ridi then buys the plane and flies it to Sudan
(see Early 1993). It is unclear if these calls are monitored, although bin Laden is under surveillance by
the US at this time (see Early 1990s and Early 1990s).

Late 1992-October 1993: Al-Qaeda Operatives Train Somali Militants to Fight US Soldiers

Al-Qaeda operatives train militants in Somalia to attack US soldiers who have recently been posted there.
This training will culminate in a battle on October 3-4, 1993, in which 18 US soldiers are killed (see October 3-4, 1993).
[Reeve, 1999, pp. 182; Piszkiewicz, 2003, pp. 100] In the months before this battle, various al-Qaeda operatives come
and go, occasionally training Somalis. It is unknown if any operatives are directly involved in the battle.
Operatives involved in the training include:

Maulana Masood Azhar, who is a Pakistani militant leader connected with Osama bin Laden.
He appears to serve as a key link between bin Laden and the Somali killers of US soldiers (see 1993).
[Los Angeles Times, 2/25/2002]
Ali Mohamed, the notorious double agent, apparently helps train the Somalis involved in the attack (see 1993).
Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, al-Qaeda’s military commander, who is one of the leaders of the operation.
[Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 77]
Mohammed Atef, al-Qaeda’s deputy military commander. An informant will later testify in an early 2001 US trial
that he flew Atef and four others from bin Laden’s base in Sudan to Nairobi, Kenya, to train Somalis
(see Before October 1993). [New York Times, 6/3/2002]
Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, who will later be convicted for a role in the 1998 US embassy bombings,
will boast that he provided the rocket launchers and rifles that brought down the helicopters.
[Washington Post, 11/23/1998; Lance, 2006, pp. 143] Odeh will later say that he is ordered to Somalia
by Saif al Adel, acting for bin Laden. [Bergen, 2006, pp. 138-139]
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Haroun Fazul), who will also be convicted for the embassy bombings,
trains militants in Somalia with Odeh. [Washington Post, 11/23/1998]
Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, who will be connected to the embassy bombings and will still be at large in 2007,
is linked to the helicopter incident as well. [Lance, 2006, pp. 143]
Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, who will also be connected to the embassy bombings,
will be killed in Pakistan in 2006 (see April 12, 2006). [CNN, 10/24/2006]
Saif al-Islam al-Masri, a member of al-Qaeda’s ruling council. He will be captured in the country of Georgia in 2002
(see Early October 2002).
Abu Talha al-Sudani, an al-Qaeda leader who settles in Somalia and remains there. He will reportedly be killed in Somalia
in 2007 (see December 24, 2006-January 2007). [Washington Post, 1/8/2007] Bin Laden dispatches a total of five groups,
some of them trained by Ali Mohamed. [Lance, 2006, pp. 142] Atef reaches an agreement with one of the warlords,
General Mohamed Farah Aideed, that bin Laden’s men will help him against the US and UN forces.
These trips to Somalia will later be confirmed by L’Houssaine Kherchtou, testifying at the East African embassy
bombings trial in 2001. Kherchtou will say that he met “many people” going to Somalia and facilitated their travel there
from Nairobi, Kenya. [Bergen, 2006, pp. 138-139, 141]

Early 1993: Bin Laden Buys Airplane in US to Help Kill US Soldiers


Essam al Ridi. [Source: CNN]

Osama bin Laden buys a US military aircraft in Arizona, paying about $210,000 for a converted Saber-40.
The transaction is arranged through Wadih El-Hage, a bin Laden employee in Sudan, and Essam al Ridi,
a US-based helper for radical Islamists. Before the purchase is made, the two men discuss the transaction
on the phone (see August 1992-1993) and El-Hage sends money to al Ridi, who had learned to fly in the US
(see Between August 1992 and 1993). Bin Laden apparently wants to use the plane to transport stinger missiles
from Pakistan to Sudan, but it is unclear whether it is ever actually used to do this. After modifying the plane,
al Ridi flies it from the US to Khartoum, Sudan, where he meets El-Hage, bin Laden, al-Qaeda leader
Mohammed Atef, and others. They have dinner, where al Ridi also sees “quite a few” AK 47s,
and men in Sudanese military uniforms. Al Ridi also visits bin Laden at the offices of one of his companies,
Wadi al Aqiq, and bin Laden offers him a job as a pilot, spraying crops and then shipping them to other countries.
However, al Ridi, who argued with bin Laden during the Soviet-Afghan war, rejects the offer,
saying bin Laden is not offering him enough money.
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001; Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 9/16/2001;
Washington Post, 5/19/2002] The plane will later be used to transport bin Laden operatives on a trip to Somalia
before the “Black Hawk Down” incident (see Before October 1993), but al Ridi will later crash it (see (1994-1995)).

Summer 1993: WTC Bomber Gives Up Names of Future Embassy Bombers, US Turns Down Deal for More Information


Mahmud Abouhalima. [Source: Agence France-Presse]

Mahmud Abouhalima is arrested for his role in the February 1993 WTC bombing. He meets with US investigators
without his lawyer and provides a detailed account of the Al-Kifah Refugee Center, bin Laden’s main support base
in the US in the early 1990s. He says that twice he turned to a Texas acquaintance named Wadih El-Hage to
buy weapons for his associates. El-Hage, who turns out to be bin Laden’s personal secretary (see September 15, 1998),
will later be caught and convicted of bombing the US embassies in Africa in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
Abouhalima further recounts fighting in Afghanistan with the mujaheddin in the 1980s and tells of travelling to
training camps with a Palestinian man named Mohammed Odeh. A Palestinian man with the name
Mohammed Saddiq Odeh will later be convicted of a role in the 1998 embassy bombings as well.
Abouhalima offers additional inside information about the bomb plot and his associates in exchange for
a lighter sentence. But, as the New York Times will later note, prosecutors turn down the offer
“for reasons that remain unclear.” Abouhalima is later found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.
[New York Times, 10/22/1998]

June 16, 1993: Ali Mohamed Detained in Vancouver; FBI Tells Canadian Authorities He Is an FBI Informant

US-al-Qaeda double agent Ali Mohamed is detained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Vancouver,
British Columbia, after attempting to pick up a man named Essam Marzouk, who is carrying numerous false passports.
They identify Mohamed as a top al-Qaeda operative. Mohamed admits to them that he traveled to Vancouver to help
Marzouk sneak into the US and admits working closely with bin Laden. [San Francisco Chronicle, 11/4/2001;
Globe and Mail, 11/22/2001; Wall Street Journal, 11/26/2001] After many hours of questioning, Mohamed tells
the Canadian officials to call John Zent, his handler at the FBI. Zent confirms that Mohamed works for the FBI
and asks them to release him. They do. [Lance, 2006, pp. 124] Mohamed is accompanied by fellow al-Qaeda operative
Khaled Abu el-Dahab (see 1987-1998), who brings $3,000 sent by bin Laden to pay for Marzouk’s bail. Marzouk
had run one of bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan and was an active member of the al-Qaeda allied group
Islamic Jihad at the time. However, Canadian intelligence apparently is not aware of his past. Marzouk will spend
almost a year in detention. But then, again with the help of another visit to Canada by Mohamed, Marzouk will be
released and allowed to live in Canada (see June 16, 1993-February 1998). He later will help train the bombers of
the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [Globe and Mail, 11/22/2001;
National Post, 11/26/2005] Jack Cloonan, an FBI agent who later investigates Mohamed, will later say,
“I don’t think you have to be an agent who has worked terrorism all your life to realize something is terribly amiss here.
What was the follow up? It just sort of seems like [this incident] dies.” [Lance, 2006, pp. 125]



Essam Marzouk. [Source: FBI]

Before October 1993: Al-Qaeda Leaders Travel to Somalia from Monitored Base in Sudan

Al-Qaeda leaders travel from Khartoum, Sudan, to Mogadishu, Somalia, while US forces are present there.
These forces will be attacked shortly afterwards in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident (see October 3-4, 1993).
This is only one of several trips to Somalia at this time (see Late 1992-October 1993). Details of Trip-
The names of all five operatives who travel are not known, but one of them is Mohammed Atef (a.k.a. Abu Hafs),
who will later become al-Qaeda’s military commander. According to Essam al Ridi, the pilot who flies them on
the first leg of the journey to Nairobi, Kenya, they are dressed in Saudi, Western, and Yemeni outfits.
The trip from Khartoum to Nairobi is arranged by an associate of Osama bin Laden’s named Wadih El-Hage,
and the five men continue from Nairobi to Mogadishu in a different aircraft.
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001;
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 5/8/2001]
Al Ridi will later say that at some time after the flight he heard the men had gone to Somalia to stir up tribal leaders
against American peacekeeping forces. [New York Times, 6/3/2002] Surveillance - Bin Laden and his associates
are under surveillance in Sudan at this time, by the CIA and Egyptian intelligence (see February 1991- July 1992
and Early 1990s), and the plane used to make the trip to Nairobi is well-known at Khartoum airport and is associated
with bin Laden (see (1994-1995)), so the CIA and Egyptians may learn of this trip. However, what action they take,
if any, is not known. [United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001;
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 5/8/2001]
In addition, Sudanese intelligence will later say that only a handful of al-Qaeda operatives travel to Somalia
at this time, although it is not known when and how the Sudanese obtain this information. [Wright, 2006, pp. 188]

October 3-4, 1993: Al-Qaeda Trained Militants in Somalia Kill 18 US Soldiers


A UN vehicle burning in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3, 1993. [Source: CNN]

Eighteen US soldiers are killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, in a spontaneous gun battle following an attempt by
US Army Rangers and Delta Force to snatch two assistants of a local warlord; the event later becomes the subject of
the movie Black Hawk Down. A 1998 US indictment will charge Osama bin Laden and his followers with
training the attackers. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002] Rocket Propelled Grenades - While rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)
are not usually effective against helicopters, the fuses on the RPGs fired by the Somalis against US helicopters
are modified so that they explode in midair. During the Soviet-Afghan War, bin Laden associates had learned from
the US and British that, although it is hard to score a direct hit on a helicopter’s weak point—its tail rotor—
a grenade on an adjusted fuse exploding in midair can spray a tail rotor with shrapnel, causing a helicopter to crash.
[Los Angeles Times, 2/25/2002] Possibly Trained by Al-Qaeda - For months, many al-Qaeda operatives had been
traveling to Somalia and training militants in an effort to oppose the presence of US soldiers there.
Even high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders like Mohammed Atef were directly involved (see Late 1992-October 1993).
Comment by Bin Laden - In a March 1997 interview, bin Laden will say of the Somalia attack,
“With Allah’s grace, Muslims over there cooperated with some Arab mujaheddin who were in Afghanistan…
against the American occupation troops and killed large numbers of them.” [CNN, 4/20/2001]
Some Al-Qaeda Operatives Leave Somalia after Battle - Al-Qaeda operative L’Houssaine Kherchtou,
who supports the organization’s operations in Somalia, will later say that he was told this event also led at least
some al-Qaeda members to flee Somalia. “They told me that they were in a house in Mogadishu and one of
the nights one of the helicopters were shot, they heard some shooting in the next house where they were living,
and they were scared, and the next day they left because they were afraid that they will be caught by the Americans.”
[Bergen, 2006, pp. 141]

December 29, 1993 and Shortly After: Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto Visits North Korea at Behest of A. Q. Khan

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visits North Korea after being asked to do so by nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan
to help co-operation between the two countries on nuclear weapons and delivery systems
(see Shortly Before December 29, 1993 and Shortly Before December 29, 1993).
Speech
- At a formal dinner with North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung,

Bhutto says: “Nuclear non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext for preventing states from exercising
fully their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes geared to their economic
and social development.”
She adds: “Pakistan is committed to nuclear non-proliferation both at the global and regional level.
It is not fair to cast doubts on Pakistan’s interests and to subject Pakistan to discriminatory treatment.”
Deal - Bhutto then asks Kim for blueprints for missiles that can deliver Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
in a potential strike on India. Kim is surprised, but Bhutto emphasizes that “We need those missiles.”
Kim agrees and proposes setting up technical teams, giving her information on computer discs to take home
with her the next day.

Something More? - However, Bhutto will later remark: “They gave me a bag of materials. Kim said the teams
each side selected would do the deal, whatever the deal was to be. I really had little idea of what they were discussing.
I did wonder, though. Was it only missiles? They said it was to be a cash deal.” Bhutto will also say that
General Khawaja Ziauddin, a close associate of Khan, was in charge of the deal for the Pakistanis.

Framed?
- When Bhutto returns to Pakistan, she meets with one of her aides, Husein Haqqani,
and shows him the bag of materials. Haqqani will later comment: “They could have been anything.
It horrified me and I said so. She sensed then that the military had framed her. Her fingerprints were
all over whatever their plan was for North Korea.” Bhutto gives the bag to Ziauddin, but will later say:
“As far as I knew, the deal involved buying No-dong missiles for cash. But when I requested more information,
the military clammed up.” After this trip, Bhutto is apparently not closely involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program
and is even unable to obtain information about its budget. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 247-249]

(1994-1995): Crash of Bin Laden’s Plane in Khartoum Is Major Local Event

Essam al Ridi, an associate of Osama bin Laden who previously purchased an aircraft for him (see Early 1993),
is asked to sell the aircraft by Wadih El-Hage, another bin Laden associate. Al Ridi, who obtains US citizenship in 1994,
agrees to check the plane out and try to sell it in Egypt, where he is living at the moment. Al Ridi goes to examine
the plane, which is in Khartoum, Sudan. He travels through Nairobi, Kenya, because he is worried about surveillance
by Egyptian intelligence, and meets El-Hage, who is now living in Nairobi. Upon arrival in Khartoum, El-Hage is met
by Ihab Ali Nawawi, another bin Laden operative and US-trained pilot. They find that the plane is in poor condition,
and try to repair it. However, both sets of brakes fail upon landing after a test flight and the plane crashes into
a sandbank near the runway. The accident is noticed by the tower and “everybody else,” and is a major event
because, as al Ridi will later say in court: “[T]his aircraft was very unique to Khartoum. There is no such private jet
aircraft at Khartoum International Airport.” Al Ridi is extremely concerned because of bin Laden’s notoriety and
because “[e]verybody knows that it is Osama bin Laden’s aircraft.” He knows Egyptian intelligence in Khartoum
will soon find out about the incident and will then come looking for him, so he is “very concerned to leave,”
and he takes the first plane out of the country.
[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001]
The CIA has been monitoring bin Laden in Sudan since he moved there in 1991 (see February 1991- July 1992
and Early 1990s), and it would make sense that the CIA would learn of the accident due to the plane’s known
ownership by bin Laden. However, it is unclear if they do so and what action they take based on it, if any.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, al Ridi had supplied bin Laden with assassination rifles in Afghanistan,
and later said that the CIA was aware of this transaction (see Early 1989).

1995: US Army Explosives Supposedly Handed to Future Embassy Bombers

According to Le Figaro, in the wake of the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), FBI investigators will discover that the explosives used in the bombings
came from the US Army. These explosives are delivered this year to mujaheddin. It has not been reported
who exactly gave the explosives to whom, nor for what use they were originally intended. Double agent Ali Mohamed
was in the Army Reserves until about this year and had a history of stealing from the Army, but it is not known if he
was involved in this incident. [Le Figaro (Paris), 10/31/2001]

October 1995: FBI Begins Investigating Bin Laden; CIA Already Monitoring Him

The FBI opens a case on bin Laden. Dan Coleman and John Ligouri, members of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF), are sent to the CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to see what the CIA knows about bin Laden.
“They were amazed by the amount of material - some forty thick files’ worth - that they found.…
Most of the information consisted of raw, unfocused data: itineraries, phone records, associates lists,
investment holdings, bank transfers.” The vast majority of the data comes from NSA electronic eavesdropping
and most of it has not been properly analyzed (see Early 1990s). They find that the CTC has been conducting
a vigorous investigation on Wadih El-Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary.
[Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 148-149] Coleman will go on to become the FBI’s biggest expert on bin Laden
and will help start the bureau’s bin Laden unit. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 90] It is not known when the CIA or NSA
began monitoring bin Laden or El-Hage.

[Unknown]

January 1996: CIA Report Exposes Militant Charity Fronts in Bosnia; Ties to Saudi Arabia and Other Governments Discovered


International Islamic Relief Organization logo.
[Source: International Islamic Relief Organization]

The CIA creates a report for the State Department detailing support for terrorism
from prominent Islamic charities.
The report, completed just as the Bosnian war is winding down, focuses on charity fronts
that have helped the mujaheddin in Bosnia. It concludes that of more than 50 Islamic
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
in existence, “available information indicates that approximately one-third…
support terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections.”
The report notes that most of the offices of NGOs active in Bosnia are located in Zagreb,
Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla. There are coordination councils there organizing the work of the charity fronts.
The report notes that some charities may be “backed by powerful interest groups,” including governments.
“We continue to have evidence that even high ranking members of the collecting or monitoring agencies
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan - such as the Saudi High Commission - are involved in illicit activities,
including support for terrorists.”
The Wall Street Journal will later comment, “Disclosure of the report may raise new questions
about whether enough was done to cut off support for terrorism before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001…
and about possible involvement in terrorism by Saudi Arabian officials.”
[Central Intelligence Agency, 1/1996; Wall Street Journal, 5/9/2003]
The below list of organizations paraphrases or quotes the report,
except for informational asides in parentheses.

The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). “The IIRO is affiliated with the Muslim World League,
a major international organization largely financed by the government of Saudi Arabia.”
The IIRO has funded Hamas, Algerian radicals, Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (a.k.a. the Islamic Group,
an Egyptian radical militant group led by Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman), Ramzi Yousef, and six militant training camps
in Afghanistan.
“The former head of the IIRO office in the Philippines, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, has been linked to
Manila-based plots to target the Pope and US airlines; his brother-in-law is Osama bin Laden.”
Al Haramain Islamic Foundation. It has connections to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and helps support
the mujaheddin battalion in Zenica. Their offices have been connected to smuggling, drug running,
and prostitution.
Human Concern International, headquartered in Canada. Its Swedish branch is said to be
smuggling weapons to Bosnia.
It is claimed “the entire Peshawar office is made up of [Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya] members.”
The head of its Pakistan office (Ahmed Said Khadr) was arrested recently for a role in the bombing
of the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan (see November 19, 1995). (It will later be discovered that Khadr
is a founder and major leader of al-Qaeda
(see Summer 2001 and January 1996-September 10, 2001).)
Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). Headquartered in Sudan, it has ties to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya.
“The regional director of the organization, Elfatih Hassanein, is the most influential [charity] official in Bosnia.
He is a major arms supplier to the government, according toclandestine and press reporting, and was forced to
relocate his office from Zagreb in 1994 after his weapons smuggling operations were exposed.
According to a foreign government service, Hassanein supports US Muslim extremists in Bosnia.”
One TWRA employee alleged to also be a member of Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya carried out a suicide car bombing
in Rijeka, Croatia (see October 20, 1995).
The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA). Based in Sudan, it has offices in 30 countries. It is said to be
controlled by Sudan’s ruling party and gives weapons to the Bosnian military in concert with the TWRA.
(The US government will give the IARA $4 million in aid in 1998 (see February 19, 2000).)
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) (the report refers to it by an alternate name, Lajnat al-Birr al-Islamiyya
(LBI)).
It supports mujaheddin in Bosnia. It mentions “one Zagreb employee, identified as Syrian-born US citizen
Abu Mahmud,”
as involved in a kidnapping in Pakistan (see July 4, 1995). [Central Intelligence Agency, 1/1996]
(This is a known alias (Abu Mahmoud al Suri) for Enaam Arnaout, the head of BIF’s US office.)
[USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, 10/6/2003, pp. 37 ]
This person “matches the description… of a man who was allegedly involved in the kidnapping of six Westerners
in Kashmir in July 1995, and who left Pakistan in early October for Bosnia via the United States.”
Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), a.k.a. Al-Kifah. This group has ties to Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden,
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and possibly Hezbollah. Both the former director of its Zagreb office
[Kamer Eddine Kherbane] and his deputy [Hassan Hakim] were senior members of Algerian extremist groups.
Its main office in Peshawar, Pakistan, funds at least nine training camps in Afghanistan.
“The press has reported that some employees of MAK’s New York branch were involved in
the World Trade Center bombing [in 1993].” (Indeed, the New York branch, known as the Al-Kifah Refugee Center,
is closely linked to the WTC bombing and the CIA used it as a conduit to send money to Afghanistan
(see January 24, 1994).
Muwafaq Foundation. Registered in Britain but based in Sudan, it has many offices in Bosnia.
It has ties to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and “helps fund the Egyptian Mujahedin Battalion in Bosnia”
and “at least one training camp in Afghanistan” (see 1991-1995).
Qatar Charitable Society, based in Qatar. It has possible ties to Hamas and Algerian militants.
A staff member in Qatar is known to be a Hamas operative who has been monitored discussing
militant operations. (An al-Qaeda defector will later reveal that in 1993 he was told this was one
of al-Qaeda’s three most important charity fronts (see 1993)).
Red Crescent (Iran branch). Linked to the Iranian government, it is “Often used by the Iranian
[intelligence agency] as cover for intelligence officers, agents, and arms shipments.”
Saudi High Commission. “The official Saudi government organization for collecting and disbursing
humanitarian aid.” Some members possibly have ties to Hamas and Algerian militants (see 1996 and After).
Other organizations mentioned are the Foundation for Human Rights, Liberties, and Humanitarian Relief (IHH)
(a.k.a. the International Humanitarian Relief Organization), Kuwait Joint Relief Committee (KJRC),
the Islamic World Committee, and Human Appeal International. [Central Intelligence Agency, 1/1996] After 9/11,
former National Security Council official Daniel Benjamin will say that the NSC repeatedly questioned
the CIA with inquiries about charity fronts. “We knew there was a big problem between [charities] and militants.
The CIA report “suggests they were on the job, and, frankly, they were on the job.” [Wall Street Journal, 5/9/2003]
However, very little action is taken on the information before 9/11. None of the groups mentioned will be
shut down or have their assets seized.

April 1996: US Aware of Al-Qaeda Cell in Kenya, Begins Monitoring It

It will later be revealed in a US trial that, by this time, US intelligence agents are aware that an al-Qaeda cell
exists in Kenya. (In fact, it may have been aware of this since late 1994 (see Late 1994)). [East African, 1/1/2001]
Further evidence confirming and detailing the cell is discovered in May and June of 1996 (see May 21, 1996).
By August 1996, US intelligence is continually monitoring five telephone lines in Nairobi used by the cell members,
such as Wadih El-Hage. The tapping reveals that the cell is providing false passports and other documents
to operatives. They are sending coded telephone numbers to and from al-Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan.
The surveillance is apparently being conducted without the required approval of either President Clinton
or Attorney General Janet Reno. [Associated Press, 12/19/2000; East African, 1/1/2001] Prudence Bushnell,
the US ambassador to Kenya, will be briefed about the cell in early 1997, but will be told there is no evidence
of a specific threat against the embassy or American interests in Kenya. [New York Times, 1/9/1999]
Ali Mohamed, an al-Qaeda double agent living in California, will later admit in US court that he had been
in long distance contact with Wadih El-Hage, one of the leaders of the cell, since at least 1996.
It will also be revealed that US intelligence had been wiretapping Mohamed’s California phone calls
since at least 1994 (see Late 1994), so presumably US intelligence is recording calls between Mohamed and
the Kenya cell from both ends. The Nairobi phone taps continue until at least August 1997, when Kenyan
and US agents conduct a joint search of El-Hage’s Nairobi house (see August 21, 1997).
[United States of America v. Ali Mohamed, 10/20/2000; Associated Press, 12/19/2000; East African, 1/1/2001]

Mid-1996-September 11, 2001: KSM Travels World; Involved in Many Al-Qaeda Operations

After fleeing Qatar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) travels the world and plans many al-Qaeda operations.
He previously was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the Operation Bojinka plot.
[Time, 1/20/2003] He is apparently involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000), and other attacks. One US official later says,
“There is a clear operational link between him and the execution of most, if not all, of the al-Qaeda plots
over the past five years.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002] He lives in Prague, Czech Republic, through much of 1997.
[Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] By 1999, he is living in Germany and visiting with the hijackers there.
[New York Times, 6/8/2002; New York Times, 9/22/2002] Using 60 aliases and as many passports,
he travels through Europe, Africa, the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia and South America, personally
setting up al-Qaeda cells. [Los Angeles Times, 12/22/2002; Time, 1/20/2003]

August 14, 1996: ’Al-Qaeda’ First Mentioned in US Media

Based on a review of the Lexis-Nexus database, the term al-Qaeda is first mentioned in the mainstream media
on this day. A “United Press International” article draws from a State Department fact sheet released
the same day (see August 14, 1996), and states, “Earlier, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Usama Bin Ladin drew on his family’s wealth ‘plus donations received from sympathetic merchant families
in the Gulf region’ to organize the Islamic Salvation Foundation, or al-Qaida. The group established
recruitment centers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan that enlisted and sheltered thousands of Arab recruits
to fight the Soviets.
‘This network remains active,’ the State Department said.” [The spelling is the same as in the original.]
[US Department of State, 8/14/1996; United Press International, 8/14/1996] The term was first used in
an overseas article, by the French wire service Agence France-Presse, in May 1993 (see May 30, 1993).
The CIA has been aware of the term since at least the start of 1996 (see Shortly Before February 1996),
and possibly by 1991, if not earlier (see February 1991- July 1992). However, the term will remain little used
and little understood by the media for the next several years. For instance, the New York Times will first mention
the term two years later in quoting the courtroom testimony of one of the plotters of the 1998 African embassy
bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). It is referred to as “al-Qaeda, an international terrorist group,
led by Mr. bin Laden.” [New York Times, 8/28/1998]

November 1996-Late August 1998: US Tracks Bin Laden’s Satellite Phone Calls


An Inmarsat Compact M satellite phone, the type used by bin Laden. [Source: Inmarsat]

During this period, Osama bin Laden uses a satellite phone to direct al-Qaeda’s operations.
The phone—a Compact M satellite phone, about the size of a laptop computer—was purchased by
a student in Virginia named Ziyad Khaleel for $7,500 using the credit card of a British man named Saad al-Fagih.
After purchasing the phone, Khaleel sent it to Khalid al-Fawwaz, al-Qaeda’s unofficial press secretary in London
(see Early 1994-September 23, 1998). Al-Fawwaz then shipped it to bin Laden in Afghanistan. [CNN, 4/16/2001]
It appears US intelligence actually tracks the purchase as it occurs (see November 1996-Late December 1999),
probably because an older model satellite phone bin Laden has is already being monitored (see Early 1990s).
Bin Laden’s phone (873682505331) is believed to be used by other top al-Qaeda leaders as well, including
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammad Atef. Al-Fawwaz also buys satellite phones for other top al-Qaeda leaders
around the same time. Though the calls made on these phones are encrypted, the NSA is able to intercept
and decrypt them. As one US official will put it in early 2001, “codes were broken.”
[United Press International, 2/13/2001; Newsweek, 2/18/2002]
The Los Angeles Times will report that the monitoring of these phones
“produced tens of thousands of pages of transcripts over two years.” [Los Angeles Times, 10/14/2001]
Bin Laden’s satellite phone replaces an older model he used in Sudan that apparently was also monitored
by the NSA (see Early 1990s). Billing records for his new phone are eventually released to the media
in early 2002. Newsweek will note, “A country-by-country analysis of the bills provided US authorities
with a virtual road map to important al-Qaeda cells around the world.” [Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002]
The countries called are:

Britain (238 or 260). Twenty-seven different phone numbers are called in Britain. Accounts differ
on the exact number of calls. Khalid al-Fawwaz, who helps publish statements by bin Laden,
receives 143 of the calls, including the very first one bin Laden makes with this phone.
Apparently most of the remaining calls are made to pay phones near him or to his associates.
He also frequently calls Ibrahim Eidarous, who works with al-Fawwaz and lives near him.
[CNN, 4/16/2001; Newsweek, 2/18/2002; Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002; O'Neill and McGrory, 2006, pp. 111]

Yemen (221). Dozens of calls go to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, which is run by
the father-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar (see Late August 1998). [Newsweek, 2/18/2002;
Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; Bamford, 2008, pp. 8]

Sudan (131). Bin Laden lived in Sudan until 1996 (see May 18, 1996), and some important al-Qaeda operatives
remained there after he left (see February 5, 1998). [Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002]

Iran (106). Newsweek will later report: “US officials had little explanation for the calls to Iran.
A Bush administration official said that US intelligence has believed for years that hard-line
anti-American factions inside Iran helped bin Laden’s organization operate an ‘underground railroad’
smuggling Islamic militants to al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.”
[Newsweek, 2/18/2002; Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002]

Azerbaijan (67). An important al-Qaeda operative appears to be based in Baku, Azerbaijan.
[Washington Post, 5/2/2001] This is most likely Ahmad Salama Mabruk, who is very close to al-Qaeda
number two Ayman al-Zawahiri and is said to be the head of the al-Qaeda cell there.
He kidnapped by the CIA in Baku in late August 1998 (see Late August 1998).

Kenya (at least 56). In the embassy bombings trial, prosecutors introduce evidence showing 16 calls
are made on this phone to some of the embassy bombers in Kenya (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
apparently all before a raid in August 1997 (see August 21, 1997). The defense introduces evidence
showing at least 40 more calls are made after that time (see Late 1996-August 1998). [CNN, 4/16/2001]

Pakistan (59).
Saudi Arabia (57).
A ship in the Indian Ocean (13).
The US (6).
Italy (6).
Malaysia (4).
Senegal (2). [Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002]
Egypt (unknown). Newsweek reports that calls are made to Egypt but doesn’t say how many.
[Newsweek, 2/18/2002]
Iraq (0). Press reports note that the records indicate zero calls were made to Iraq.
[Newsweek, 2/18/2002; Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002]

1,100 total calls are made on this phone. Adding up the above numbers means that the destination of
over 100 calls is still unaccounted for. [Newsweek, 2/18/2002] The use of this phone stops two months
after the August 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. However, it appears bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders
continue to use other satellite phones occasionally after this time. Shortly after 9/11, James Bamford,
an expert authority on the agency, says “About a year or so ago the NSA lost all track of him.…
He may still use [satellite phones] occasionally to talk about something mundane,
but he discovered that the transmitters can be used for honing.” [CNN, 9/21/2001]
According to a different account, bin Laden will attempt to use a different phone communication method,
but US intelligence will soon discover it and continue monitoring his calls (see Late 1998 and After).

Late 1996-August 1998: US Listens In as Bin Laden Speaks to Planners of Embassy Bombings in Kenya

In 2001, four men will be convicted of participating in the 1998 embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
During their trial, it will come to light that the NSA was listening in on bin Laden’s satellite phone
(see November 1996-Late August 1998). Additionally, during this time bin Laden calls some of the plotters of
the bombing before the bombing takes place. The prosecution will show records revealing that bin Laden
calls Kenya 16 times, apparently all before an August 1997 raid on the Nairobi, Kenya, house of Wadih El-Hage
(see August 21, 1997), who is taking part in the embassy bombing plot and is bin Laden’s former personal secretary.
The transcripts of two calls between El-Hage and al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef (using bin Laden’s phone)
are even read to the jury in the trial. The defense however, shows that at least 40 additional calls are made from
bin Laden’s phone to Kenya after El-Hage left Kenya in September 1997. Further, El-Hage makes some calls
to Khalid al-Fawwaz, who essentially is serving as bin Laden’s press secretary in London and is being frequently
called by bin Laden around the same time. The transcript of a February 1997 call between El-Hage
and Mohamed Saddiq Odeh, one of the other embassy bombing plotters, is also read to the jury.
The US had been wiretapping El-Hage’s phone and other phones connected to the al-Qaeda Kenya cell,
since at least April 1996 (see April 1996). [CNN, 4/16/2001] In one call, El-Hage is overheard saying
after returning from visiting bin Laden in Afghanistan that bin Laden has given the Kenya al-Qaeda cell
a “new policy.” After the raid on El-Hage’s house, USinvestigators will discover that policy is
“militarizing” the cell. But most details of what is said in these calls has not been made public.
[Washington Post, 5/2/2001] In another call in July 1997, cell member Fazul Abdullah Mohammed
(a.k.a. Haroun Fazul) specifies which mobile phone the cell needs to use when calling bin Laden.
[New York Times, 1/13/2001] US intelligence also listens in during this time as bin Laden frequently calls
the Kenya office of Mercy International, an office that is being monitored because of suspected al-Qaeda ties
(see Late 1996-August 20, 1998). It has not been explained how the US failed to stop the August 1998
embassy bombings, given their surveillance of all these calls before the bombing took place.

1997-September 11, 2001: US Knows Swiss Bank Funds Hamas and Top Al-Qaeda Leaders, Yet Considers Bank ‘Low Priority’


The Al Taqwa Bank had offices in this building in Lugano, Italy,
on the border with Switzerland. [Source: Keystone]

Newsweek will later claim that US investigators “on bin Laden’s trail” had known about the Al Taqwa Bank
in Switzerland and its support for al-Qaeda “for years. But the group’s mazelike structure made it hard to track,
and the Feds considered it a low priority.” A senior Treasury official later will tell Congress that
US investigators learned in 1997 that Hamas had transferred $60 million into accounts at the Al Taqwa Bank.
Also in 1997, US investigators learn the names of many Al Taqwa shareholders. Many of them turn out to be rich
and powerful Arabs, including members of the bin Laden family and members of the Kuwaiti royal family
(see 1997-December 1999). Newsweek later will claim that, “The US took a harder look at Al Taqwa
after the [1998 US] embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
Sources say US intelligence tracked telephone contacts between Al Taqwa and members of bin Laden’s inner circle.
Al-Qaeda operatives would call Al Taqwa representatives in the Bahamas as they moved around the world.
Still, the network’s complex structure made it difficult to prove how money changed hands,
and the investigation stalled. Under US pressure, the Bahamian government revoked Al Taqwa’s license
[in the spring of 2001]. Treasury officials say the network continued to do business anyway.”
[Newsweek, 3/18/2002] The US will declare Al Taqwa a terrorist financier two months after 9/11
(see November 7, 2001).

[Unknown]

Febuary 25, 1997: Monitored Fax Links Ali Mohamed and Others in US and Germany to Al-Qaeda Leader

In February 1997, Wadih El-Hage, Osama bin Laden’s former personal secretary now living in Kenya
and working on an al-Qaeda bomb plot, goes to Afghanistan and visits bin Laden and al-Qaeda leader
Mohammed Atef (see February 7-21, 1997). He returns to Kenya with a seven-page report from Atef,
al-Qaeda’s military commander, that details al-Qaeda’s new ties to the Taliban. Atef writes:
“We wish to put our Muslim friends in the picture of the events, especially that the media portrayed
an untrue image about the Taliban movement. Our duty towards the movement is to stand behind it,
support it materially and morally.” On February 25, 1997, El-Hage faxes the report to some associates with
the suggestion that it be shared with the “brothers in work.” US intelligence is monitoring El-Hage’s phone
and learns the contents of the fax and whom it is sent to. The fax is sent to:

Ali Mohamed, the US-al-Qaeda double agent living in California. Mohamed has already been under surveillance
since 1993 for his al-Qaeda ties (see Autumn 1993). He will not be arrested until one month after the 1998
African embassy bombings (see September 10, 1998).

Ihab Ali Nawawi, an apparent al-Qaeda operative living in Orlando, Florida. It is not known if Nawawi is monitored
after this, but communications between him, Mohamed, and El-Hage are discovered in January 1998
(see January 1998). He will not be arrested until May 1999 (see May 18, 1999).

Farid Adlouni. He is a civil engineer living in Lake Oswego, Oregon. In 1996 and 1997, El-Hage calls Adlouni
in Oregon 72 times, sometimes just before or after meeting with bin Laden. Later in 1997, Adlouni’s home phone
and fax numbers will be found in two personal phone directories and one notebook kept by El-Hage
(see Shortly After August 21, 1997). Records show that El-Hage has extensive dealings with Adlouni,
mostly by selling gems El-Hage bought in Africa for a better price in the US. The FBI interviews Adlouni twice
in late 1997, but he is not arrested. As of 2002, it will be reported that he continues to live in Oregon and remains
a “person of interest” and subject of investigation by the FBI.

Other copies of the fax are sent to associates in Germany, but they have not been named.
Apparently these contacts do not result in any arrests, as there are no known arrests of al-Qaeda figures
in Germany in 1997. [Oregonian, 9/13/2002]

August 21, 1997: US Raids Al-Qaeda Cell Member’s House but Fails to Stop Embassy Bombing Plot


The outside and inside of El-Hage’s house in Nairobi. These pictures were apparently taken during
the 1997 raid and were used as evidence in El-Hage’s trial. [Source: FBI]

Dan Coleman, an FBI agent working with Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, has been examining transcripts
from wiretapped phones connected to bin Laden’s businesses in Sudan (see Early 1990s). One frequently called
number belongs to Wadih El-Hage, a US citizen who is later revealed to be bin Laden’s personal secretary. El-Hage
often makes obvious and clumsy attempts to speak in code. The CIA comes to believe that El-Hage might be
recruited as an agent. On this day, Coleman, two CIA agents, and a Kenyan police officer enter El-Hage’s house
in Nairobi, Kenya, with a search warrant. The investigators interview El-Hage (who returned that day from
visiting bin Laden in Afghanistan) and confiscate his computer. [Los Angeles Times, 10/14/2001;
Wright, 2006, pp. 242-244] A large amount of incriminating evidence is discovered in El-Hage’s documents
and computer files (see Shortly After August 21, 1997 and Shortly After August 21, 1997).
El-Hage moves to the US, where he is interviewed by a grand jury, then let go (see September 24, 1997).
He will be arrested shortly after al-Qaeda bombs the US embassy in Nairobi (see September 15, 1998).
He will be sentenced to life in prison for his role in that attack. State Department officials will later strongly assert
that while staffers at the US embassy in Kenya were told about the raid at the time, they were not told about
any potential connection to al-Qaeda. However, US intelligence officials strongly assert that the embassy staff
was frequently briefed about the bin Laden connection. [New York Times, 1/9/1999]

Shortly After August 21, 1997: Important Al-Qaeda Contacts Discovered through Seized Address Book


Al Haramain Islamic Foundation’s main office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
[Source: Bilal Qabalan / Agence France-Presse / Getty Images]

Wadih El-Hage has been bin Laden’s personal secretary since the early 1990s.
When US agents raid his house in Nairobi, Kenya, they seize his address book (see August 21, 1997),
which contains the names and phone numbers for many other al-Qaeda operatives. [CNN, 5/25/2001]
The names discovered in the book include:

Ali Mohamed, the al-Qaeda double agent living in California. US investigators are already tapping
his California phone and have been tapping calls between him and El-Hage since at least 1996 (see April 1996).

Mamoun Darkazanli. He is a Syrian-born businessman living in Hamburg, Germany,
who has contacts with Mohamed Atta’s al-Qaeda cell in the same city.
Darkazanli’s name and phone number are listed, and El-Hage even has a business card listing El-Hage’s address
in Texas and Darkazanli’s address in Hamburg (see Late 1998).

Ghassan Dahduli. He works at two US non-profit organizations, the Islamic Association for Palestine
and InfoCom. Both organizations will be shut down for supporting terrorist networks
(see September 16, 1998-September 5, 2001).

Salah al-Rajhi (see Shortly After August 21, 1997). He and his brother of Sulaiman Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi,
are billionaires and jointly own the Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. Sulaiman started a network of
organizations in Herndon, Virginia known as the SAAR network (named for the four initials in his name).
This network will be raided by US officials in 2002 for suspected terrorist funding ties
(see March 20, 2002). [Newsweek, 12/9/2002]

Ihab Ali Nawawi, an al-Qaeda operative living in Florida. He is referred to as “Ihab Ali” and his location in Tampa,
Florida, is mentioned. He will not be arrested until May 1999 (see May 18, 1999).
[United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 39, 5/3/2001]

Essam Marzouk. He is linked to both al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad and is living in Vancouver, Canada at the time.
He will later train the 1998 embassy bombers. It is unclear if the link to Marzouk is shared with Canadian intelligence
(see Shortly After August 21, 1997). [National Post, 3/19/2002]

Essam al Ridi. He is a US citizen and a pilot who helped bin Laden buy an airplane in the US in the early 1990s
(see Early 1993). He appears to have no militant ties after that. In late 1999, US prosecutors will contact al Ridi
where he is living in Bahrain and convince him to testify against El-Hage and others involved in the 1998
embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [CNN, 7/2/2002]

Farid Adlouni. He is a civil engineer living in Lake Oswego, Oregon. In 1996 and 1997, El-Hage calls Adlouni
in Oregon 72 times, sometimes just before or after meeting with bin Laden. Adlouni’s home phone and fax numbers
are be found in two personal phone directories and one notebook kept by El-Hage (see Shortly After August 21, 1997).
Earlier in 1997, El-Hage also sent him a fax written by al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef (see Febuary 25, 1997).
Records show that El-Hage has extensive dealings with Adlouni, mostly by selling gems El-Hage bought in Africa
for a better price in the US. The FBI interviews Adlouni twice in late 1997, but he is not arrested. As of 2002,
it will be reported that he continues to live in Oregon and remains a “person of interest” and subject of investigation
by the FBI. [Oregonian, 9/13/2002]

Khalid al-Fawwaz. He is al-Qaeda’s de facto press secretary in London. El-Hage gives al-Fawwaz’s correct name,
London phone number, and street address, but lists him as living in Texas. Presumably this is a slight attempt
at subterfuge. [United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 38, 5/2/2001]

A business card in the name Mamdouh M. Salim is found. This is a reference to Mamdouh Mahmud Salim,
a known al-Qaeda leader. [United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 37, 5/1/2001]

A business card belonging to Mansour al-Kadi is found. [New Yorker, 4/21/2008] Al-Kadi is the Deputy General of
the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a suspect Saudi charity closely linked to the Saudi government. Al-Kadi
will be fired in early 2004 and the entire foundation will be shut down several months later
(see March 2002-September 2004). The Treasury Department will later say that Al Haramain has a role
in the 1998 African embassy bombings (see Autumn 1997). [US Treasury Department, 9/9/2004]

Several business cards relating to the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). A 1996 CIA report connected
the IIRO to terrorist funding, but the IIRO will not be prosecuted due to its close ties to the Saudi government
(see January 1996 and October 12, 2001). [Newsweek, 12/9/2002]

According to author Douglas Farah, the address book is “full of the names of diamond dealers and jewelers,
often including the purchaser’s home phone number.” This suggests al-Qaeda could be profiting from
the diamond trade in Africa. [Farah, 2004, pp. 64-65]
But Farah also will note in 2004 that many of the leads from El-Hage’s address book and other documents
discovered around the same time are not fully explored. In fact, he says that “Most of El-Hage’s notebooks,
written in Arabic, have still not been translated into English.” [Farah, 2004, pp. 64-65]

Autumn 1997: CIA Ignores Tip Linking Saudi Charity to Al-Qaeda Plot on US Embassy in Kenya


Al Haramain Foundation’s Kenya office in 2004. [Source: Associated Press]

An informant tells an intelligence agency allied to the US that the Nairobi, Kenya, branch of a Saudi charity named
the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation is plotting to blow up the US embassy in Nairobi. The chief of the CIA station
in Kenya passes on this informant’s warning to Ambassador Prudence Bushnell and others at the embassy.
On October 31, 1997, the Kenyan government acts on the informants’ tip, arresting nine Arabs connected
to the charity and seizing their files. Charity Already Linked to Al-Qaeda Cell in Kenya - A 1996 secret CIA report
shows the CIA has already linked Al Haramain to militants, smuggling, drug running, and prostitution
(see January 1996).
In August 1997, US intelligence raids the Kenya house of Wadih el-Hage because they correctly believe
he is heading an al-Qaeda cell there (see August 21, 1997). The raid uncovers a business card belonging to
Mansour al-Kadi, the Deputy General of Al Haramain’s worldwide operations (see Shortly After August 21, 1997).
CIA Fails to Take Warning Seriously - The CIA sends a special team to analyze the files and finds no evidence of a plot.
This team wants to question the nine arrested Arabs, but the CIA station chief refuses to ask the Kenyan government
for access to the suspects, saying he doesn’t want to bother them any more about the issue.
The CIA drops the investigation and the nine Arabs are deported. Ambassador Bushnell is told that the threat
has been eliminated. But some members of the CIA team are furious and feel that their investigation was short-circuited.
Some intelligence officials believe at the time that members of the charity have ties to bin Laden.
[New York Times, 1/9/1999] Charity Later Linked to Kenya Bombings - The Nairobi embassy will be bombed
in August 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). In 2004, it will be reported that according to US officials,
“A wholesale fish business financed with Al Haramain funds… steered profits to the al-Qaeda cell behind
the [embassy bombing].” One of the bombers confessed days after the bombing that this “business was for al-Qaeda.” [Associated Press, 6/7/2004] In 2004, the Treasury Department will say that two members of the Al Haramain branch
in the nearby Comoros Islands helped some of the bombers escape from Kenya after the bombings.
[US Treasury Department, 9/9/2004] Charity Stays Open, Linked to Later Kenya Bombing - A month later after
the bombing,s the Kenyan government will ban Al Haramain from the country, but its office nonetheless
remains open. Some funds connected to it are believed to have helped support the al-Qaeda cell behind
the 2002 bombings in Mombasa, Kenya (see November 28, 2002). Yet Al Haramain’s Kenya office
still remains open until late 2004, when Al Haramain is shut down worldwide
(see March 2002-September 2004). [Associated Press, 6/7/2004]

September 24, 1997: El-Hage Testifies before US Grand Jury


The Texas tire store where El-Hage worked in 1997. [Source: CNN]

In August 1997, US intelligence raids the home of Wadih El-Hage, bin Laden’s former personal secretary
and a US citizen (see August 21, 1997). With his cover blown, El-Hage decides to return to the US.
Arriving at a New York City airport on September 23, he is served with a subpoena to testify before
a grand jury the next day. He testifies for several hours and is questioned extensively.
[United State of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 36, 4/30/2001]
US prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald will later claim that “El-Hage chose to lie repeatedly to the grand jury,
but even in his lies he provided some information of potential use to the intelligence community—
including potential leads” to the location of his confederates and wanted missing files.
[New York Times, 1/9/1999; US Congress, 10/21/2003]
But after this, El-Hage is not arrested. He moves back to Texas, where he had lived in the early 1990s,
and works in a tire store. [Arizona Republic, 9/28/2001] In October 1997, he is interviewed by agents in Texas
[United State of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 28, 4/12/2001] , and then left alone until August 1998
when he will be interrogated again shortly after the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He is ultimately arrested and found guilty for his role in those bombings.

October 1997: US Intelligence Stops Monitoring Al-Qaeda Cell in Kenya Despite Evidence It Is Planning an Attack


Fazul Abdullah Mohammed. [Source: Daily Nation]

Shortly after the US raid on Wadih El-Hage’s house in Nairobi, Kenya (see August 21, 1997),
US investigators discover a letter in the house that mentions a cache of incriminating files had been
moved from the house and hidden elsewhere. Investigators suspect the files could contain evidence of
a coming attack by El-Hage’s Nairobi cell. A law enforcement official later says US investigators begin
a “somewhat frantic, concerted effort” to locate the missing files. “The concern was high enough about
something being out there to go right away.” A search for the files is conducted at another location
in Kenya in September 1997, but the files are not found. [New York Times, 1/9/1999]
But despite this search, and even though other documents found in the raid refer to other unknown members
of the cell and the imminent arrival of more operatives (see Shortly After August 21, 1997),
the wiretaps on five phone numbers connected to El-Hage are discontinued in October 1997,
one month after El-Hage moved to the US (see September 24, 1997). Fazul Abdullah Mohammed
(a.k.a. Haroun Fazul), who had been living with El-Hage and using the same phones as him, takes over running
the cell. US intelligence will resume monitoring the phones in May 1998 and continue to monitor them
through August 1998 (see May 1998), when the cell will successfully attack US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). It will be stated in the 2002 book The Cell, “The hardest thing to understand
in retrospect is why US law enforcement did nothing else to disrupt the activities of the Nairobi cell”
after the raid on El-Hage’s house. [New York Times, 1/13/2001; Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 203-205]
The files will be found only after the African embassy bombings, when the offices of the charity
Mercy International are searched on August 20, 1998. They will contain incriminating information,
including numerous phone calls from bin Laden to Nairobi.
[United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al, 3/20/2001] It is not clear why the charity was not searched
before the attacks, since two of the five phones monitored since 1996 were to Mercy’s Kenya offices
(see Late 1996-August 20, 1998).

December 1997-Spring 1998: Urgent Requests for Embassy Security Go Unheeded


Prudence Bushnell.
[Source: PBS]

By December 1997, Prudence Bushnell, the US Ambassador to Kenya, is aware that her embassy could be in danger.
She has been told of an August 1997 warning that proved there was an al-Qaeda cell in Nairobi (see Late 1994),
a precise (and ultimately accurate) November 1997 warning detailing a plot to attack the embassy
(see November 1997), and other recent warnings, including information indicating that she is an assassination target.
She sends two cables to State Department headquarters in Washington, claiming that the embassy’s location
makes it “extremely vulnerable to a terrorist attack,” and asks for security improvements to be made.
The State Department turns down her requests and begins to see Bushnell as a nuisance. In early 1998,
General Anthony Zinni, the commander of US forces in the region, visits the Nairobi embassy and decides it is
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. He offers to send a security team to inspect the situation, but his offer is turned down.
The State Department sends its own team instead and in March 1998 determines that about $500,000 worth of easily
implemented improvements should make the embassy secure. But the money is not quickly allocated.
Bushnell then sends “an emotional letter to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright begging for
the Secretary’s personal help.” She says she has been fighting for months for a more secure embassy
as threats increase, and that the State Department’s refusal to grant her requests for funding is
“endangering the lives of embassy personnel.” Albright takes no action. The embassy will be bombed in August
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [New York Times, 1/9/1999]

January 1998: US Intercepts Communications between 3 Al-Qaeda Agents in US, but Fails to Stop Their Plot

Ali Mohamed, the al-Qaeda double agent living in California, receives a letter from Ihab Ali Nawawi
(an apparent al-Qaeda sleeper cell operative living in Orlando, Florida, at the time (see September 1999)).
Nawawi tells Mohamed that Wadih El-Hage, a key member of the al-Qaeda cell in Kenya, has been interviewed by
the FBI (see August 21, 1997). Mohamed is given a new contact number for El-Hage. Mohamed calls El-Hage
and speaks to him about this, then calls other operatives who pass on the warning of the FBI’s interest in El-Hage
to bin Laden. US intelligence is monitoring Mohamed’s phone calls at this time, so presumably they are aware
of these connections. [New York Times, 10/24/2000; Raleigh News and Observer, 10/21/2001;
Chicago Tribune, 12/11/2001] Yet, despite all of these monitored communications, neither Mohamed,
nor Nawawi, nor El-Hage, are apprehended at this time, even though all three are living in the US.
Their plot to blow up two US embassies in Africa succeeds in August 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).

Late Spring 1998: Kenyan Intelligence Tries to Warn CIA about Embassy Attack

“Just months before” the US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
Kenyan intelligence warns the CIA about an imminent plot to attack the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
Paul Muite, a prominent lawyer and legislator in Kenya, later says he was told the CIA showed the Kenyan
warning to the Mossad, who was dismissive about its reliability. The CIA then chose to ignore it.
[Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 20

May 1998: US Intelligence Resumes Monitoring Al-Qaeda Cell in Kenya

US intelligence resumes monitoring the al-Qaeda cell in Kenya, and continues to listen in all the way
through the US embassy attacks that the cell implements in August 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
US intelligence had begun wiretapping five phones used by the cell by late 1996, including the phones of cell leader
Wadih El-Hage and two phones belonging to Mercy International, a charity believed to have been used as a front
by the Kenya cell. The monitoring stopped in October 1997, though it is not clear why. The New York Times
will report that “after a break, [monitoring] began again in May 1998, just months before the bombing and precisely
during the time the government now asserts the attack was being planned.” It is not known what caused the monitoring
to resume nor has it been explained how the cell was able to succeed in the embassy attacks while being monitored.
[New York Times, 1/13/2001]

May 7, 1998: Al-Qaeda Leader Visits Bosnia; US Charity Is Funding Al-Qaeda There

Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer), a high-ranking al-Qaeda leader, visits Bosnia for unknown reasons
and connects with a charity suspected of financing bin Laden’s organization. Salim was one of the founders
of al-Qaeda and will be arrested in Germany later in the year (see September 20, 1998) and charged in connection
with the 1998 embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Records show that the Bosnia branch of
the US-based Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) sponsored Salim’s visa, reserved him an apartment,
and identified him as one of its directors. A BIF mole in Bosnian intelligence is able to tip off Salim that
investigators are onto him, so he is not caught (see September 1996-June 2000). Intelligence officials will question
BIF officers about Salim’s trip in early 2000, but the reason for the trip remains a mystery.
[New York Times, 6/14/2002]

May 15, 1998: Oklahoma FBI Memo Warns of Potential Terrorist-Related Flight Training; No Investigation Ensues

An FBI pilot sends his supervisor in the Oklahoma City FBI office a memo warning that he has observed
“large numbers of Middle Eastern males receiving flight training at Oklahoma airports in recent months.”
The memo, titled “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” further states this “may be related to planned terrorist activity”
and “light planes would be an ideal means of spreading chemicals or biological agents.”
The memo does not call for an investigation, and none occurs. [NewsOK (Oklahoma City), 5/29/2002;
US Congress, 7/24/2003] The memo is “sent to the bureau’s Weapons of Mass Destruction unit and forgotten.”
[New York Daily News, 9/25/2002] In 1999, it will be learned that an al-Qaeda agent has studied flight training
in Norman, Oklahoma (see May 18, 1999). Hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi will briefly visit
the same school in 2000; Zacarias Moussaoui will train at the school in 2001 (see February 23-June 2001).

May 26, 1998: Bin Laden Promises to Bring Jihad to US


Top: Bin Laden, surrounded by security, walking to the press conference.
Bottom: the three journalists attending the press conference sit next to bin Laden. [Source: CNN]
Bin Laden discusses “bringing the war home to America,”
in a press conference from Khost, Afghanistan.

[US Congress, 9/18/2002] Bin Laden holds his first and only press conference to help publicize
the fatwa he published several months before. Referring to the group that signed the fatwa, he says,
“By God’s grace, we have formed with many other Islamic groups and organizations in the Islamic world
a front called the International Islamic Front to do jihad against the crusaders and Jews.” He adds later,
“And by God’s grace, the men… are going to have a successful result in killing Americans and getting rid of them.”
[CNN, 8/20/2002] He also indicates the results of his jihad will be “visible” within weeks. [US Congress, 7/24/2003]
Two US embassies will be bombed in August (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Bin Laden sits next to
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef during the press conference. Two Pakistani journalists and
one Chinese journalist attends. But event never gets wide exposure because no independent videotaping is allowed
(however, in 2002 CNN will obtain video footage of the press conference seized after the US conquered
Afghanistan in late 2001). Pakistani journalist Ismail Khan attends and will later recall,
“We were given a few instructions, you know, on how to photograph and only take a picture of Osama
and the two leaders who were going to sit close by him. Nobody else.” Two sons of Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman
attend and distribute what they claim is the will or fatwa of their father (see May 1998),
who has been sentenced to life in prison in the US. Journalist Peter Bergen will later comment that the significance
of the sons’ presence at the press conference “can’t be underestimated” because it allows bin Laden to benefit
from Abdul-Rahman’s high reputation amongst radical militants. Bergen also later says the press conference
is a pivotal moment for al-Qaeda. “They’re going public. They’re saying,
‘We’re having this war against the United States.’” [CNN, 8/20/2002]
The specific comment by bin Laden about “bringing the war home to America” will be mentioned in
the August 2001memo given to President Bush entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”
(see August 6, 2001).

[Unknown]

https://khunnamob.globat.com/backup/khunnamob/www.khunnamob.info/board/show.php-Category=khunnamob&No=791&forum=4&page=29&PHPSESSID=5df051bc51e3404a3b6bdcb9f62a03ba.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_93
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-59kouBgO_s
No plane crashed in Shanksville.

Correction: The Usgs scar is not the exact one/
Whatever made the hole in shanksville was not flight 93.






ตัวกลาง:เคล็ดลับของสหรัฐในการสนับสนุนการก่อการร้าย

เพื่อมิให้ปฏิบัติการลับของสหรัฐในการเกื้อหนุนเครือข่ายก่อการร้ายมุสลิมหัวรุนแรงเป็นที่ล่วงรู้
สหรัฐจึงจำเป็นต้องทำการผ่าน ตัวกลาง (GO BETWEEN) อีกทีหนึ่ง หากความลับนี้เกิดรั่วไหล สหรัฐก็สามารถ
ปฏิเสธข้อกล่าวหาได้โดย ตัดตอน เฉพาะข้อมูลและหลักฐานที่เชื่อมโยงความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสหรัฐกับ
ตัวกลางออกไป เพื่อให้เข้าใจว่าตัวกลางเท่านั้นคือผู้ที่อยู่เบื้องหลังในการสนับสนุนการก่อการร้าย
นายวิลเลียม เคซี อดีตผู้บัญชาการหน่วยงานซีไอเอ ในยุครัฐบาลเรแกน ยอมรับว่าเขาเองเป็นผู้ติดต่อ
ประสานงานกับตุรกี ปากีสถาน และซาอุดิอารเบีย ในการร่วมมือสนันบสนุนเครือข่ายก่อการร้ายมุสลิมหัวรุนแรง
ตามข้อตกลงนี้ สหรัฐ ปากีสถาน ตุรกีและซาอุดิอารเบีย จะร่วมกันให้การสนับสนุนผ่านหน่วยงานข่าวกรองปากีสถาน
หรือ ไอเอสไอ และอีกส่วนผ่านเครือข่ายองค์กรศาสนานิกายวาฮาบีที่มีอยู่ทั่วโลก 3 หรืออีกนัยหนึ่ง
สหรัฐใช้ ไอเอสไอและวาฮาบีเป็นตัวกลางนั่นเอง

อัลไคดาไม่เกี่ยวข้องกับสหรัฐแล้วจริงหรือ?

เป็นความจริงที่สหรัฐและชาติพันธมิตรเคยให้ความสนับสนุนเครือข่ายก่อการร้ายมุสลิมและกลุ่มอัลไคดา
แต่เมื่อสงครามเย็นยุติลงพวกเขาก็ได้เปลี่ยนแปลงมาเป็นฝ่ายต่อต้านสหรัฐ  นี่คือคำอธิบายที่สื่อกระแสหลักทั่วโลก
ใช้อธิบายเหตุผลในการก่อการร้ายชองกลุ่ม อัลไคดา นับตั้งแต่เกิดเหตุการณ์ณ์ 11 กันยาเป็นต้นมา
ทว่ามีข้อมูลหลักฐานอยู่มากมายที่ส่อว่า แท้จริงแม้จนถึงปัจจุบันโครงข่ายการให้การสนับสนุน
เครือข่ายผู้ก่อการร้ายมุสลิมหัวรุนแรงที่สหรัฐและพันธมิตรได้สร้างขึ้นยังคงดำรงอยุ่
และสหรัฐก็ยังคงอาศัยโครงข่ายนี้สนับสนุนเครือข่ายก่อการร้ายเหล่านี้อยู่เช่นเดิม อาทิเช่น
หนึ่ง สถานีโทรทัศน์ ซีบีเอสของสหรัฐโดยนายแดน แรเทอร์ ได้รายงานว่าในวันที่ 10 กันยายน 2544
เพียงหนึ่งวันก่อนเหตุวินาศกรรมตึกเวิร์ลเทรด นายบิน ลาเดนได้เข้ารับการบำบัดด้วยเครื่องฟอกไตใ
นโรงพยาบาลของกองทัพอากาศปากีสถาน ในเมืองราวันบินดี4 ก่อนหน้านี้หนังสือพิมพ์เลอ ฟิกาโร
ของผรั่งเศสได้ลงข่าวโดยอ้างแหล่งข่าวภายในหน่วยงานไอเอสไอ ในช่วงวันที่ 4-14 กรกฎาคม ปี2544
สองเดือนก่อนเกิดเหตุ 11 กันยา นายบิน ลาเดน ได้เข้ารับการผ่าตัดในโรงพยาบาลอเมริกัน
ณ เมือง ดูไบประทศอาหรับ เอมิเรตส์ ในช่วง 10 วัน ที่เขาพักรักษาตัวอยู่นั้น ได้มีเครือญาติในตระกูลบินลาเดน
บุคคลสำคัญจาก ซาอุดิอาราเบีย และอาหรับเอมิเรตส์ รวมถึงเจ้าหน้าที่ ซีไอเอประจำดูไบ ได้ข้าพบนายบิน ลาเดน5

หากข่าวทั้งสองชิ้นนี้มีมูลความจริงเป็นไปได้หรือที่ทางการสหรัฐจะไม่ทราบถึงที่อยู่ของนายบินลาเดน
เหตุใดจึงไม่เข้าจับกุมทั้งๆที่ก่อนหน้าสหรัฐได้ตั้งรางวัลนำจับตัวเขาเป็นจำนวนหลายล้านเหรียญสหรัฐ
ในข้อหาเกี่ยวข้องกับการวางระเบิดกงสุลสหรัฐ 2 แห่งในอัฟริกาตะวันออกเมื่อปี 2536
สอง สถานีโทรทัศน์เอบีซี ของสหรัฐได้เสนอข่าวว่า เอฟบีไอพบว่า ก่อนเหตุการณ์ 11 กันยา ไม่กี่เดือน
ได้มีการโอนเงินจำนวนอย่างต่ำ สี่ล้านาบาท จากธนาคารในปากีสถานไปยังบัญชีของนายมูฮัมหมัด อัททา
หัวหน้ากลุ่มก่อการร้ายในการก่อวินาศกรรมตึกเวิร์ลเทรด การโอนเงินนี้เป็นไปตามคำสั่งของนายพล มามูด อัคหมัด
หัวหน้าหน่วยงานไอเอสไอ ของปากีสถาน ข้อมูลนี้ได้รับการยืนยันอีกครั้งโดย สำนักข่าว เอเอฟพี ของฝรั่งเศส7
สิ่งที่ผิดสังเกตคือ ในวันที่ 4 กันยายน หนึ่งอาทิตย์ก่อนเหตุการณ์ 11 กันยา นายพล อัคหมัด
ได้เดินทางไปยังสหรัฐอเมริกาเพื่อเข้าพบและปรึกษาหารือกับเจ้าหน้าที่ระดับสูงของซีไอเอ
อย่างเป็นทางการตามธรรมเนียมที่ถือปฏิบัติมาโดยตลอด และในวันที่ 12-13 กันยายน
หนึ่งวันหลังเหตุการณ์วินาศกรรมตึกเวิร์ลเทรด นายพล อัคหมัด ก็ได้ลงนามในข้อตกลงร่วมมือ
ในการปราบปรามการก่อการร้ายร่วมกับนายริชาด อาร์มีเทจ รองเลขาธิการกระทรวงกลาโหมสหรัฐ
และยังได้เข้าพบนายพล คอลิน พาวเวล เลขาธิการกระทรวงกลาโหมเป็นการส่วนตัวอีกด้วย8
เป็นไปได้หรือ ที่ทางการสหรัฐไม่ทราบระแคะระคายมาก่อนหน้านี้เลยว่า บุคคลสำคัญที่เป็นถึงหัวหน้า
หน่วยงานข่าวกรองปากีสถาน หน่วยงานที่สหรัฐเป็นตัวตั้งตัวตีในการก่อตั้ง อีกทั้งยังมีความสัมพันธ์อันใกล้ชิดกัน
มาเป็นเวลานานและให้ความไว้วางใจถึงกับขอให้ร่วมมือในการปราบปรามการก่อการร้ายจะเป็นผู้สมรู้ร่วมคิด
ในการก่อการร้ายที่มุ่งทำลายสหรัฐ สาม จวบจนวันนี้ เครือข่ายองค์กรศาสนานิกายวาฮาบีของซาอุดิอารเบีย
ยังคงให้การสนับสนุนสหรัฐ ดังที่เป็นมา ในบทบรรณาธิการหนังสือพิมพ์อัลคุด อัล อาราบี
ที่เพิ่งตีพิมพ์ในประเทศอังกฤษ ฉบับวันที่ 14 พฤศจิกายน ศกนี้ อ้างถึงคำวินิจฉัยสูงสุดทางศาสนา
หรือฟัดวา ที่ประกาศห้ามมิให้มุสลิมนิกายวาฮาบีทำการสู้รบกับกองทัพสหรัฐในอิรัก
และเตือนระวังชาวซาอุดิอารเบีย มิให้หลงผิดเชื่อคำหลอกลวงเพื่อไปร่วมรบกับพี่น้องมุสลิมในอิรัก9

http://khunnamob.globat.com/backup/khunnamob/www.khunnamob.info/board/show.php-Category=khunnamob&No=791&forum=4&page=30&PHPSESSID=5df051bc51e3404a3b6bdcb9f62a03ba.htm

ความสำเร็จในการเคลื่อนไหวนั้นไม่ได้เป็นไปอย่างไร้ระบบ ตามมีตามเกิดเหมือนขบวนการอื่นในภูมิภาค
ทว่าเป็นระบบที่ด็อกเตอร์คนหนึ่งหยิบยืมมาจากขบวนการ “อิควานุลมุสลิมีน” (ภราดรมุสลิม) ที่ก่อตั้งโดย
ฮะซัน บันนา นักคิดและนักต่อสู้มุสลิมแห่งอิยิปต์ นโยบายของขบวนการอิควานุลมุสลิมีนได้กลายเป็นนโยบาย
ขบวนการต่อสู้สากล ที่มุสลิมทั่วโลกสามารถนำเอาไปใช้ในภูมิภาคที่พวกตนอยู่ อิควานุลมุสลิมีนใน อิยิปต์
ต่อสู้กับกษัตริย์ทรราชและต่อสู้กับ ลัทธิบะอัฟษ (บาธ) ขอญะมาลอับดุลนาซิร (นัซเซอร์) และได้กลายเป็น
ขบวนการที่ผิดกฎหมาย เช่นเดียวกับอิควานุลมุสลิมีนในตูนิเซีย ซีเรียในทศวรรษต่อมาหรือในปัจจุบัน
ขบวนการอิควานุลมุสลิมีนมีเป้าหมายเพื่อก่อตั้งรัฐอิสลามและปกครองด้วย ระบอบอิสลามาธิปไตย
ทว่าการต่อสู้นั้นแตกต่างกันไปตามกาละและเทศะ ในขณะที่อิควานุลมุสลิมีนต่อสู้ด้วยอาวุธยุทโธปกรณ์
พรรคอิควานในจอร์แดนกลับเล่นการเมืองและมีผู้แทนในรัฐสภา

แก้ไขเมื่อ 04 ต.ค. 46 19:08:28

จากคุณ : Shiblee - [ 4 ต.ค. 46 19:07:14 ]


๕.๑๓,ประเทศไทย

ทางภูมิศาสตร์มีความสำคัญเป็นศูนย์กลางของภูมิภาคอาเชี่ยน ซึ่งในอดีตเคยถูกสหรัฐใช้
เป็นฐานที่มั่นในการจัดส่งกำลังเข้าสู้รบในสมรภูมิ เวียตนาม ลาว กัมพูชา นับได้ว่าเป็น
จุดยุทธศาสตร์หนึ่งที่มีความสำคัญมาก ซึ่งมีความเหมาะ สมทางภูมิศาสตร์ในการปิดล้อมจีน
ทางตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ ปัจจุบันรัฐบาล พ.ต.ท.ทักษิณ ชินวัตร ได้ดำเนินนโยบาย ทางด้านเศรษฐกิจ การเมือง
อย่างมีวิสัยทัศน์ ที่สอดคล้องกับสภาพความเป็นจริง ต่อสถานการณ์ การเปลี่ยนแปลงทางสากล นโยบายการกลับมาสู่
ความร่วมมือทางด้าน เศรษฐกิจ-การเมือง ฉันมิตรประเทศเพื่อนบ้านที่ดีต่อกันในกลุ่มอาเซียน

การมีความเห็นร่วมกันกับการให้ความสำคัญ ต่อคณะทำงานระหว่างประเทศที่ว่าด้วยอนุภูมิภาคแห่งลุ่มแม่น้ำโขง
หรือ GMS (The Great Mekong Sub-region) จะเป็นการปูพื้นฐานการจัดตั้งเขตการค้าเสรีอาเซียน ด้วยการรวมเศรษฐกิจ
เป็นตลาดเดียวแบบอียู ภายในระยะเวลา ๒๐ ปี หรือในปี ๒๕๖๓ ภายใต้ชื่อ ประชาคมเศรษฐกิจอาเซียน หรือเออีซี
ที่มีประชากร รวมมากถึง ๕๐๐ ล้านคน

ข้อตกลงการค้าเสรีอาเซียน-จีน ในการประชุมสุดยอดอาเซียนครั้งนี้จะทำให้เกิดเขตการค้าเสรีที่ใหญ่ที่สุดในโลก
ด้วยจำนวนประชากร ๑,๘๐๐ ล้านคน และมูลค่าการค้า ๑.๒ ล้านล้านดอลลาร์สหรัฐ ในอีก ๑๐ ปีข้างหน้า การเดินทางไป
เจริญสัมพันธ์ไมตรี จีน – รัสเชีย ของ นายกรัฐมนตรี ทักษิณ ชินวัตร จะนำไปสู่อำนาจต่อรองกับการพึ่งพาสหรัฐอเมริกา
เพียงด้านเดียว จากวิสัยทัศน์ ดังกล่าวจะทำให้ประเทศไทย เกิดภูมิคุ้มกันหลุดพ้นจากอุบัติเหตุ ที่อาจตกเป็น
จุดยุทธศาสตร์สงคราม ในการปิดล้อมจีนทางด้านตะวันตกเฉียงใต้ได้ในอนาคต

๕.๑๔,กรณีไฟใต้
สถานการณ์ความสับสนในภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย ตั้งแต่ปลายปี ๒๕๔๖ มากระทั่งถึงปัจจุบัน ดูเหมือน
การปราบปรามของรัฐบาล ยิ่งระดมกำลังเข้าปราบปราม สถานการณ์ ยิ่งสับสนรุนแรงขึ้น ข้อน่าสังเกตก็คือ
หากเป็นขบวนการแบ่งแยกดินจริง การเคลื่อนไหวน่าจะเดินแนวทางเคลื่อนไหวทาง การเมือง และวัฒนธรรม
มากกว่าการกระทำอันโหดเหี้ยมป่าเถื่อน จงใจที่จะสร้างความยั่วยุให้สถานการณ์ขยายตัว ไปสู่ความขัดแย้งทางศาสนา
ระหว่างชาวพุทธ กับมุสลิม และจงใจให้เกิด การล้อมปราบจลาจลจากรัฐบาลกลาง เช่นกรณี การล้อมปราบที่มัสยิดกรือเซะ

กรณีไฟใต้หากรัฐบาลหลงทิศหลงทาง สถานการณ์อาจถูกชักนำไปสู่การขยายตัวเป็นสงครามประชาชน
ในพื้นที่ ๓ จังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้ เมื่อถูกผูกเชื่อมโยงเข้ากับสถานการณ์ในอินโดนีเซีย และฟิลิปปินส์
ก็อาจจะเป็นข้ออ้างของสหรัฐอเมริกาในการที่จะเคลื่อนกำลังนาวิกโยธินเข้า ประจำการช่องแคบมะละกา ก็เป็นได้









































http://khunnamob.globat.com/backup/khunnamob/www.khunnamob.info/board/show.php-Category=khunnamob&No=634&forum=6&page=62&PHPSESSID=5df051bc51e3404a3b6bdcb9f62a03ba.htm

The Carlyle Group


Sami Baarma, a top executive of the Saudi National Commercial Bank (NCB),
sits on the board of Mahfouz’s Middle East Capital Group (MECG), that had on its board, Sheikh Bakhsh.
In addition, Baarma sits on the board of the Carlyle Group, which had former President George H. W. Bush
as a senior advisor. Carlyle is the eleventh largest military contractor in the U.S., and a leading contributor
to George W. Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign. Former President George H.W. Bush has visited
Saudi Arabia at least twice to successfully court bin Laden family financing for the Carlyle Group.

The Carlyle Group’s relationships with prominent Saudis is particularly murky considering that,
despite assertions that Osama is estranged from the family, the documentary records contradict the claim.
According to the Wall Street Journal:

Among its far-flung business interests, the well-heeled Saudi Arabian clan -
which says it is estranged from Osama - is an investor in a fund established by Carlyle Group,
a well-connected Washington merchant bank specializing in buyouts of defense and
aerospace companies. Through this investment and its ties to Saudi royalty,
the bin Laden family has become acquainted with some of the biggest names in
the Republican Party. In recent years, former President Bush, ex-Secretary of State James Baker
and
ex-Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci have made the pilgrimage to the
bin Laden family’s headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Mr. Bush makes
speeches on behalf of Carlyle Group
and is senior adviser to its Asian Partners fund, while Mr. Baker is its senior counselor.
Mr.
Carlucci is the group’s chairman. Osama is one of more than 50 children
of Mohammed bin Laden, who built the family’s $5 billion business,
Saudi Binladin Group, largely with construction contracts
from the Saudi government...^[33]

The long-time Chairman of the Carlyle Group, Frank Carlucci, was not only
a former Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration, but a Deputy Director of the CIA
during the Carter Administration. As the Second Secretary in the US Embassy in the Congo
during the time of the reign and consequent assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Carlucci was intimately
involved in the US efforts to overthrow Lumumba’s government. In 1974, Frank Carlucci headed
the American CIA operation to overthrow the Lisbon socialist government. He had been Chief of
Sears Roebucks international operations, an actual espionage operation, and later a top official of
the American intelligence.

Carlyle's tentacles embrace Asia
By Tim Shorrock

• Part 1: US-Taiwan: The guiding hand of Frank Carlucci
  

http://www.atimes.com/china/DC20Ad02.html

WASHINGTON - When Thailand, South Korea and other Asian countries stood on
the brink of bankruptcy in 1999, one of the first United States banks on the scene was the Carlyle Group,
the Washington private equity fund known primarily for its US investments in defense and real estate.

Thatyear, George Bush Sr, the former US president and Carlyle's senior adviser for Asia,
convened the first meetings of Carlyle's Asia Advisory Board in Bangkok to discuss the region's potential
for foreign investment. Since then, Carlyle has become one of the largest foreign investors in South Korea
and Taiwan and is quickly positioning itself to become a major player in mergers and acquisitions in Japan.
It also hopes to capitalize on China's entry into the World Trade Organization to make a big investment
splash on the mainland.

Through its US$750 million Asia fund, it has made four acquisitions. They include KorAm Bank,
one of South Korea's largest private banks, in which Carlyle invested $145 million for a controlling
interest in 2000; Taiwan Broadband, the island's fourth-largest cable company, in which Carlyle
has invested $187 million; Mercury Communications, a South Korean telecom manufacturer recently
spun off from the bankrupt Daewoo Group, for $49 million; and Pacific Department Stores,
a joint venture with a Taiwan group that operates a chain of retail stores in mainland China, for $43 million.

As Japan opens up to foreign investment, Carlyle is hoping to become a premier buyout company.
"Finally, finally we're seeing some focus on shareholder value in Japan," Jonathan Colby,
a former aide to Henry Kissinger, who is one of Carlyle's managing directors for Asia,
told a recent New York conference on private equity in Asia.

Carlyle has created a $2.2 billion venture fund to buy Japanese companies and banks,
which recently agreed to make its first acquisition, a 90 percent stake, worth $28 million,
in the security trucking subsidiary of the bankrupt Daiei Group, Japan's largest retailer.
Meanwhile, Carlyle is about to secure its third acquisition in South Korea, where Carlyle and JP Morgan
have reportedly offered $1.2 billion to buy Kumho Industrial, the world's 10th-largest tire maker
and a major exporter to the United States and China.

Bush is the most prominent of a long list of Carlyle advisers and managing partners who have parlayed
their experience and contacts in government to create one of the world's largest private equity funds.
Carlyle's chairman is Frank Carlucci, who was secretary of defense and national security adviser during
the Ronald Reagan administration and, prior to that, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
James Baker III, a former secretary of state and treasury, is Carlyle's senior counselor.

Last year, Carlyle named former British premier John Major to be chairman of Carlyle Europe.
Other recent additions include Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission;
William E Kennard, the former chairman of the US Federal Communications Commission; and Afsaneh Beschloss,
the former chief investment officer of the World Bank. Carlyle's advisory boards in Europe, Asia and Japan
are peppered with executives from major corporations, such as Nestle, Roche, BMW, Toshiba and Fujitsu,
and such men of influence as Karl Otto Pohl, the former president of Germany's Bundesbank.

Bush has put together a stellar list of former officials to find investors for the Asia fund and identify
potential companies to buy. Some are former heads of state, including Fidel Ramos of the Philippines and
Anand Panyarachun of Thailand (Thailand's current Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra,
a longtime friend of Bush, resigned from the fund before taking office just over a year ago).
Others are steeped in the world of securities and banking, such as Liu Hong-Ru, the former chairman of
China's Securities Regulatory Commission and Arifin Siregar, the former head of Indonesia's Central Bank;
the rest are mere tycoons, such as Sofjan Wanandi of Indonesia's Gamala Group and Frank Shrontz,
the former chief executive officer of Boeing.

The board also includes senior executives from Singapore Technologies Ltd, First Philippines Holdings Corp
and investment authorities in Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. Every year, Bush gathers his advisers for a meeting
somewhere in Asia; the last one, in May, took place in Seoul. Carlyle's Japan's advisory board includes
James Abegglan, the chairman of Asia Advisory Services and a longtime business consultant in Tokyo;
former US ambassadors to Tokyo Michael Armacost and Thomas S Foley; Taizo Nishimuro,
the chairman of Toshiba Corp; and executives from Fujitsu, Sanwa Bank, and Yahoo Japan.
Carlucci and Baker are members of both the Asia and Japan advisory boards; Bush only chairs the Asian board.

Colby downplayed the role played by Bush, Baker and other advisers. "They open doors,
but we still have to do the hard work of making investments profitable," he said.
Carlyle officials said Bush's involvement in the company is limited to giving speeches to investment conferences.
"Mr Bush does not and has never represented Carlyle before other governments or government officials,"
said Chris Ullman, Carlyle's spokesman. "He has made no business deals for Carlyle." Baker,
on the other hand, "does much more on the business side".

Investors, however, recognize that the Bush name - and the many contacts Bush developed as president,
CIA director and ambassador to the United Nations - carry tremendous weight as he travels
around the world on behalf of Carlyle. "Nothing beats the ability to have George Bush call up
some contact he's known for the last 20 years to comment on the worthiness of a particular deal,"
said Pat Macht, a spokesperson for the California Public Employees Retirement System,
the world's largest public pension fund, which owns 5.5 percent of Carlyle. That is particularly true in Asia,
where personal relationships are key to business deals.

Carlyle acquired KorAm Bank shortly after Bush visited Seoul to meet with senior government officials
in the Kim Dae-jung government. Carlyle's bid for the bank, according to a detailed account in Business Week,
received crucial support from advisory board member Park Tae-joon, a former South Korean general
who built Korea's Pohang Iron and Steel Corp into the world's largest steelmaker. (Park later resigned
from the board after joining the government.)

Carlyleand other buyout companies are attracted to Asia because, in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
the structure of Asian capitalism is changing from family-controlled conglomerates -
personified by giant South Korean chaebols such as Hyundai and Daewoo -into smaller companies
run by professional managers. Governments, meanwhile, have abandoned social policies that
once guaranteed a portion of the workforce lifetime jobs and made layoffs very difficult.
That's all changing, even in South Korea, where militant unions have given the country
a bad reputation in the eyes of many foreign investors. "Contrary to popular belief, major layoffs
are being done in Korea," Colby said at the investment seminar in New York.

Another factor: with banks holding billions of dollars in bad loans that will probably never be repaid,
corporations are desperate for investment capital. "Being able to tap private equity is crucial to long-term
growth in Asia," explained Ray Hood, director of Asian investments for State Street Bank.
For companies like Carlyle, Asia "is where the rewards will be in the next few years. Investment returns
will be a complete steal."

The advisory board Bush chairs plays a critical role in determining Carlyle's investment strategies in Asia.
Asked how the boards operate, Conway, who attends the annual meetings of the European board,
described an expansive process where advisers strategize about how to create and nurture companies
with a global reach. At a recent meeting of the European board, he said, the consensus was that
"companies that have been more single-country companies are going to have to expand onto
the European stage and ultimately a global stage". To implement the strategy,
Carlyle acquired and combined three companies from Italy, German and the United States;
in another case, it combined two German and Canadian automotive firms.
A member of Carlyle's European board, Conway said, provided key advice
when United Defense bought the Swedish defense firm Bofors last year.

On his trips to Asia, Bush is often accompanied by Baker, who is well known in Asia,
particularly in Japan and South Korea, for his forceful policies when he was treasury secretary to Reagan.
In 1985, Baker was the driving force behind the Plaza Accords that nearly doubled the value of the yen,
driving up the costs of Japanese goods and forcing Japanese manufacturers to invest overseas.
In 1986, he launched a crackdown on the trade practices of South Korea and Taiwan that forced
those newly industrialized countries to shift their exports away from the US market and sell more goods
in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Bush himself has had extensive dealings with Asia, particularly Japan. As president,
he was popular with the Japanese elite because he played down trade friction in favor of closer strategic ties -
a policy followed by his son, George W Bush. In 1991, Prescott Bush, the former president's brother,
raised eyebrows in Japan when he signed on as an investment adviser to a man who turned out to be
the head of one of Japan's largest criminal syndicates; Prescott, pleading ignorance of his client's background,
immediately canceled the deal. In 1990, Jeb Bush, now governor of Florida and the brother of the current president,
went to Japan for his Florida real-estate company and explained to investors that his contacts would make it easier
for them to buy US property.

George W Bush himself had direct experience with non-performing loans when he was an oil executive
and governor in Texas. His knowledge in this area was much in evidence last summer, when Junichiro Koizumi,
the Japanese prime minister, paid his first visit to Bush. As Japanese reporters blinked in wonderment,
Bush went on at some length to explain the importance of restructuring bad loans and banks.

Carlyle's forte is not only money-making. Its executives also influence policy - sometimes profoundly.
Last week, Carlucci, who is chairman of the US-Taiwan Business Council, a coalition of US multinationals
doing business in Taiwan, invited Tang Yiau-ming, Taiwan's defense minister, to attend a closed-door
summit of US and Taiwanese defense officials sponsored by the council and key US military contractors,
including Carlyle's United Defense Industries. Tang's visit, which was capped by a meeting with
US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, marked the highest-level defense contacts between Taipei
and Washington since diplomatic relations were severed in 1979 - and paralleled President Bush's push to expand
arms sales to Taiwan, where Carlyle has significant investments.

At the same time, Bush Sr has not been hesitant about offering advice to his son about issues
that could affect Carlyle's investments in Asia. Last spring, after President Bush stuck a knife in Kim Dae-jung's
"Sunshine Policy" by saying North Korea couldn't be trusted, Bush Sr sent the president a memo written
by Donald Gregg, his former national security adviser who once served as CIA station chief in Seoul,
urging the new administration to ease its hardline policies.

A few weeks later, in a decision the New York Times described as "the first concrete evidence of
the elder Bush's hand in a specific policy arena", George W said that he was willing to talk to the North
"any time, any place". But the president's "axis of evil" speech on January 29, which North Korea took to be
a near declaration of war, ended any hopes of rapprochement and led Pyongyang to cancel a February visit
by Gregg and several other former diplomats. President Bush tried to soften his rhetoric during
his late-February visit to Seoul, but was met instead by the largest anti-US demonstrations of his career.
Carlyle, however, is sanguine about the investment climate in Korea. Bush's "axis" speech
"doesn't add to my level of concern", said Conway.

Since 1987, Carlyle has invested $6.4 billion in 233 transactions, with a rate of return of 36 percent
on its completed investments. It currently has $12.5 billion invested around the world.

((c)2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact ads@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

The Iron Triangle The Carlyle Group Exposed 2004 English with Dutch Subtitles 1



The Iron Triangle The Carlyle Group Exposed 2004 English with Dutch Subtitles 2



The Iron Triangle The Carlyle Group Exposed 2004 English with Dutch Subtitles 3



The Iron Triangle The Carlyle Group Exposed 2004 English with Dutch Subtitles 4



The Iron Triangle The Carlyle Group Exposed 2004 English with Dutch Subtitles 5




http://www.oklahomacitybombing.com/oklahoma-city-bombing.html

The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building after the explosion

http://911research.com/non911/oklahoma/index.html


http://911review.com/precedent/decade/okc.html



http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20060221_oklahoma_city_bombing/


http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0405/oklo_bombing.php3

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building immediately after bombing

http://faculty.umf.maine.edu/~walters/web%20104/104%20outline%2014_08.htm



Oklahoma, 1995, Timothy McVeigh


Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in June 1996;


U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya bombed, August 1998 ;


U.S.S. Cole, October 2000.


NYC: World Trade Center, 9/11

Khadafy (1988 Lockerbie), Al-Qaeda, Taliban: Who are the extremist terrorists?
U.S. Politics: Red states and Blue. Wherefore art the art of compromise, common ground.
Half truths and empty rhetoric.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jevOj3Qh-w

World Trade Center 911 BOMBINGS COVER UP

9/11 - focused analyzed video of the WTCs falling. Notice the early EXPLOSIONS as the floors collapse,
in near perfect timing. Funny how Guiliani and Hillary Clinton were arm in arm that AM and how Bush
has been recorded stating that he knew about the bombings - before it happened; trying to explain
away his lack of surprise when told in the classroom. Share and spread this video around the world,
so everyone can see what is going on in the USA. See http://www.saunalahti.fi/wtc2001/H-de... -
for some excellent analysis of this controlled demolition. Also : http://www.infowars.net/WTC7Report/ -
great info from Alex Jones' InfoWars.Who caused this tragedy ? Republican, Democrat, two sides of
the same Illuminati/Freemason coin. the only way to stop it is to NOT VOTE. Pass the word !



http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/SCH404A.html

EXTRAORDINARY ADMISSION

This extraordinary admission that the FBI had advance plans and the full documentation of where to find everyone
and everything was blithely reported. Only after the detonation of the bomb in the World Trade Center did
"the FBI finally open the boxes." They had been receiving regular reports from "the man they called ‘the Colonel,’
[who] wore a hidden microphone as he moved the inner circle. … There … federal agents heard first-hand
as another plot evolved," one promulgated by their own operative and the rationale for the arrests of June 24.
All the while that the U.S. has sounded the alarm about "Muslim Fundamentalist terror," it has funded
the Islamic Fundamentalist group in Afghanistan led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who has received
to date $3.3 billion in official U.S. aid administered by the CIA.
Many of the figures in the Muslim movement in the U.S., including those accused of involvement in
the World Trade Center bombing, were among those who organized the sending of CIA arms
and funds to Hekmatyar. (See "Late For Work," Prevailing Winds #1.)

The U.S. rulers are terrorizing the American people with operations of their own authorship,
deployed as a rationale for "maintaining vast military budgets for devastating assaults upon Iraq,
Somalia and targets now on the Pentagon drawing board.

[Unknown]

http://www.dailynews.co.th/newstartpage/index.cfm?page=content&categoryId=31&contentID=41462




วันศุกร์ ที่ 08 มกราคม 2553
ลูบคมซีไอเอ

เป็นความสูญเสีย และบทเรียนเจ็บแสบ ของหน่วยข่าวกรองหลักมหาอำนาจสหรัฐ กรณีที่สายลับซีไอเอ
ถูกมือระเบิดฆ่าตัวตาย ที่แฝงตัวในคราบสายลับพวกเดียวกัน สังหารดับดิ้นพร้อมกันถึง 7 คน
ในอัฟกานิสถานเมื่อวันที่ 30 ธ.ค.

ตอนนี้ทางการสหรัฐกำลังสอบสวน หาเบื้องหน้าเบื้องหลังเหตุการณ์ แต่เท่าที่สำนักข่าวเอ็นบีซี ล้วงมาได้
เมื่อวันก่อน ระบุว่า มือระเบิดรายนี้คือ ฮูมัม คาห์ลิล อาบู มาลาล อัล-บาลาวี ชาวจอร์แดน
อดีตสมาชิกเครือข่ายอัลกอ อิดะห์กลับใจ หันมา (หลอก) ให้ความร่วมมือกับรัฐบาลจอร์แดน

หน่วยข่าวกรองจอร์แดน นำตัวบาลาวีไปปฏิบัติการลับ ทางภาคตะวันออกของอัฟกานิสถาน
โดยมีภารกิจพิเศษตามหาตัว นายไอย์มาน อัล-ซาวาฮิรี ชาวอียิปต์ หัวหน้าใหญ่หมายเลข 2 ของอัล กออิดะห์
ซึ่งข่าวกรองระบุว่าหลบซ่อนตัวอยู่ในพื้นที่รอยต่อ ระหว่างอัฟกานิสถานกับปากีสถาน

แต่สุดท้ายบาลาวีสบโอกาส ลงมือปฏิบัติตามที่ตั้งใจไว้แต่แรก ดึงชนวนสายคาดระเบิดที่ซ่อนอยู่ใต้เสื้อผ้า
ร่างเละพร้อมกับสายลับซีไอเอสหรัฐ 7 คน และเจ้าหน้าที่ข่าวกรองจอร์แดน ยศ ร.อ.อีก 1 คน
นอกจากนั้นยังมีผู้โดนสะเก็ดระเบิดบาดเจ็บอีก 6 ราย

เหตุเกิดภายในฐานปฏิบัติการส่วนหน้า จังหวัดโคสต์ของอัฟกานิสถาน ใกล้ชายแดนปากีสถาน
ร.อ.อาลี บิน ไซดี ของหน่วยข่าวกรองแห่งชาติจอร์แดน คือหัวหน้าคนควบคุม และคนนำตัวบาลาวี ไปปฏิบัติการลับ
ร่วมกับซีไอเอสหรัฐในอัฟกานิสถาน และ ร.อ.ไซดียังเป็นสมาชิกคนสำคัญของราชวงศ์จอร์แดนด้วย

ญาติบอกว่า ร.อ.ไซดีเดินทางไปอัฟกานิสถาน 20 วันแล้ว และกำหนดเดินทางกลับบ้าน
เพื่อร่วมฉลองปีใหม่กับญาติมิตรในวันที่โดนระเบิดเสียชีวิต

บาลาวีสามารถเข้านอกออกใน ภายในฐานดังกล่าวได้ตลอดเวลา ดังนั้นวันลงมือก่อเหตุ
จึงไม่มีการตรวจค้นร่างกาย เหมือนกับทุกครั้งก่อนหน้านั้น

เป็นความสูญเสียครั้งใหญ่สุด จากเหตุการณ์เดียว ของสำนักข่าวกรองกลาง หรือซีไอเอ ของสหรัฐ
นับตั้งแต่เหตุการณ์ระเบิดค่ายนาวิกโยธินสหรัฐ ในกรุงเบรุต เมืองหลวงเลบานอนเมื่อวันที่ 23 ต.ค. 2525
ซึ่งมีผู้เสียชีวิต 307 ศพ รวมถึงเจ้าหน้าที่สหรัฐ 241 ศพ

คราวนั้นทีมมือระเบิดพลีชีพ ใช้รถบรรทุกหนักซุกระเบิด รวมน้ำหนัก 5,400 กก.
โจมตีค่าย ซึ่งอยู่แถวสนามบินกรุงเบรุต

บรูซ ไรเดล อดีตสายลับซีไอเอ และที่ปรึกษาทำเนียบขาว เผยรายงานข่าวกรองที่ยังไม่มีการยืนยันว่า
บาลาวีสามารถเข้าไปถึงรัง และถึงตัวซาวาฮิรี และถูกซาวาฮิรีสั่งให้เล่นงานกลับ คอยคาบข่าวรายงานข้อมูล
และความเคลื่อนไหวภายในฐานศัตรู

ตอนแรกบาลาวีเป็นสมาชิกคนสำคัญคนหนึ่งของอัลกออิดะห์ ถูกทางการจอร์แดนจับกุมเมื่อเดือน ธ.ค. 2550
และตอนที่อยู่ในที่คุมขัง ซีไอเอสหรัฐเข้ามามีบทบาทร่วมสอบสวน บาลาวีประกาศให้ความร่วมมือกับ
ทางการจอร์แดน-สหรัฐ และถูกคัดเลือกให้เป็นสายลับ กลับไปล้วงตับอัลกออิดะห์ถึงรังใหญ่

ซึ่งที่ผ่านมาบาลาวีตีบทแตก จนได้รับความไว้วางใจอย่างสูง ทั้งจากซีไอเอสหรัฐ
และหน่วยข่าวกรองแห่งชาติจอร์แดน

เหตุการณ์ที่เกิดขึ้น ยังเป็นการเปิดเผยข้อเท็จจริงอย่างหนึ่ง จอร์แดนแม้จะเป็นชาติพันธมิตร ซี้ปึ้กกับตะวันตก
และอเมริกามานานหลายทศวรรษ แต่ไม่เคยยอมรับหรือยืนยันว่ามีทหารหรือเจ้าหน้าที่ข่าวกรองของตนอยู่ใน
อัฟกานิสถาน อันเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการสนับสนุนสหรัฐ ในการขับไล่ตาลีบันตั้งแต่ปี 2544.

เลนซ์ซูม

[Unknown]

http://www.manager.co.th/Around/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9530000002609


โบสถ์ที่ถูกโจมตีและได้รับความเสียหายมากที่สุด


ชาวมุสลิมประท้วงคัดค้านไม่ให้ชาวคริสต์ใช้คำว่าอัลเลาะห์เรียกพระเจ้า


ชุมนุมประท้วงใหญ่

โบสถ์ 3 แห่งในมาเลย์ถูกปาระเบิดก่อนมุสลิมประท้วงค้านศาสนาอื่นใช้ “อัลเลาะห์”

8 มกราคม 2553 15:38 น.

เอเอฟพี - โบสถ์ 3 แห่งในกรุงกัวลาลัมเปอร์ของมาเลเซียถูกโจมตีด้วยระเบิดเพลิงในเช้าวันนี้
(8) โดยโบสถ์แห่งหนึ่งได้รับความเสียหายหนัก ท่ามกลางความขัดแย้งที่ทวีความรุนแรงขึ้น
เกี่ยวกับความต้องการใช้คำว่า “อัลเลาะห์” เรียกพระเจ้าของคนที่ไม่ได้นับถือศาสนาอิสลาม

ขณะที่กลุ่มชาวมุสลิมกำลังเตรียมการสำหรับการประท้วงทั่วประเทศในวันนี้ (8)เจ้าหน้าที่ตำรวจก็ระดมกำลัง
รักษาความปลอดภัยโบสถ์หลายแห่งทั่วประเทศ หลังโบสถ์แห่งหนึ่งย่านชานกรุงกัวลาลัมเปอร์เกิดไฟไหม้
เนื่องจากถูกโจมตีด้วยระเบิดเพลิง

ผู้บัญชาการตำรวจกรุงกัวลาลัมเปอร์กล่าวว่า เกิดเหตุเพลิงไหม้ที่โบสถ์เดซา เมลาวาตี เมื่อเวลาประมาณ 00.25 น.
ตามเวลาท้องถิ่นในเช้าวันนี้ ไม่มีรายงานผู้บาดเจ็บ และกำลังสอบสวนสาเหตุ ซึ่งคาดว่าเป็นการวางเพลิง
โดยมีผู้เห็นคนร้าย 2 คนขี่รถจักรยานยนต์เข้ามา และปาระเบิดเพลิงใส่ ทำให้พื้นที่ชั้นล่างเสียหายร้อยละ 90

ยิ่งไปกว่านั้น ยังมีการปาระเบิดขวดดังกล่าวเข้าไปในบริเวณโบสถ์อีก 2 แห่ง ทว่า
ไม่ได้รับความเสียหายร้ายแรงแต่อย่างใด

ด้านฮิชัมมุดดิน ฮุสเซน รัฐมนตรีมหาดไทยของมาเลเซียวอนขอให้ประชาชนอยู่ในความสงบ
ท่ามกลางความขัดแย้งเกี่ยวกับการใช้คำว่า “อัลเลาะห์” เรียกศาสดาของชาวคริสต์
พร้อมการเคลื่อนไหวเพื่อให้ชนกลุ่มน้อยในมาเลเซียมั่นใจว่าพวกเขาจะปลอดภัย

ทั้งนี้ ในสัปดาห์ที่ผ่านมา ศาลฎีกาตัดสินอนุญาตให้หนังสือพิมพ์เดอะ เฮรัลด์ ในเครือคาทอลิก
ใช้คำว่า “อัลเลาะห์” เรียกพระเจ้าของชาวคริสต์ได้ด้วย ซึ่งรัฐบาลชี้ว่าคำๆ นี้
ควรใช้กันเฉพาะชาวมุสลิมเท่านั้น ทั้งยังยื่นอุทธรณ์ต่อศาลเพื่อให้พิจารณาคดีดังกล่าวใหม่อีกครั้ง

ประเด็นดังกล่าวยังส่งผลกระทบต่อความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างชาวมุสลิม ซึ่งเป็นประชากรส่วนใหญ่ของประเทศ
กับชาวจีน และชาวอินเดีย ซึ่งเป็นชนส่วนน้อย ที่มีทั้งศาสนาคริสต์ ฮินดู และพุทธ

[Unknown]

Summer 1998: CIA Breaks up Islamic Jihad Cell in Albania

A joint surveillance operation conducted by the CIA and Albanian intelligence identifies an Islamic Jihad cell
that is allegedly planning to bomb the US Embassy in Tirana, Albania’s capital. The cell was created in
the early 1990s by Mohammed al-Zawahiri, brother of Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The operation intercepts lengthy discussions between the cell and Ayman. [New Yorker, 2/8/2005;
Wright, 2006, pp. 269] At the behest of the US government, Egypt, which is co-operating with the US
over renditions (see Summer 1995), issues an arrest warrant for Shawki Salama Attiya, one of the militants
in the cell. Albanian forces then arrest Attiya and four of the other suspected militants. A sixth suspect is killed,
but two more escape. The men are taken to an abandoned airbase, where they are interrogated by the CIA,
and then flown by a CIA-chartered plane to Cairo, Egypt, for further interrogation. The men are tortured
after arriving in Egypt:

Ahmed Saleh is suspended from the ceiling and given electric shocks; he is later hanged for
a conviction resulting from a trial held in his absence;
Mohamed Hassan Tita is hung from his wrists and given electric shocks to his feet and back;
Attiya is given electric shocks to his genitals, suspended by his limbs and made to stand for hours
in filthy water up to his knees;
Ahmed al-Naggar is kept in a room for 35 days with water up to his knees, and has electric shocks
to his nipples and penis; he is later hanged for an offence for which he was convicted in absentia;
Essam Abdel-Tawwab will also describe more torture for which prosecutors later find “recovered wounds.”

On August 5, 1998, a letter by Ayman al-Zawahiri will be published that threatens retaliation for the Albanian
abductions (see August 5, 1998). Two US embassies in Africa will be bombed two days later
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [Washington Post, 3/11/2002, pp. A01; New Yorker, 2/8/2005;
Grey, 2007, pp. 128] The US State Department will later speculate that the timing of the embassy bombings
was in fact in retaliation for these arrests. [Ottawa Citizen, 12/15/2001]

June 12, 1998: State Department Issues Warning of Bin Laden Attack, but Not in Africa

On May 26, 1998, Osama bin Laden said at a press conference that there would be “good news”
in coming weeks (see May 26, 1998). On June 12, the State Department issues a public warning, stating,
“We take those threats seriously and the United States is increasing security at many US government facilities
in the Middle East and Asia.” Notably, the State Department does not mention increasing security in Africa.
Two US embassies will be bombed there in August 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
There are no other public warnings given before the embassy bombings. [Bergen, 2001, pp. 110]

Mid-Summer 1998: MI6 and Moroccans Begin Discussions with Embassy Bombing Cell Member about Recruitment

The British intelligence service MI6 and Moroccan intelligence approach al-Qaeda operative
L’Houssaine Kherchtou in an attempt to recruit him. Kherchtou is disillusioned with al-Qaeda and
has been under surveillance by the Moroccans for some time. The results of the first meeting are not known,
but after it Kherchtou returns to Nairobi, Kenya, where he had helped with a plot to bomb the US embassy
and provided his apartment to other conspirators (see Late 1993-Late 1994), and makes contact with other cell
members again in early August. He apparently does not know the precise details of the operation,
but when the attack happens (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), he realizes who did it. MI6 is aware that
he is in Kenya and he is detained at the airport by local authorities and turned over to them. MI6 debriefs him
about the embassy bombings, but this information is not immediately shared with the FBI
(see Shortly After August 7, 1998), which later takes him into custody (see Summer 2000).
[American Prospect, 6/19/2005]

July 29-August 7, 1998: NSA Listens to Surge of Phone Calls about Upcoming Embassy Bombings; No Warnings Are Given


Khalid al-Fawwaz. [Source: CNN]

The NSA is monitoring phone calls between bin Laden in Afghanistan and Khalid al-Fawwaz in London,
yet no action is taken after al-Fawwaz is given advanced notice of the African embassy bombings
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Al-Fawwaz, together with Ibrahim Eidarous and Adel Abdel Bary,
are operating as bin Laden’s de facto international media office in London, and the NSA has listened
in for two years as bin Laden called them over 200 times (see November 1996-Late August 1998).
On July 29, 1998, al-Fawwaz is called from Afghanistan and told that more satellite minutes are needed
because many calls are expected in the next few days. Al-Fawwaz calls a contact in the US and rush orders
400 more minutes for bin Laden’s phone. A flurry of calls on bin Laden’s phone ensues, though what is said
has not been publicly revealed. [Knight Ridder, 9/20/2001] On August 7 at around 4:45 a.m., about three hours
before the bombings take place, a fax taking credit for the bombings is sent to a shop near al-Fawwaz’s office.
The fingerprints of his associates Eidarous and Abdel Bary are later found on the fax. They fax a copy of this
to the media from a post office shortly after the bombings and their fingerprints are found on that fax as well.
[Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 7/13/1999; Daily Telegraph, 9/19/2001] Canadian intelligence is monitoring
an operative named Mahmoud Jaballah who is serving as a communication relay between operatives in Baku
and London. He is monitored talking to people both in Baku and London just before the fax is sent from
Baku to London (see August 5-7, 1998). The NSA has also been monitoring the operatives in Baku
(see November 1996-Late August 1998). It is not clear why the Canadians or the NSA fail to warn about
the bombings based on these monitored phone calls. Before 9/11, bin Laden’s phone calls were regularly
translated and analyzed in less an hour or so. It has not been explained why this surge of phone calls
before the embassy bombings did not result in any new attack warnings. The three men will be arrested
shortly after the embassy bombings (see Early 1994-September 23, 1998).

August 1998: US Intelligence Monitoring ‘Very Important Source’ Linked to Al-Qaeda in Sudan

US intelligence is reportedly monitoring a “very important source” in Khartoum, Sudan,
during the time of the August 1998 US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
An unnamed US official working in Sudan at the time will later tell this to journalist Jonathan Randal.
This official will claim the US is intercepting telephone communications between this source and al-Qaeda
at least during 1998. The name of the source has not been revealed, but this person is considered so important
that after the embassy bombings the US will consider killing the source in retaliation. However,
a different target is chosen because the source either knows nothing about the bombings or at least
does not mention them in intercepted conversations. [Randal, 2005, pp. 152]
It is not known when this surveillance ends or what happens to the source.

August 4-19, 1998: US Refuses Extradition of Two Embassy Bombers


Sayyid Iskandar Suliman. This picture is from a poor photocopy of his passport found
in Sudanese intelligence files. [Source: Public domain via Richard Miniter]

On August 4, 1998, Sudanese immigration suspects two men, Sayyid Nazir Abbass and
Sayyid Iskandar Suliman, arriving in Sudan, apparently due to something in their Pakistani passports.
They attempt to rent an apartment overlooking the US embassy. Three days later, US embassies are bombed
in Kenya and Tanzania (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Within hours, Sudanese officials arrest Abbass
and Suliman. The two of them had just come from Kenya, and one of them quickly admits to staying in the same
hotel in Kenya as some of the embassy bombers. Sudanese intelligence believes they are al-Qaeda operatives
involved in the bombings. [Observer, 9/30/2001; Vanity Fair, 1/2002; Randal, 2005, pp. 132-135] The US embassy
in Sudan has been shut down for several years. But around August 14, a Sudanese intelligence official contacts
an intermediary and former White House employee named Janet McElligott and gives her a vague message that
Sudan is holding important suspects and the FBI should send a team immediately to see if they want to take
custody of them. [Randal, 2005, pp. 132-135]
The FBI wants the two men, but on August 17, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright forbids their extradition.
The US has decided to bomb a factory in Sudan in retaliation for the embassy bombings instead of cooperating
with Sudan. But FBI agent John O’Neill is not yet aware of Albright’s decision, and word of the Sudanese offer
reaches him on August 19. He wants immediate approval to arrest the two suspects and flies to Washington
that evening to discuss the issue with counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke. But Clarke tells O’Neill to speak
to Attorney General Janet Reno. Later that night, O’Neill talks to Reno and she tells him that the decision
to retaliate against Sudan instead has already been made. Mere hours later, the US attack a factory in Sudan
with cruise missiles (see August 20, 1998). Within days, it becomes apparent that the factory had no link to
al-Qaeda (see September 23, 1998), and no link between the bombings and the Sudanese government will emerge
(although Sudan harbored bin Laden until 1996). [Randal, 2005, pp. 132-138] The Sudanese will continue to hold
the two men in hopes to make a deal with the US. But the US is not interested, so after two weeks they are send
to Pakistan and set free there (see August 20-September 2, 1998).

August 5, 1998: Threat Precedes Embassy Bombings

The Islamic Jihad, a militant group that has joined forces with al-Qaeda, issues a statement threatening
to retaliate against the US for its involvement rounding up an Islamic Jihad cell in Albania (see Summer 1998).
It is believed Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote the statement, which says, “We wish to inform the Americans…
of preparations for a response which we hope they read with care, because we shall write it with the help of God
in the language they understand.” The bombing of two US embassies in Africa follows two days later
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [CNN, 1/2001; Wright, 2006, pp. 269]

August 6-7, 1998: Most Bombers Fly to Pakistan just before African Embassy Bombings

Most of the al-Qaeda operatives involved in the African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998)
leave the country the night before the bombings. Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani fly
from Nairobi to Karachi, Pakistan, on one flight. Fahid Muhammad Ally Msalam, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh,
and five unnamed bombers fly from Nairobi to Karachi with a stopover in Dubai on another flight.
Some use false passports, but others, such as Abdullah, travel in their real name.
Two others, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan and Mustafa Fadhil, flew to Pakistan on August 2. Odeh is arrested
at 5:30 a.m., Kenya time, while going through customs in Karachi, but the others on his flight are not
(see 5:30 a.m., August 7, 1998). Two suicide bombers are killed in the bombings. The only operatives who remain
in East Africa after the bombings are Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Haroun Fazul), who volunteered to clean up
the evidence in Kenya, and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who volunteered to do the same in Tanzania,
plus Mohamed al-Owhali, one of the suicide bombers in Kenya who unexpectedly ran away at the last minute
and survived with only minor injuries. [United Press International, 1/2/2001;
United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 38, 5/2/2001] Given the extent to which US intelligence
was monitoring the members of the Kenyan cell (see April 1996 and May 1998), and even reportedly had multiple
informants in the cell (see Before August 7, 1998), it is unclear how the US missed the departure of nearly
every suspect from Kenya.

August 7, 1998: Third African Embassy Bombing Is Aborted

Al-Qaeda operatives plan to bomb the US embassy in Kampala, Uganda, at the same time the embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania are bombed (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), but there is a delay at the last moment.
Police arrest 18 people over the next two weeks before the attack can be carried out. A Ugandan official will later say,
“The attacks were planned to be more serious and devastating” than the other two. It is unclear what becomes of
these 18 suspects; none of them are tried in the US. [Associated Press, 9/25/1998; Reeve, 1999, pp. 200]

5:30a.m., August 7, 1998: Bomber Arrested in Pakistan Four Hours before
Embassy Bombings; US Officials Keep His Immediate Confession Secret for
Over a Week

At approximately 5:30 in the morning, Kenya time, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh is arrested at the airport
in Karachi, Pakistan. Odeh is one of the bombers in the embassy bombings which take place four hours later
in Kenya and Tanzania (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
[United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 38, 5/2/2001]
Odeh Stopped Because of Alert Inspector or CIA? - He had flown out of Nairobi, Kenya, the night before,
with his plane stopping in Dubai on the way to Pakistan (see August 6-7, 1998).
According to some accounts, an inspector notices that Odeh’s passport picture has a beard,
while Odeh does not have a beard and looks different. Furthermore, Odeh is unable to look the inspector
in the eyes. But according to UPI, he is stopped because he had been identified by the CIA. In any case,
over the next hours, he is handed over to intelligence officers and makes a full confession.
He admits that he is a member of al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, and that he is the head of the al-Qaeda cell in Kenya.
He even gives the address of the villa where the bomb was built and the names of the other bombers.
[Bergen, 2001, pp. 116; United Press International, 1/2/2001; Associated Press, 4/3/2001;
Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 213] False or Mistaken Account by CIA Officer
- CIA officer Gary Berntsen heads the CIA’s emergency deployment team to Tanzania
in the immediate wake of the bombings. He will improbably claim in a 2005 book that
the US at first primarily suspects Hezbollah.
According to him, it is only on August 15 when a CIA officer in Karachi happens to notice an article saying
that an Arab traveling on a false passport was arrested in Karachi near the time of the bombings.
This is discovered to be Odeh, who is transferred to US custody. Only then does al-Qaeda’s involvement
become clear. Perhaps to support this timeline, Berntsen also falsely claims that another bomber,
Mohamed al-Owhali, is arrested on August 15 when in fact he is arrested three days earlier.
[United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 38, 5/2/2001; Berntsen and Pezzullo, 2005]
Odeh's Confession and Other Al-Qaeda Evidence Kept Secret for Days
- Publicly, the US does not link any evidence from the bombing to al-Qaeda until August 17,
when Odeh’s confession is finally mentioned in front page news stories. Even then, the story is based on
accounts from Pakistani officials and US officials say they cannot confirm it. [Washington Post, 8/17/1998]
In fact, there is a wealth of information immediately tying al-Qaeda to the bombings that is kept secret,
including wiretaps of many of the bombers (see April 1996 and May 1998), informants in the cell
(see Before August 7, 1998), and even a statement of responsibility that was intercepted hours
before the bombings had occurred (see August 5-7, 1998).

10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998: Al-Qaeda Bombs US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Killing Over 200


Bombings of the Nairobi, Kenya, US embassy (left), and the Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
US embassy (right). [Source: Associated Press] (click image to enlarge)

Two US embassies in Africa are bombed within minutes of each other. At 10:35, local time,
a suicide car bomb attack in Nairobi, Kenya, kills 213 people, including 12 US nationals, and injures more than
4,500. Mohamed al-Owhali and someone known only as Azzam are the suicide bombers, but al-Owhali runs away
at the last minute and survives. Four minutes later, a suicide car bomb attack in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
kills 11 and injures 85. The attacks are blamed on al-Qaeda. Hamden Khalif Allah Awad is the suicide bomber there.
[PBS Frontline, 2001; United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden, et al., Day 38, 5/2/2001]
The Tanzania death toll is low because, remarkably, the attack takes place on a national holiday so
the US embassy there is closed. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 195] The attack shows al-Qaeda
has a capability for simultaneous attacks.The Tanzania bombing appears to have been a late addition,
as one of the arrested bombers allegedly told US agents that it was added to the plot only about 10 days in advance.
[United State of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., Day 14, 3/7/2001] A third attack against the US embassy
in Uganda does not take place due to a last minute delay (see August 7, 1998). [Associated Press, 9/25/1998]
August 7, 1998, is the eighth anniversary of the arrival of US troops in Saudi Arabia, and some speculate
that is the reason for the date of the bombings. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 46] In the 2002 book The Cell,
reporters John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Miller will write, “What has become clear with time is that
facets of the East Africa plot had been known beforehand to the FBI, the CIA, the State Department,
and to Israeli and Kenyan intelligence services.… [N]o one can seriously argue that the horrors of August 7,1998,
couldn’t have been prevented.” They will also comment, “Inexplicable as the intelligence failure was,
more baffling still was that al-Qaeda correctly presumed that a major attack could be carried out by
a cell that US agents had already uncovered.” [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 195, 206]
After 9/11, it will come to light that three of the alleged hijackers,
Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi, had some involvement in the bombings
(see October 4, 2001, Late 1999, and 1993-1999) and that the US intelligence community was aware of
this involvement by late 1999 (see December 15-31, 1999), if not before.

[Unknown]

August 8-15, 1998: Bombing Informant Again Reveals Key Information

In November 1997, an Egyptian named Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed walked into the US embassy
in Nairobi, Kenya, and told CIA officers of a group planning to blow up the embassy (see November 1997).
His warning would turn out to be a startlingly accurate description of the 1998 US embassy bombing
in Nairobi (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Ahmed apparently is involved in the bombing of
the US embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that takes place the same day the Nairobi embassy is bombed.
One day after the attacks, Ahmed contacts the British embassy and offers to help. He is overheard saying,
“I told them everything I knew.” He also tells the British that it was “not the first time” he had cooperated
with Western officials, and that he had been doing so “since last year.”
[New York Times, 10/23/1998; New York Times, 1/9/1999] CIA officer Gary Berntsen will later reveal that
he meets Ahmed as Ahmed is being kicked out of an allied government’s embassy. Berntsen then interviews
Ahmed, and while the account of the interview is almost completely censored, Ahmed apparently gives
information that leads to the arrest of one of the embassy bombers in Pakistan on August 15.
This is the crucial break that allows the US to conclusively determine al-Qaeda’s role in the bombings
and arrest some of the other bombers. [Berntsen and Pezzullo, 2005, pp. 22-25]
The US does not ask for Ahmed’s extradition, and he is charged for the Tanzania bombing in that country.
The New York Times will report, “Several non-American diplomats in the region [speculate] that
the United States is allowing the Tanzanians to try Mr. Ahmed because they fear his trial in America
might bring to light his dealings with American authorities and other Western intelligence services.”
[New York Times, 10/23/1998; New York Times, 1/9/1999] In March 2000, Tanzania will announce that
all charges against Ahmed have been dropped and he is being deported. No reason will be given.
[New York Times, 3/20/2000]

August 9, 1998: Ali Mohamed Tells FBI He Knows Who the Embassy Bombers Are but Won’t Name Names; He Is Not Arrested

Two days after the US embassy bombings in Africa (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
the FBI interview double agent Ali Mohamed over the telephone. Mohamed is living openly in California.
He says al-Qaeda is behind the bombings and that he knows who the perpetrators are, but he won’t give
their names to the FBI. He also tries to downplay his involvement in the bombings, saying that he lived
in Kenya in 1994 and ran front companies for bin Laden there, but when he was shown a file containing
a plan to attack the US embassy in Kenya, he “discouraged” the cell members from carrying out the attack.
A week later, prosecutors subpoena Mohamed to testify before a grand jury hearing in New York to be held
in September. Author Peter Lance will later comment, “Considering that Mohamed had told [US Attorney Patrick]
Fitzgerald at their dinner meeting in the fall of 1997 (see October 1997) that he had fake passports and the means
to leave the country quickly, it’s mind-boggling how long it took the Feds to search his home…”
They do not arrive at his house until August 24 (see August 24, 1998). On August 27, he again tells the FBI
on the phone that he knows who the bombers are but again refuses to name names. He will not be arrested
until September 10 (see September 10, 1998). [New York Times, 1/13/2001; Lance, 2006, pp. 296]

Mid-August 1998: Al-Qaeda Operative Tells FBI about Planned Yemen Attack

Mohamed al-Owhali is arrested and immediately begins confessing to FBI investigators his role in the recent
al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). In addition to
revealing the existence of an al-Qaeda network in the US planning an attack there (August 12-25, 1998)
and also revealing the phone number of a key al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late August 1998),
it appears he also reveals al-Qaeda plans for an attack in Yemen. In October 2000, Al-Qaeda operatives bombed
the USS Cole in a port in Yemen (see October 12, 2000). In January 2001, in coverage of al-Owhali’s trial for
his role in the embassy bombings, a court document mentions that during his interrogation he mentioned
“a possible attack in Yemen.” [CNN, 1/19/2001] However, one newspaper notes, “It could not be learned
how the authorities followed up on the information or how detailed it was.” [New York Times, 1/18/2001]
It will later be revealed that al-Owhali identified the two leaders of the Cole bombing as participants in
the planning for the US embassy bombings. [CNN, 10/16/2001]

August17-Late August 1998: President Clinton Criticized for Using Missile
Strike on Al-Qaeda as Distraction from Personal Sex Scandal

In 1998, President Clinton faces a growing scandal about his sexual relationship with aide Monica Lewinsky,
and even faces the possibility of impeachment over the matter. He is publicly interrogated about the scandal
on August 17, 1998. Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke will later claim that he worries Clinton might let
the timing of the scandal get in the way of acting on new intelligence to hit Osama bin Laden
with a missile strike in retaliation for the recent African embassy bombings
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). But Clarke is reassured when Clinton tells his advisers,
“Do you all recommend that we strike on the 20th? Fine. Do not give me political advice or personal advice
about the timing. That’s my problem. Let me worry about that.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 185-186]
Defense Secretary William Cohen also warns Clinton that he will be criticized for changing the subject from
the Lewinsky scandal. [Benjamin and Simon, 2005, pp. 358] Criticism from Politicians - Clinton gives the go-ahead
for the missile strike on August 20th anyway (see August 20, 1998) and is immediately widely criticized for it.
In late 1997, there was a popular movie called “Wag the Dog” based on a fictional president
who creates an artificial crisis in order to distract the public from a domestic scandal.
Republicans are particularly critical and seize upon a comparison to the movie. House Speaker Newt Gingrich
(R) initially supports the missile strike, but later criticizes it as mere “pinpricks.”
[9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 117] Sen. Arlen Specter (R) says, “The president was considering doing
something presidential to try to focus attention away from his personal problems.”
[Benjamin and Simon, 2005, pp. 358-359] Sen. Daniel Coats (R) says, “I just hope and pray the decision
that was made was made on the basis of sound judgment, and made for the right reasons, and not made
because it was necessary to save the president’s job.” [New York Times, 8/4/2004] Media Criticism
- The media is also very critical, despite a lack of any evidence that Clinton deliberately timed the missile
strike as a distraction. Television networks repeatedly show clips of the “Wag the Dog” movie
after the missile strike. New Yorker journalist Seymour Hersh reports, “Some reporters questioned
whether the president had used military force to distract the nation’s attention from the Lewinsky scandal.”
[Benjamin and Simon, 2005, pp. 358-359] 9/11 Commission Commentary - The 9/11 Commission will later conclude,
“The failure of the strikes, the ‘wag the dog’ slur, the intense partisanship of the period, and the [fact that one
of the missile targets probably had no connection to bin Laden (see September 23, 1998)] likely had a cumulative
effect on future decisions about the use of force against bin Laden.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 118]

August 19, 1998: CIA Learns Bin Laden’s Travel Plans before Missile Strike

Through its own monitoring of Osama bin Laden’s satellite phone,
the CIA determines that he intends to travel to a training camp in Khost, in eastern Afghanistan.
The CIA has to use its own equipment to do this because of a dispute with the NSA, which refused to
provide it with full details of its intercepts of bin Laden’s calls (see December 1996). Although the CIA
can only get half of what the NSA gets, shortly after the attacks on US embassies in East Africa
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), it determines that bin Laden will travel to Khost the next day.
On that day, the US launches several missile strikes, one of which is against Khost
(see August 20, 1998), but bin Laden does not travel there, evading the missiles. Some will later claim that
bin Laden changes his mind on the way there for no particular reason,
but there will also be allegations that the Pakistani ISI warned him of the upcoming attack
(see July 1999). [Wright, 2006, pp. 283]

August 20, 1998: Al-Zawahiri Denies Responsibility for Embassy Bombing

Around the time of a US missile strike against al-Qaeda leaders (see August 20, 1998),
Ayman al-Zawahiri uses Osama bin Laden’s satellite phone to speak to Rahimullah Yusufzai,
a leading Pakistani reporter for the BBC and the Karachi-based News. During the call, Al-Zawahiri denies
al-Qaeda is responsible for attacks on two US embassies in East Africa, which killed over 200 people
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998):
“Mr. bin Laden has a message. He says, ‘I have not bombed the American embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. I have declared jihad, but I was not involved.’”
Although bin Laden’s trial for the embassy bombings in Afghanistan, arranged by the Taliban,
collapses when the US fails to provide sufficient evidence of his involvement
(see (October 25-November 20, 1998)), bin Laden is generally thought to have known of and
authorized the two attacks. [Wright, 2006, pp. 279, 283]

August 22-25 1998: Embassy Bomber Identifies Photo of Al-Qaeda Leader

After he is arrested for the Nairobi embassy bombing (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
Mohamed al-Owhali is questioned by local Kenyan law enforcement and the FBI,
and discloses important information (see August 4-25, 1998).
When he is shown photographs of al-Qaeda operatives, one of the people he identifies is
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (a.k.a. Bilal), a cousin of another Nairobi bomber. Al-Nashiri is an al-Qaeda leader
who helped al-Owhali obtain a false passport in Yemen when al-Owhali stayed at an al-Qaeda safe house
in April-May 1998. It is unclear where the FBI obtained the photo of al-Nashiri, although US intelligence was
previously informed of al-Nashiri’s involvement in a plot to smuggle anti-tank missiles into Saudi Arabia
(see 1997). [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/9/1998, pp. 16 ;
United State of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., Day 14, 3/7/2001; Burke, 2004, pp. 174;
9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3]

August 24, 1998: Ali Mohamed’s Apartment Searched in Wake of Embassy Bombings; He Is Linked to the Bombers but Is Not Arrested

Two days after the US embassy bombings in Africa (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), double agent
Ali Mohamed told the FBI over the telephone that he knows who the perpetrators are, but he won’t reveal
their names (see August 9, 1998). Mohamed is living openly in Sacramento, California, but is not arrested.
A week later, he received a subpoena ordering him to testify before a grand jury hearing in New York
to be held in September. On August 24, a ten-person team of federal agents secretly search Mohamed’s apartment.
They copy computer files and photograph documents.His computer has been bugged since October 1997,
but agents nonetheless clone his hard drives. They also copy his CD-Roms and floppy disks and
photocopy documents. Then they try to hide any trace that they have been in his apartment.
They discover a false passport and a number of training documents. One file, created in May 1998,
discusses security measures for terrorist cells and specifically mentions his links to al-Qaeda.
They even find documents from the Nairobi al-Qaeda cell and training manuals.
[San Francisco Chronicle, 9/21/2001; Raleigh News and Observer, 10/21/2001; Wall Street Journal, 11/26/2001;
Lance, 2006, pp. 296] However, he will still not be arrested until September 10 (see September 10, 1998).

Late August 1998: US Intelligence Community Begins Joint Surveillance of Al-Qaeda Communications Hub


Al-Qaeda’s communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen. [Source: PBS NOVA]

The investigation of the East Africa embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998)
led to the discovery of the phone number of an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen
(see August 4-25, 1998). The hub is run by an al-Qaeda veteran named Ahmed al-Hada,
who is helped by his son Samir and is related to many other al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen and elsewhere.
He is also the father in law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar, whose wife, Hoda al-Hada, lives at the hub
with their children. [Newsweek, 6/2/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; MSNBC, 7/21/2004;
Suskind, 2006, pp. 94; Wright, 2006, pp. 277, 309, 343, 378] Several of Ahmed al-Hada’s relatives die fighting
for al-Qaeda before 9/11, a fact known to US intelligence. [Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2005; Guardian, 2/15/2006]
The NSA may already be aware of the phone number, as they have been intercepting Osama bin Laden’s
communications for some time (see November 1996-Late August 1998) and, according to Newsweek,
“some” of bin Laden’s 221 calls to Yemen are to this phone number. [Newsweek, 2/18/2002;
Sunday Times (London), 3/24/2002; Media Channel, 9/5/2006]
The US intelligence community now begins a joint effort to monitor the number.
The NSA and CIA jointly plant bugs inside the house, tap the phones,
and monitor visitors with spy satellites.
[Mirror, 6/9/2002; Wright, 2006, pp. 343; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ]
US intelligence also learns that the communications hub is an al-Qaeda “logistics center,” used by agents
around the world to communicate with each other and plan attacks. [Newsweek, 6/2/2002]
The joint effort enables the FBI to map al-Qaeda’s global organization (see Late 1998-Early 2002)
and at least three of the hijackers use the number, enabling the NSA to intercept their communications
and find out about an important al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia (see December 29, 1999 and January 5-8, 2000
and Early 2000-Summer 2001). It appears al-Qaeda continues to use this phone line until Samir al-Hada dies
resisting arrest in early 2002 (see February 13, 2002).

August 26, 1998: African Embassy Bomber Rendered to US

Mohamed al-Owhali, one of the bombers of the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), is rendered from Kenya to the US. Al-Owhali was arrested in Nairobi
after the bombing and gave up information to local authorities and the FBI about it
(see August 4-25, 1998 and August 22-25 1998). He will be tried in the US and sentenced to life in prison
(see October 21, 2001). [Grey, 2007, pp. 129, 246]

Late August 1998: NSA Defies Order to Share Raw Intelligence with Other Agencies

Following the African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
CIA managers ask Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, what it most needs to improve the agency’s
capabilities against al-Qaeda. Alec Station chief Michael Scheuer will later say that he raises
“our dire need for verbatim reports derived from electronic collection.” This is a reference to his desire
to get verbatim transcripts of calls to and from al-Qaeda’s operations hub in Yemen, in particular ones
between it and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. The NSA has the transcripts, but is refusing to provide them
to the CIA, and the two agencies have been at loggerheads over the issue for nearly two years.
Alec Station needs the transcripts, not the summaries the NSA provides, because the operatives
talk in code on the phone and this code cannot be cracked based on the summaries, only using the transcripts
(see February 1996-May 1998, December 1996, After December 1996, and After December 1996).
Other senior CIA officers have similar trouble getting transcripts from the NSA. Higher officials order the NSA
to comply, and they do, but only for less than 12 requests. Then the system returns to the way it was,
with NSA only sharing summaries. [Atlantic Monthly, 12/2004] The reason for the change back is unclear,
although bin Laden stops using his satellite phone around this time (see Late August 1998).

September 10, 1998: Ali Mohamed Secretly Arrested Despite Failure to Share Information Between US Agencies


Patrick Fitzgerald [Source: Publicity photo]

Ali Mohamed is finally arrested after testifying at a grand jury hearing. The arrest is officially kept secret,
but the media will report it one month later. [New York Times, 10/30/1998] Patrick Fitzgerald is on the
prosecutor team that subpoenaed Mohamed to appear, but apparently he and the other prosecutors know
very little about Mohamed. Fitzgerald blames this on a legal “wall” between intelligence gathering and
criminal prosecution. He later will relate what happened on the day Mohamed testified: “Ali Mohamed lied
in that grand jury proceeding and left the courthouse to go to his hotel, followed by FBI agents,
but not under arrest. He had imminent plans to fly to Egypt. It was believed [by the prosecutors] at the time
that Mohamed lied and that he was involved with the al-Qaeda network but Mohamed had not by then
been tied to the [embassy] bombings. The decision had to be made at that moment whether to charge Mohamed
with false statements. If not, Mohamed would leave the country. That difficult decision had to be made without
knowing or reviewing the intelligence information on the other side of the ‘wall.’ It was ultimately decided to
arrest Mohamed that night in his hotel room [and he was arrested]. [The prosecution] team got lucky
but we never should have had to rely on luck. The prosecution team later obtained access to
the intelligence information, including documents obtained from an earlier search of Mohamed’s home by
the intelligence team on the other side of ‘the wall.’ Those documents included direct written communications
with al-Qaeda members and a library of al-Qaeda training materials that would have made the decision
far less difficult. (We could only obtain that access after the arrest with the specific permission of the
Attorney General of the United States, based upon the fact that we had obligations to provide the defendant
with discovery materials and because the intelligence investigation of Mohamed had effectively ended.)…
Mohamed [later] stated that had he not been arrested on that day in September 1998, he had intended to travel
to Afghanistan to rejoin Osama bin Laden. Thus, while the right decision to arrest was made partly in the dark,
the ‘wall’ could easily have caused a different decision that September evening that would have allowed
a key player in the al-Qaeda network to escape justice for the embassy bombing in Kenya and rejoin
Osama bin Laden in a cave in Afghanistan, instead of going to federal prison.” [US Congress, 10/21/2003]
Mohamed’s associate Khaled Abu el-Dahab, now living in Egypt, wil hear of Mohamed’s arrest and
attempt to leave the country, but will be arrested in October 1998. He will be put on trial there and sentenced
to 15 years in prison (see 1999). [San Francisco Chronicle, 11/21/2001]

September 15, 1998: US Arrests Bin Laden’s Personal Secretary


Wadih El Hage. [Source: FBI]

On September 15, 1998, Wadih El-Hage is arrested in the US after appearing before a US grand jury.
A US citizen, he had been bin Laden’s personal secretary. He will later be convicted for a role in the 1998
US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [New York Times, 9/18/1998]

[Unknown]

Shortly After September 15, 1998: US Investigators Find Mention of ‘Joint Venture’ between Al-Qaeda and Texas Charity

In the wake of the US embassy bombings in Africa (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
the US arrests Wadih El-Hage, who will later be convicted for his role in those bombings.
Looking through his diaries, investigators discover a reference to a “joint venture”
between al-Qaeda and the Holy Land Foundation, a charity based in Texas
known for its support of Hamas.
The name and phone number of a Texas man connected to Holy Land is also found in El-Hage’s
address book (see September 16, 1998-September 5, 2001). The US had considered taking action
against Holy Land in 1995 (see January 1995-April 1996) and again in 1997 (1997).
Yet, as the Wall Street Journal will later note, “Even when [this] evidence surfaced in 1998
suggesting a tie between the foundation and Osama bin Laden, federal investigators didn’t act.”
[Wall Street Journal, 2/27/2002]

September 20, 1998: Important Al-Qaeda Leader Arrested in Germany


Mamdouh Mahmud Salim. [Source: FBI]

Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer), an al-Qaeda operative from the United Arab Emirates
connected to the 1998 US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998, is arrested near
Munich, Germany. [PBS, 9/30/1998] The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later call him bin Laden’s “
right hand man,” and “head of bin Laden’s computer operations and weapons procurement.”
He is also “the most senior-level bin Laden operative arrested” up until this time.
[New York Times, 9/29/2001; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]
Author Lawrence Wright will later note that bin Laden and Salim worked together in Afghanistan
in the 1980s, “forging such powerful bonds that no one could get between them.” Salim was also
one of the founding members of al-Qaeda (see August 11-20, 1988) and bin Laden’s personal imam
(i.e., preacher). [Wright, 2006, pp. 131, 170] Starting in 1995, Salim had been making frequent visits to Germany.
Mamoun Darkazanli, who lived in Hamburg and associated with Mohamed Atta’s al-Qaeda cell,
had signing powers over Salim’s bank account. Both men attended al-Quds mosque, the same Hamburg mosque
as hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi. [Vanity Fair, 1/2002] The FBI learns much from Salim
about al-Qaeda, and this information could have been useful to the US embassy bombings investigation.
However, the FBI is unwilling to brief their German counterparts on what they know about Salim and al-Qaeda.
[New York Times, 9/29/2001]

September 23, 1998-July 12, 1999: Bin Laden’s London Office Is Shut Down

Khalid al-Fawwaz, Osama bin Laden’s de facto press secretary, is arrested in London on September 23, 1998.
He is arrested with six other suspects, presumably including Ibrahim Eidarous and Adel Abdel Bary.
The three of them effectively run the Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC), a bin Laden front in London.
But al-Fawwaz and all the other suspects apparently are quickly released. Al-Fawwaz is arrested again
on September 27 at the request of the US, which issues an extradition warrant for him the same day.
On July 12, 1999, Eidarous and Bary are arrested again, as the US issues extradition warrants for them as well.
All three are charged in the US for roles in the 1998 African embassy bombings
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [New York Times, 9/29/1998; New York Times, 7/13/1999]
It is not clear why the three were not arrested earlier, or why they were not charged in Britain.
They had been monitored in London for years. Bin Laden called them over 200 hundred times from 1996 to 1998,
and they are alleged to have been involved in many plots (see Early 1994-September 23, 1998).
For instance, the three received a fax from al-Qaeda operatives taking credit for the embassy bombings hours
before the bombings actually took place and passed it on to media outlets (see July 29-August 7, 1998).

October 1998: Vulgar Betrayal Investigation Nearly Shut Down


Mark Flessner.

Two months after the US embassy bombings in Africa (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
FBI agent Robert Wright and his Vulgar Betrayal investigation discover evidence they think ties
Saudi multimillionaire Yassin al-Qadi to the bombings. Since 1997, Wright had been investigating
a suspected terrorist cell in Chicago that was connected to fundraising for Hamas.
They discovered what they considered to be clear proof that al-Qadi and other people they were already
investigating had helped fund the embassy bombings. Wright asks FBI headquarters for permission to open
an investigation into this money trail at this time, but the permission is not granted. Wright will later recall,
“The supervisor who was there from headquarters was right straight across from me and started yelling at me:
‘You will not open criminal investigations. I forbid any of you. You will not open criminal investigations
against any of these intelligence subjects.’” Instead, they are told to merely follow the suspects and file reports,
but make no arrests. Federal prosecutor Mark Flessner, working with the Vulgar Betrayal investigation,
later will claim that a strong criminal case was building against al-Qadi and his associates.
“There were powers bigger than I was in the Justice Department and within the FBI that simply were not
going to let [the building of a criminal case] happen. And it didn’t happen.… I think there were very serious
mistakes made. And I think, it perhaps cost, it cost people their lives ultimately.” [ABC News, 12/19/2002]
Flessner later will speculate that Saudi influence may have played a role. ABC News will report in 2002,
“According to US officials, al-Qadi [has] close personal and business connections with the Saudi royal family.”
[ABC News, 11/26/2002] Wright later will allege that FBI headquarters even attempted to shut down
the Vulgar Betrayal investigation altogether at this time. He says, “They wanted to kill it.” [ABC News, 12/19/2002]
However, he will claim, “Fortunately an assistant special agent in Chicago interceded to prevent FBI headquarters
from closing Operation Vulgar Betrayal.” [Federal News Service, 6/2/2003] He claims that a new supervisor
will write in late 1998, “Agent Wright has spearheaded this effort despite embarrassing lack of investigative
resources available to the case, such as computers, financial analysis software, and a team of financial analysts.
Although far from being concluded, the success of this investigation so far has been entirely due to the foresight
and perseverance of Agent Wright.” [Federal News Service, 5/30/2002] When the story of this interference
in the alleged al-Qadi-embassy bombings connection will be reported in late 2002, Wright will conclude,
“September the 11th is a direct result of the incompetence of the FBI’s International Terrorism Unit.
No doubt about that. Absolutely no doubt about that. You can’t know the things I know and not go public.”
He will remain prohibited from telling all he knows, merely hinting, “There’s so much more.
God, there’s so much more. A lot more.” [ABC News, 12/19/2002]

(October25-November 20, 1998): Bin Laden Tried by Taliban for Embassy Bombings,
Set Free After US Does Not Provide Much Evidence

After the Taliban is warned that bin Laden has been accused of involvement in the recent 1998
African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), it initiates judicial proceedings
against him. But when the US fails to provide Afghanistan’s supreme court with sufficient evidence,
bin Laden is acquitted. [Associated Press, 11/20/1998] The Taliban has already received some claims
regarding bin Laden’s involvement in terrorism from the US (see August 23, 1998), but these are insufficient
and more evidence is requested. Originally, there is no cut-off date for supplying evidence, but when the US
does nothing, the Taliban leaders become frustrated and announce a time limit on the inquiry:
“If anyone has any evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in cases of terrorism, subversion, sabotage,
or any other acts, they should get it to the court before November 20. If by then there is nothing,
we will close the case and in our eyes he will be acquitted.” In a November 10 cable the US embassy in Pakistan,
which also handles Afghan affairs, comments: “The Taliban appear to many observers not to be totally
unreasonable in their demand that the US provide them evidence on bin Laden.”
[US Embassy (Islamabad), 11/10/1998 ]
The US then sends the Taliban a video of an interview bin Laden gave CNN in 1997, a transcript of his ABC
1998 interview, and a copy of his US indictment for the embassy bombings.
[US Department of State, 11/11/1998 ] The inquiry is headed by the country’s chief justice,
Noor Mohamed Saqib. After the evidence is found not to be enough and bin Laden is set free, Saqib comments:
“It is their shame that they have been silent. America is wrong about bin Laden… Anything that happens now
anywhere in the world they blame Osama, but the reality is in the proof and they have not given us any.
It’s over and America has not presented any evidence. Without any evidence, bin Laden is a man without sin…
he is a free man.” [Associated Press, 11/20/1998] However, the State Department says that it did not “endorse,
support, or request” the sharia court trial, but simply wanted bin Laden extradited. A White House spokesperson
says, “Without commenting on the rigor of the Taliban judicial system, it is clear that Mr. bin Laden is
a proven threat to US national interests.” [US Department of State, 11/11/1998 ; Associated Press, 11/20/1998]
The Taliban’s leadership is not satisfied with the outcome of the trial and will subsequently ask the US for help
in getting rid of bin Laden (see November 28, 1998).

Late 1998: US Initiates New Effort to Stop Financing of Al-Qaeda, but to Little Effect


William Wechsler. [Source: CAP]

Shortly after the US embassy bombings in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
the US launches a new interagency effort to track bin Laden’s finances. There had been a previous interagency
effort in 1995 but it had fizzled (see October 21, 1995). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke sets up a task force.
He orders it to find out how much money bin Laden has, where it comes from, how it is distributed, and to stop it.
Clarke appoints William Wechsler, a National Security Council staff member, to head the task force.
The task force begins an investigation of bin Laden’s finances (see Late 1998). Clarke later writes that he and
Wechsler “quickly [come] to the conclusion that the [US government] departments [are] generally doing
a lousy job of tracking and disrupting international criminals’ financial networks and had done little or nothing
against terrorist financing.” [New York Times, 9/20/2001; Clarke, 2004, pp. 190-191] Clarke will later claim there was
only limited effort from within the US government to fight bin Laden’s financial network. He will assert that
within weeks of setting up the interagency effort, it was determined that only one person in the US government,
a lowly Treasury Department official, appeared to have any expertise about the hawala system, an informal and
paperless money transfer system used by al-Qaeda that is popular with Muslim populations worldwide
(see 1993-September 11, 2001). Clarke will later write that the “CIA knew little about the [hawala] system,
but set about learning. FBI knew even less, and set about doing nothing.” The FBI claims there are no hawalas
in the US, but Wechsler finds several in New York City using a simple Internet search. Clarke will say,
“Despite our repeated requests over the following years, nobody from the FBI ever could answer even our most
basic questions about the number, location, and activities of major hawalas in the US—much less taken action.”
The efforts of other departments are not much better. The one Treasury official with some expertise about
hawalas is eventually let go before 9/11. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 192-193] Efforts to pressure governments overseas
also meet with little success (see August 20, 1998-1999).

December 4, 1998: CIA Director Issues Ineffective Declaration of War on Al-Qaeda

CIA Director Tenet issues a “declaration of war” on al-Qaeda, in a memorandum circulated in the
intelligence community. This is ten months after bin Laden’s fatwa on the US (see February 22, 1998),
which is called a “de facto declaration of war” by a senior US official in 1999. Tenet says,
“We must now enter a new phase in our effort against bin Laden.… each day we all acknowledge that
retaliation is inevitable and that its scope may be far larger than we have previously experienced.…
We are at war.… I want no resources or people spared in this efforts [sic], either inside CIA or the
[larger intelligence] community.” Yet a Congressional joint committee later finds that few FBI agents
ever hear of the declaration. Tenet’s fervor does not “reach the level in the field that is critical so [FBI agents]
know what their priorities are.” In addition, even as the counterterrorism budget continues to grow generally,
there is no massive shift in budget or personnel until after 9/11. For example, the number of CIA personnel
assigned to the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) stays roughly constant until 9/11, then nearly doubles from
approximately 400 to approximately 800 in the wake of 9/11. The number of CTC analysts focusing on
al-Qaeda rises from three in 1999 to five by 9/11. [New York Times, 9/18/2002; US Congress, 9/18/2002]
Perhaps not coincidentally, on the same day Tenet issues his declaration, President Clinton is given
a briefing entitled “Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks” and US intelligence
scrambles to respond to this threat (see December 4, 1998).

December 21, 1998: Bin Laden May Be Planning Attacks on New York and Washington

In a Time magazine cover story entitled “The Hunt for Osama,” it is reported that intelligence sources
“have evidence that bin Laden may be planning his boldest move yet—a strike on Washington or possibly
New York City in an eye-for-an-eye retaliation. ‘We’ve hit his headquarters, now he hits ours,’ says
a State Department aide.” [Time, 12/21/1998]

December 22, 1998: Bin Laden Takes Credit for ‘Instigating’ Embassy Bombings

In an interview for Time magazine held on this date, bin Laden is asked whether he was responsible for
the August 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
He replies, “If the instigation for jihad against the Jews and the Americans in order to liberate
[Islamic shrines in Mecca and Medina] is considered a crime, then let history be a witness that I am a criminal.
Our job is to instigate and, by the grace of God, we did that—and certain people responded to this instigation.…
I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the legend of the so-called superpower that is America.”
He admits knowing certain people accused of being behind the bombing, such as Wadih El-Hage and
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, but denies they had any connection to the bombings.
[Time, 1/11/1999; Globe and Mail, 10/5/2001]

Late 1998: Taliban Stall Pipeline Negotiations to Keep Western Powers at Bay

During the investigation of the August 7, 1998 US embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998),
FBI counterterrorism expert John O’Neill finds a memo by al-Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef on a computer.
The memo shows that bin Laden’s group has a keen interest in and detailed knowledge of negotiations
between the Taliban and the US over an oil and gas pipeline through Afghanistan. Atef’s analysis suggests
that the Taliban are not sincere in wanting a pipeline, but are dragging out negotiations to keep
Western powers at bay. [Salon, 6/5/2002]

[Unknown]

Early 1999-March 21, 2000: Muslim FBI Agent Refuses to Wear Wire in Meeting with BMI Head; FBI Infighting Follows


Gamal Abdel-Hafiz. [Source: Charles Ommanney]

Gamal Abdel-Hafiz, the only Muslim FBI agent in the years just prior to 9/11, becomes involved in FBI agent
Robert Wright’s Vulgar Betrayal investigation in early 1999. An accountant working for BMI Inc.,
an investment firm with connections to many suspected terrorism financiers (see 1986-October 1999),
tells Abdel-Hafiz that he is worried that BMI funds had helped fund the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). BMI president Soliman Biheiri hears that Abdel-Hafiz had been told
about this, and wants to meet with him to discuss it (apparently without realizing that Abdel-Hafiz is
an undercover FBI agent). Wrights asks Abdel-Hafiz to wear a wire to the meeting, but Abdel-Hafiz refuses
to do so. This leads to infighting within the FBI. On July 6, 1999, Abdel-Hafiz files a religious discrimination
complaint, accusing Wright of making derogatory comments to fellow agents. [Frontline, 10/16/2003]
On March 21, 2000, Wright makes a formal internal complaint about Abdel-Hafiz. FBI agent Barry Carmody
seconds Wright’s complaint. Wright and Carmody accuse Abdel-Hafiz of hindering investigations by
openly refusing to record other Muslims. In an affidavit, Wright claims that Abdel-Hafiz refused to wear
the wire “based on religious reasons saying, ‘A Muslim doesn’t record another Muslim.’” Abdel-Hafiz
does not deny the quote, but claims it was taken out of context. [Wall Street Journal, 11/26/2002;
ABC News, 12/19/2002; Frontline, 10/16/2003] Federal prosecutor Mark Flessner and other FBI agents back up
the allegations against Abdel-Hafiz. [ABC News, 12/19/2002] Carmody will also claim that, in a different
investigation, Abdel-Hafiz hindered an inquiry into the possible ties to Islamic militants of fired
University of South Florida Professor Sami al-Arian by refusing to record a conversation with the professor in 1998.
[Tampa Tribune, 3/4/2003] Complaints to superiors and headquarters about Abdel-Hafiz never get a response.
[Fox News, 3/6/2003] “Far from being reprimanded, in February 2001 Abdel-Hafiz [is] promoted to one of
the FBI’s most important anti-terrorism posts, the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia, to handle investigations
for the FBI in that Muslim country.” [ABC News, 12/19/2002; Frontline, 10/16/2003] In 2003, FBI agent John Vincent
will complain, “Five different FBI field divisions complained of this agent’s activities,
and the FBI headquarters response was to promote him to a sensitive position in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.”
[Federal News Service, 6/2/2003] Abdel-Hafiz will be suspended in February 2003 over charges that he faked
a break-in of his own house in order to collect $25,000 in insurance benefits and then failed an FBI polygraph test
when asked about it. In January 2004, the FBI’s Disciplinary Review Board will reinstate him after deciding
there was insufficient evidence in the case. [Tampa Tribune, 3/4/2003; Frontline, 10/16/2003]

February 1999: Bin Laden Strengthens Ties with Philippine Militant Group


Hashim Salamat. [Source: BBC]

Western intelligence monitors a series of phone calls in which bin Laden asks the leader of
a Philippine militant group to set up more training camps that al-Qaeda can use. Bin Laden is said to call
Hashim Salamat, the leader of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). There are reports that al-Qaeda
started funding and using MILF training camps in 1995. But apparently bin Laden successfully asks for
more camps because the movement of militants into Afghanistan has grown increasingly difficult since
the African embassy bombings in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). [CNS News, 9/19/2002;
CNN, 10/28/2002; Asia Times, 10/30/2003] The same month, Salamat claims in a BBC interview that the MILF
has received money from bin Laden, but says that it has only been for humanitarian purposes.
[New York Times, 2/11/1999; Asia Times, 10/30/2003]

June 7, 1999: Bin Laden Finally Makes FBI’s 10 Most Wanted


A US wanted poster for bin Laden, highlighting the African embassy bombings and a $5 million reward.
[Source: US State Department]

The FBI puts bin Laden on its “10 Most Wanted List.” This is almost a year and a half after bin Laden’s
“declaration of war” against the US on February 22, 1998 (see February 22, 1998), and about six months
after the CIA’s “declaration of war against al-Qaeda” in December 1998 (see December 4, 1998).
It is also three years after an internal State Department document connected bin Laden to financing
and planning numerous terrorist attacks. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002; US Congress, 7/24/2003]

Late 1999: Saudis Claim to Add Two 9/11 Hijackers to Watch List and Inform CIA

Prince Turki al Faisal, Saudi intelligence minister until shortly before 9/11 (see August 31, 2001),
will later claim that around this time its external intelligence agency tells the CIA that hijackers
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar have been put on a Saudi terror watch list. The Saudis have been
tracking the two men, as well as Nawaf’s brother Salem, for some time (see March 21, 1999, April 4, 1999,
April 6, 1999, and After Early April 1999). Saeed Badeeb, Turki’s chief analyst, and Nawaf Obaid,
a security consultant to the Saudi government, support Turki’s account though Turki himself will later back
away from it after becoming Saudi ambassador to the US (see August 21, 2005).
In 2003, Prince Turki will say, “What we told [the CIA] was these people were on our watch list from
previous activities of al-Qaeda, in both the [1998] embassy bombings and attempts to smuggle arms into
the kingdom in 1997,” (see 1997 and October 4, 2001). However, the CIA strongly denies any such warning,
although it begins following Almihdhar and Alhazmi around this time (see January 2-5, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000).
[Associated Press, 10/16/2003; Salon, 10/18/2003; Wright, 2006, pp. 310-311, 448]
The US will not put Almihdhar and Alhazmi on its watch list until August 2001 (see August 23, 2001).

December 14, 1999: Al-Qaeda Operative Planning LA Airport Attack Is Arrested


Diana Dean. [Source: Seattle Times]

Al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam is arrested in Port Angeles, Washington, attempting to enter
the US with components of explosive devices. One hundred and thirty pounds of bomb-making chemicals
and detonator components are found inside his rental car. He subsequently admits he planned to bomb
Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999. [New York Times, 12/30/2001]
Alert border patrol agent Diana Dean stops him; she and other agents nationwide had been warned
recently to look for suspicious activity. Ressam’s bombing would have been part of a wave of attacks
against US targets over the New Year’s weekend (see December 15-31, 1999). He is later connected to
al-Qaeda and convicted. [US Congress, 9/18/2002; PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002]

December 15-31, 1999: US Intelligence Launches Worldwide Effort to Thwart Millennium Attack Plots


From left to right: Mokhtar Haouari, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, Abdel Ghani Meskini.
The picture of Meskini is from an ATM camera. [Source: Public domain, public domain,
and Seattle Times] (click image to enlarge)

In the wake of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999), FBI investigators work frantically
to uncover more millennium plots before the end of the year. US authorities also make a number of arrests.

A telephone number found in Ressam’s pocket leads to Abdel Ghani Meskini, an Algerian living in
New York City who had gone to Seattle to meet Ressam. Meskini is monitored and arrested in
New York on December 30.
One of Ressam’s credit cards leads to the arrest of Mokhtar Haouari, an Algerian living in Montreal,
Canada. Meskini later cooperates with US investigators and is never charged, while Haouari will be
sentenced to 24 years in prison. [Time, 2/7/2000; CNN, 1/16/2002; Wright, 2006, pp. 298]
Another Algerian associate of Ressam’s, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, escapes to Afghanistan,
but will eventually be caught by the Algerian government and convicted in Algeria. [PBS Frontline, 10/25/2001]
Investigators believe that Mohamedou Ould Slahi, an al-Qaeda operative whose cousin is a top al-Qaeda leader,
went to Canada to give the go-ahead for Ressam’s attack. Slahi is arrested several times overseas,
but never charged (see January-April 2000). [CNN, 3/6/2002]
Khalid Deek, a US citizen, is arrested around this time for masterminding another al-Qaeda millennnium plot
(see December 11, 1999). But counterterrorism expert Rita Katz will later say Deek was a suspected mastermind
of Ressam’s Los Angeles airport plot, too. [Orange County Register, 9/12/2005] Deek’s name and phone number
is found in Ressam’s telephone book. Ressam knew Deek from bin Laden training camps in Afghanistan.
Both of them, like most of Ressam’s group, have links to the GIA, an Algerian militant group associated
with al-Qaeda. [Newsweek (International), 3/13/2000] Others escape the US after hearing media reports of
Ressam’s arrest. However, enough people are caught to stop additional millennium attacks. Counterterrorism
“tsar” Richard Clarke later says, “I think a lot of the FBI leadership for the first time realized that…
there probably were al-Qaeda people in the United States. They realized that only after they looked at the results
of the investigation of the millennium bombing plot.” [PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002]
Yet Clinton’s National Security Adviser Sandy Berger later claims that the FBI will still repeatedly assure
the Clinton White House until Clinton leaves office that al-Qaeda lacks the ability to launch a domestic strike
(see 2000).

December 29, 1999: NSA Tells CIA about Planned Al-Qaeda Summit Involving Future Hijackers

The NSA, monitoring a telephone in an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late August 1998
and Late 1998-Early 2002), has listened in on phone calls revealing that hijackers Khalid Almihdhar,
Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi are to attend an important al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000
(see Shortly Before December 29, 1999). Almihdhar’s full name was mentioned, as well as the first names of
hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi. On this day, the NSA shares this information with the CIA’s
Alec Station bin Laden unit. Other US intelligence agencies, including FBI headquarters and the FBI’s
New York field office, are told as well. Although Khalid Almihdhar’s full name was mentioned in one call,
the NSA only passes on his first name. Also, the NSA has already learned from monitoring the Yemen hub
that Nawaf’s last name is Alhazmi and that he is long-time friends with Almihdhar (see Early 1999).
However, they either don’t look this up in their records or don’t pass it on to any other agency.
[9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 239 ; Wright, 2006, pp. 310]
An NSA analyst makes a comment that is shared between US intelligence agencies,
“Salem may be Nawaf’s younger brother.” This turns out to be correct. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ;
9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ] A CIA officer will later tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that
information from the Africa embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) was reviewed in late
1999 during a worldwide effort to disrupt millennium attack plots (see December 15-31, 1999)
and “a kind of tuning fork… buzzed when two [of the hijackers] reportedly planning a trip to [Malaysia]
were linked indirectly to what appeared to be a support element… involved with the Africa bombers.”
[US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] The fact that they are connected to the Yemen communication hub
already indicates some importance within al-Qaeda. It is learned they are connected to the embassy bombings
in some way (see October 4, 2001 and Late 1999). [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ;
9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ]
The NSA report about them on this day is entitled, “Activities of Bin Laden Associates,”
showing the clear knowledge of their ties to bin Laden. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502; Vanity Fair, 11/2004]
The CIA will track Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi to the Malaysia summit (see January 2-5, 2000 and
January 5-8, 2000).

[Unknown]

Early 2000: Chechens Begin Working with Bin Laden on Hijacking Plot

According to a French intelligence report, in the beginning of 2000 bin Laden meets with Taliban leaders,
other al-Qaeda leaders, and armed groups from Chechnya to plan a hijacking, possibly of an airplane flying to
the US. They create a list of seven possible airlines to hijack: American, Delta, Continental, United, Air France,
Lufthansa, and a vague “US Aero.” The group considers hijacking a US airline flying out of Frankfurt and
diverting it to Iran or Afghanistan or hijacking a French or German plane and diverting it to Tajikistan or
Afghanistan. The goals are to increase international pressure to force a Russian withdrawal from Chechnya
and to force the release of Islamists in US prisons. [Associated Press, 4/16/2007; Le Monde (Paris), 4/17/2007]
This latter goal is a likely reference to the Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, as US intelligence repeatedly hears of
al-Qaeda hijacking plots to free him (see 1998, March-April 2001, and May 23, 2001). The Chechens are likely
connected to Chechen leader Ibn Khattab, who has a long history of collaboration with bin Laden
(see 1986-March 19, 2002 and Before April 13, 2001). According to other news reports, in early 2000,
the CIA observed Mohamed Atta as he bought large quantities of chemicals in Frankfurt,
apparently to build explosives (see January-May 2000), and in February and March 2001,
Atta and two associates will apply for a job with Lufthansa Airlines at the Frankfurt airport that would
give them access to secure areas of the airport, but apparently none of them are able to get the job
(see February 15, 2001). Bin Laden will apparently uphold the decision to go forward with this plot later in 2000
(see October 2000) and the French will continue to report on the plot in January 2001, apparently passing
the information to the CIA (see January 5, 2001). But it is unclear what happens after that and if the plot morphs
into the 9/11 attacks, is canceled, or was a ruse all along. Some of the 9/11 hijackers fought in Chechnya and
therefore might also be linked to Ibn Khattab (see 1996-December 2000).

January 5-8, 2000: Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It



Attendees of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar,
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali.
Bottom row, from left: Yazid Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. [Source: FBI]

About a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret,
“top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
[CNN, 8/30/2002; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole
(see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002]
At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information
on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include:
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot
through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows
many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar
as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000). Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - Mohammed is sometimes referred to
as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM
is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995),
and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important
in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance.
[Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002] Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed
by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access
to transcripts of KSM’s interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and
told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [Newsweek, 7/9/2003;
New York Post, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [Independent, 6/6/2002;
CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/29/2003]
For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA
even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—
and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/2003]
Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] ,
was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994).
[CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002]
The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified
a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003
(see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS News, 8/15/2003]
Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident.
But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over
(see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002] Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned
the condominium where the summit was held. [New York Times, 1/31/2002; Newsweek, 6/2/2002] A possibility to
expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000
(see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities
when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from
summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000).
[New Straits Times, 2/10/2002] Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] ,
will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000),
but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003.
[CNN, 5/15/2003] Tawfiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of
bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary
at least for the USS Cole bombing. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack.
Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa.
[9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995.
[US Congress, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit
will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen
for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002]
He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia
while 9/11 is being prepared. [Los Angeles Times, 10/10/2001; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 188;
Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and
the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans
(see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000)
and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002).
He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified
a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3]
(Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani).
[CNN, 12/11/2000; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006] Ramzi bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted
to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11,
despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him.
[Newsweek, 11/26/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Time, 9/15/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002;
CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time.
[Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt,
will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.”
[New York Times, 8/24/2002]
Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and
left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/2001]
Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002]
One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand
why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers.
[Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s
presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved
in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000).
[Guardian, 10/15/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Newsweek, 9/4/2002]
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter
at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him to the apartment where the summit is held.
[Associated Press, 10/2/2002; Newsweek, 10/7/2002; Australian, 12/24/2002; Knight Ridder, 6/12/2004]
After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot.
Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don’t want to take custody of him
(see September 17, 2001). Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi,
is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/2002] US intelligence
intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]
Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers,
but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8]
Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in
the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US
in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony
and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006). Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based
Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [Cox News Service, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged
with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/2001] However, according to the Wall Street Journal,
bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may
just be a reference to them. [Wall Street Journal, 10/8/2001]

9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Blocks Notification to FBI about Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa


Victims’ family members Lorie Van Auken (right) and Kristen Breitweiser (left) are shocked to learn Tom Wilshire
blocked a cable to the FBI about Khalid Almihdhar’s visa. [Source: Banded Artists]

Doug Miller, an FBI agent assigned to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, reads CIA cables reporting
that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa and drafts a cable to the FBI to inform it of this.
The CIA obtained the information through a tap on Almihdhar’s phone in Yemen (see December 29, 1999)
and by monitoring him as he passed through Dubai (see January 2-5, 2000) on his way to an al-Qaeda summit
in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000). Draft Cable - Miller writes that Almihdhar has a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999)
and that the visa application states his destination is New York and he intends to stay for three months.
The draft cable mentions the tap on Almihdhar’s phone, his planned travel to Malaysia, and the links
between his phone and the 1998 East African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998
and October 4, 2001). It also says that the CIA has obtained photographs of Almihdhar and
these will be sent separately. Miller asks the FBI for feedback resulting from an FBI investigation.
Blocked - A CIA officer known as “Michelle” accesses Miller’s draft about an hour after he writes it.
The cable is then blocked on the orders of the station’s deputy chief, Tom Wilshire, as a few hours after Miller
drafts the cable Michelle attaches a message to it saying, “pls hold off on [cable] for now per [Tom Wilshire].”
[US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 240 ] Miller is also told, “This is not a matter for the FBI.”
[Wright, 2006, pp. 311] 'No Reason to Kill the Message' - Author James Bamford will later comment:
“A potential terrorist and member of al-Qaeda was heading for the US, the FBI’s jurisdiction—its turf—
and he [Miller] was putting the FBI on notice so it could take action. There was no reason to kill the message.”
[Bamford, 2008, pp. 19] Miller will later say he has no “rational answer” as to why the cable was blocked,
but will speculate that Alec Station officers were annoyed he had encroached on their territory.
[Congressional Quarterly, 10/1/2008] Michelle drafts a cable falsely saying that the information about
Almihdhar’s visa has been shared with the FBI (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and there will be
a discussion the next day about whether the cable should be sent (see January 6, 2000).
The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI
a “significant failure” but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on.
[US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 250 ] The 9/11 Commission will know of the incident, but will relegate it
to an endnote in its final report, omitting Wilshire’s role entirely. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502]
The CIA inspector general will falsely claim that the cable is not sent, “[a]pparently because it was in the wrong format
or needed editing.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xv ]

Summer 2000: FBI Extracts Confession from Embassy Bombing Cell Member without Torture

The FBI extracts a full confession from L’Houssaine Kherchtou, also known as “Joe the Moroccan,”
a member of the cell that bombed the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (see Late 1993-Late 1994 and
10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). However, in contrast with methods used on al-Qaeda operatives
after 9/11, he is not tortured and the FBI is at pains to treat him well. Relaxing Surroundings, Respectful Treatment
- FBI agent Jack Cloonan will later say of the initial interrogation, which took place in Morocco,
“The setting was beautiful, it was this grand house with stables out back, gazelles bouncing in the background,
palm trees, three-course meals.” Kherchtou had a relationship with the British intelligence service MI6
(see Mid-Summer 1998 and Shortly After August 7, 1998), but had broken off contact with it and has to be
lured to Morocco, where his debriefing is headed by Patrick Fitzgerald. Cloonan will later describe the questioning:
“We advised [Kherchtou] of his rights. We told him he could have a lawyer anytime, and that he could pray
at any time he wanted. We were letting the Moroccans sit in on this, and they were dumbfounded.…
The Moroccans said he’d never talk. He never shut up for 10 days.” Fitzgerald denies Kherchtou a plea bargaining
agreement, and says he must plead guilty to conspiracy to murder, for which he may receive a life sentence,
though Fitzgerald promises to ask the judge for leniency. However, Cloonan will later say, “His wife needed money
for medical treatment in Khartoum, and al-Qaeda had failed to provide it.” It is Cloonan’s “in” with Kherchtou,
who is also sure that the US will not torture him. When Kherchtou wavers, Cloonan steps in. As he recalls:
“I said, ‘Joe, you understand English, so I’d like you to go out and pray on this with your two Moroccan brothers.’
I thought Fitzy was going to give birth. Joe went out and prayed and came back and said yes.”
He provides the FBI with details of the plot and becoming a star witness at the trial (see September 2000).
[American Prospect, 6/19/2005; Vanity Fair, 12/16/2008] Invaluable Information - Kherchtou’s information,
provided at a time when the US knows comparatively little about al-Qaeda, is, in Cloonan’s assessment,
invaluable. “He told us about a lot of things,” Cloonan later says.
“We learned how they recruited people, their front organizations, how they used NGOs
[non-governmental organizations], false passports, what they thought about kidnapping,
how they developed targets, did their surveillance, a day in the life of Osama bin Laden,
what weapons they used, what vehicles they drove, who was the principal liaison with
the Sudanese government, that there was a relationship between al-Qaeda and
Hezbollah, how they did their training exercises, their finances, and their membership.”
After the trial, he enters the witness protection program in the US. Four of his onetime associates
will receive life sentences as a direct result of his information. [Vanity Fair, 12/16/2008]
FBI Use Kherchtou as Example of Successful Interrogation Tacticss - FBI officials will later compare
this outcome favorably to procedures used by other US agencies after 9/11. For example,
following the detainee abuse scandals after 9/11, FBI manager Tom Harrington will write that the FBI has
“been successful for many years obtaining confessions via non-confrontational interviewing techniques.”
Cloonan will later contrast Kherchtou’s treatment with that of al-Qaeda training manager Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi
in December 2001, when the US sent al-Libi to Egypt to be tortured and interrogated, but some of the information
he provided there turned out to be false (see December 19, 2001 and January 2002 and After).
[American Prospect, 6/19/2005]

After October 12, 2000: Possible Links Between Cole Bombing and Yemeni Government Hinder US Investigation

Author Lawrence Wright will later write about the FBI’s investigation of the USS Cole bombing in Yemen
(see October 12, 2000): “The FBI was convinced that the [Cole] bombers had been tipped off about the arrival
of the Cole, and they wanted to expand the investigation to include a member of the president’s own family
and a colonel in [the Yemeni equivalent of the FBI]. There was scant interest on the part of the Yemen authorities
in pursuing such leads.” Wright will also point out: “Yemen was a particularly difficult place to start a terrorist
investigation, as it was filled with active al-Qaeda cells and with sympathizers at very high levels of government.
On television, Yemeni politicians called for jihad against America. Just getting permission from the Yemeni
government to go to the crime scene—the wounded warship in the Aden harbor—required lengthy negotiations
with hostile officials.” Cooperation from the Yemen government is erratic at best. For instance,
the Yemenis eventually show the FBI a videotape taken by a harborside security camera, but it appears the moment
of the explosion has been edited out. [Wright, 2006, pp. 325; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ]
Later, when the FBI is finally allowed to interview Fahad al-Quso, who the FBI believes is one of the main
Cole plotters, a Yemeni colonel enters the room and kisses Quso on both cheeks. This is a recognized signal
to everyone that al-Quso is protected. [Wright, 2006, pp. 330] Between Yemeni obstructions, infighting between
US officials (see October 14-Late November, 2000), and security concerns hindering movement,
there will never be the same kind of investigation and trial as there was with the 1998 embassy bombings
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and February-July 2001).

November-December 2000: Key Suspect in Cole Bombing Identified


Rahim al-Nashiri [Source: AP]

After several weeks of investigation, US authorities learn that al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
was involved in the plot to attack the USS Cole. Investigators find a second safe house used by the bombing team,
and learn it was registered to al-Nashiri under a name variant. Al-Nashiri’s name is dimly familiar to FBI agent
Ali Soufan, who remembers that a source said al-Nashiri was planning a seaborne attack against a US vessel
in Aden (see After August 7, 1998). The FBI then finds that al-Nashiri rented a car in Aden before the bombing.
Author Lawrence Wright will comment, “It was another strong link between al-Qaeda and the Cole attack.”
[New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ] In addition, one of the bombers detained by Yemeni authorities, Jamal al-Badawi,
identifies al-Nashiri as a person who gave instructions for the attack. Al-Badawi also says he thought al-Nashiri
was working for bin Laden, but al-Nashiri did not tell al-Badawi this directly. [CNN, 12/13/2000]
Although al-Nashiri was the operational manager, he was actually in Afghanistan for a meeting with
Osama bin Laden when the opportunity to attack arose and was not physically present at the bombing.
Investigators are aware that he is the cousin of one of the bombers of the US embassy in Nairobi,
which he facilitated, and a captured embassy bomber identified a photo of him for the FBI two years earlier
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and August 22-25 1998). Al-Nashiri has been known to various
intelligence agencies since 1998, at least, and was monitored at the Malaysia summit of top al-Qaeda leaders
at the start of the year (see January 5-8, 2000). [CNN, 12/11/2000; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3;
Wright, 2006, pp. 318] US investigators also identify another leading suspect in the case, Khallad bin Attash,
at around the same time (see January 4, 2001).

November 11, 2000: Cole Investigators Find Link to Embassy Bombings


Jamal Badawi. [Source: Rewards for Justice]

Based on information from interviews of suspects detained during the USS Cole bombings
(see Late October-Late November 2000), the FBI finds that one of the lead bombers was Khallad bin Attash,
an operative also involved in the 1998 East African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).
The detained men, Jamal al-Badawi and Fahad al-Quso, say that they recently traveled to Afghanistan and
met bin Attash there. Al-Badawi also says bin Attash helped purchase a boat used in the Cole bombing.
The head of the FBI’s investigation, Ali Soufan, is startled by this news, as an informer has already provided
information on bin Attash, describing him as one of bin Laden’s top lieutenants. Although the FBI wants to
interview the two detained men to obtain more information, the Yemeni authorities refuse at this point,
saying they have both sworn on the Koran they were not involved in the attack, so they must be innocent.
Limited access to al-Quso will be granted to the FBI later, but the Yemeni authorities will indicate to him that
he is still under their protection (see Early December 2000). [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/9/1998 ;
9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 192; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ]

[Unknown]

January 25, 2001: Clarke Warns Rice Al-Qaeda Cells Are Inside US and Are ‘Major Threat’

Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke’s plan to deal with al-Qaeda is given to National Security Adviser Rice
on this day. It includes a warning that al-Qaeda cells already exist in the US. The plan was outlined in a document
he prepared in December 2000 (see January 25, 2001), which stated that US intelligence believes there are
al-Qaeda “sleeper cells” in the US and that they’re not just a potential problem but “a major threat in being.”
Clarke noted in the document that two key al-Qaeda members involved in the Millennium plot were naturalized
US citizens (presumably a reference to Raed Hijazi and Khalil Deek) and that one suspect in the 1998 embassy
bombings had “informed the FBI that an extensive network of al-Qaeda ‘sleeper agents’ currently exists in the US”
(see August 12-25, 1998). It also said that Ahmed Ressam’s attempted December 1999 attack revealed al-Qaeda
supporters in the US (see December 15-31, 1999). Finally, the Clarke warned that more attacks have almost
certainly been set in motion. [Washington Post, 1/20/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260, 535]

March-April 2001: Al-Qaeda Defector Describes Plot to Hijack US Airplane


Chris Isham. [Source: Viewimages.com]

In March 2001, the ISI learns that one of bin Laden’s operatives, who is working on a sensitive al-Qaeda job
in Afghanistan, has been providing information to the CIA at the US consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan.
The operative, whose CIA codename is “Max,” becomes worried that the ISI will disclose to al-Qaeda
his dealings with the CIA. The next month, ABC News reporters Chris Isham and John Miller meet with
Max and help him defect to the US and talk to the FBI. Max tells the reporters that in 1999 and 2000
he was trained as part of a small group by Saif al-Adel, one of al-Qaeda’s top leaders. Asked by Isham
and Miller whether al-Qaeda is planning any operations targeting the US, he describes a plan to hijack
an airplane carrying a US senator or ambassador and then use the dignitary to bargain for the release of the
“Blind Sheikh,” Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman. US intelligence learned of the same basic plot idea in 1998 (see 1998).
Max does defect and will be extensively debriefed by the FBI. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp. 282]
In May 2001, a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) will be sent to top White House officials warning
that “terrorist groups [are] cooperating on [a] US hostage plot”(see May 23, 2001). It is not known for how long
Max was talking to the CIA or what he told them before he was exposed, but his account contradicts assertions
that US intelligence did not have any well placed informants in al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. An Afghan named
“Ahmed” defects around the same time and there are similarities between his case and that of Max,
but it is unknown if they are in fact the same person or not (see April 2001).

Late March-Early April 2001: CIA Warns Al-Qaeda Leader Zubaida Planning an Attack

The CIA issues repeated warnings that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida may be planning an attack for
the near future. One report cites a source indicating an attack on Israel, Saudi Arabia, or India. At this time,
the CIA believes Zubaida was a major figure in the Millennium plots (see May 30, 2001).
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke relays these reports to National Security Adviser Rice.
She is also briefed on Zubaida’s activities and the CIA’s efforts to locate him.
[9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 255; US District Court of Eastern Virginia, 5/4/2006, pp. 1 ]

April 6, 2001: Rebel Leader Warns Europe and US About Large-Scale Imminent Al-Qaeda Attacks


Ahmed Shah Massoud speaking before European Parliament. [Source: Robert Sanchez/ Black Star]

Ahmed Shah Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan,
has been trying to get aid from the US but his people are only allowed to meet with low level US officials.
In an attempt to get his message across, he addresses the European Parliament: “If President Bush doesn’t help us,
these terrorists will damage the US and Europe very soon.” [Dawn (Karachi), 4/7/2001; Time, 8/4/2002]
A classified US intelligence document states, “Massoud’s intelligence staff is aware that the attack against
the US will be on a scale larger than the 1998 embassy bombings, which killed over two hundred people
and injured thousands (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).” [Defense Intelligence Agency, 11/21/2001 ]
Massoud also meets privately with some CIA officials while in Europe. He tells them that his guerrilla war
against the Taliban is faltering and unless the US gives a significant amount of aid, the Taliban will conquer
all of Afghanistan. No more aid is forthcoming. [Washington Post, 2/23/2004]

May 2001: CIA Learns Bin Laden Associates Are Heading to US, Preparing for Martyrdom

The Washington Post will later report, “In May 2001, the CIA learned supporters of bin Laden were planning
to infiltrate the United States; that seven were on their way to the United States, Canada and Britain;
that his key operatives ‘were disappearing while others were preparing for martyrdom,’ and that bin Laden
associates ‘were planning attacks in the United States with explosives.’” [US Congress, 9/18/2002;
Washington Post, 9/19/2002] This information may be related to a warning given by captured al-Qaeda operative
Ahmed Ressam this month that al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida is seeking Canadian passports for himself and
five other top militants in order to plant explosives in US cities (see May 30, 2001 and May 2001).
[Calgary Herald, 4/3/2002] It is not known if the seven traveling to the US, Canada, and Britain refer to
any of the 9/11 hijackers, but 11 of the hijackers travel to the US in May and June (see April 23-June 29, 2001),
stopping in Britain along the way (see January-June 2001). Investigators will later say that they are not sure
if the aliases Zubaida wanted on the Canadian passports could have been used by some of the 9/11 hijackers.
[Calgary Herald, 4/3/2002]

May 16-17, 2001: US Warned Bin Laden Supporters Are Inside US and Planning an Attack

On May 16, an anonymous person calls the US embassy in the United Arab Emirates and warns that
bin Laden supporters have been in the US and are planning an attack in the US using “high explosives.”
The caller mentions that operatives are infiltrating the US from Canada, but there is no mention of when
or where the attack might occur. The next day, based on this warning, the first item on the agenda for
counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke’s interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) is entitled:
“[Osama bin Laden]: Operation Planned in US.” The anonymous caller’s tip cannot be later corroborated.
In July, the CIA will share the warning with the FBI, the INS, the US Customs Service, and the State Department.
It will also be mentioned in the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing given to President Bush
(see August 6, 2001) and Bush will be told that the CIA and FBI are investigating it. But eventually,
neither the CIA nor FBI is able to corraborate the information in the call. [US Congress, 9/18/2002;
Washington Post, 9/19/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 255, 262, 535]
There are some other possibly interlinked warnings this month also warning of an al-Qaeda plot to
attack the US from Canada using explosives (see May 30, 2001, May 2001, and May 2001).

May 23, 2001: White House Told Al-Qaeda May Stage Hijacking or Storm Embassy

A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) sent to top White House officials is entitled,
“Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot.” It warns of a possible hostage plot against
the US abroad to force to release of prisoners being held in the US, including Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman
(see July 1990). The report notes operatives might hijack an aircraft or storm a US embassy overseas.
SEIBs are typically based on the previous day’s President Daily Briefing (see January 20-September 10, 2001),
so it is probable President Bush is given this information. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 255-256, 533;
US District Court of Eastern Virginia, 5/4/2006, pp. 2 ] This report leads to an FAA warning to airlines
noting the potential for “an airline hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States.”
[9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 255-256]

May 30, 2001: FBI Is Warned of Major Al-Qaeda Operation in the US Involving Hijackings, Explosives, and/or New York City


Ahmed Ressam as pictured in his Canadian passport. [Source: FBI]

Ahmed Ressam is convicted in the spring of 2001 for attempting to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport
(see December 14, 1999). Facing the likelihood of life in prison, he starts cooperating with authorities in an attempt
to reduce his sentence. On this day, he details his experiences in al-Qaeda training camps and his many dealings
with top al-Qaeda deputy Abu Zubaida. According to FBI notes from Ressam’s interrogation, Zubaida asked
Ressam to send him six original Canadian passports to help Zubaida “get people to America”
(see May 2001 and May 2001). Zubaida “wanted an operation in the US” and talked about the need to get explosives
into the US for this operation, but Ressam makes it clear this was a separate plot from the one he was involved with.
Notes from this day further explain that Ressam doesn’t know if any explosives made it into the US because once
an operation is initiated, operators are not supposed to talk about it to anyone. [Calgary Herald, 4/3/2002;
Newsweek, 4/28/2005] Zubaida told this to Ressam in 1999, but also indicated that he is willing to wait a year or more
to make sure the plot comes to fruition successfully. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 146]
Similarity to 9/11 Attacks - There’s no concrete evidence that Ressam knows any detail of the 9/11 attacks.
[Newsweek, 4/28/2005] However, Fox News will later report that roughly around this time Ressam testifies
“that attack plans, including hijackings and attacks on New York City targets, [are] ongoing.” [Fox News, 5/17/2002]
Questioned shortly after 9/11, Ressam will point out that given what he’s already told his US interrogators,
the 9/11 attacks should not be surprising. He notes that he’d described how Zubaida talked
“generally of big operations in [the] US with big impact, needing great preparation, great perseverance,
and willingness to die.” Ressam had told of “plans to get people hired at airports, of blowing up airports,
and airplanes.” [Newsweek, 4/28/2005] Sharing the Warning - The CIA learns of this warning in June.
[Tenet, 2007, pp. 146] Ressam will repeat some of this in a public trial in July (see July 8, 2001).
Apparently, the FBI also waits until July to share the information from this debriefing with most other
intelligence agencies, the INS, Customs Service, and the State Department. Ressam’s warnings will first be
mentioned to Bush in his now famous August 6, 2001 briefing (see August 6, 2001), but as Newsweek will note,
“The information from Ressam that was contained in [Bush’s] PDB [is] watered down and seem[s] far more bland
than what the Algerian terrorist was actually telling the FBI.” Zubaida’s second plot will be boiled down to
one sentence in the PDB: “Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaida was planning his own US attack.”
[Newsweek, 4/28/2005]

June 2001: Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Complete Merger

Two major terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and the Egypt-based Islamic Jihad, formally merged into one.
This completes a merging process that had been going on for years (see August 11-20, 1988,
December 1, 1996-June 1997, and February 22, 1998). The technical name of the new entity is Qaeda al-Jihad,
though it is widely called al-Qaeda. Bin Laden remains in charge, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Islamic Jihad,
remains second in command. [New Yorker, 9/9/2002]

June 12, 2001: CIA Learns KSM Is Sending Operatives to US to Meet Up with Operatives Already There

A CIA report says that a man named “Khaled” is actively recruiting people to travel to various countries,
including the US, to stage attacks. CIA headquarters presume from the details of this report that Khaled is
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). On July 11, the individual source for this report is shown a series of photographs
and identifies KSM as the person he called “Khaled.” [USA Today, 12/12/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 277, 533]
This report also reveals that:

Al-Qaeda operatives heading to the US would be “expected to establish contact with colleagues already living there.”
KSM himself had traveled to the US frequently, and as recently as May 2001.
KSM is a relative of bomber Ramzi Yousef.
He appears to be one of bin Laden’s most trusted leaders.
He routinely tells others that he can arrange their entry into the US as well. However,
the CIA doesn’t find this report credible because they think it is unlikely that he would come to the US
(in fact, it appears he had (see Summer 1998)). Nevertheless, they consider it worth pursuing. One agent replies,
“If it is KSM, we have both a significant threat and an opportunity to pick him up.” In July, the source clarifies
that the last time he can definitely place KSM in the US was in the summer of 1998 (see Summer 1998).
The CIA disseminates the report to all other US intelligence agencies, military commanders, and parts of the Treasury
and Justice Departments. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry will later request that the CIA inform them how CIA agents
and other agencies reacted to this information, but the CIA does not respond to this. [US Congress, 7/24/2003]
It appears that KSM will send at least one and probably two operatives to the US after this time and before 9/11
(see August 4, 2001 and September 10, 2001). On July 23, 2001, the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia will give KSM
a US visa (he uses an alias but his actual photo appears on his application) (see July 23, 2001).
Also, during this summer and as late as September 10, 2001, the NSA will intercept phone calls between KSM
and Mohamed Atta, but the NSA will not share this information with any other agencies (see Summer 2001).

June 19, 2001: Bin Laden Calls for ‘Blood and Destruction’ and Tells Followers to ‘Penetrate America and Israel’


Scenes in the al-Qaeda recruitment video show operatives training at
the al-Farouq camp in Afghanistan. [Source: CBC]

An al-Qaeda recruitment video created months earlier is made public.
The video had been circling amongst radical militants, but appears on the news worldwide after
a Kuwaiti newspaper gets a copy. The video celebrates the bombing of the USS Cole.
Bin Laden appears on the video, and while he does not take credit for the bombing, others in the video do.
Bin Laden says that Muslims have to leave countries that are ruled by “allies of Jews and Christians,”
and join his cause to be “prepared” for holy war. In an address to Palestinians, he calls for “blood, blood
and destruction, destruction.” He says, “We give you the good news that the forces of Islam are coming…”
He also issues a call to arms: “Your brothers in Palestine are waiting for you; it’s time to penetrate America
and Israel and hit them where it hurts the most.” He also tells his supporters to “slay the United States and Israel.”
A similar video appeared shortly before the bombing of the USS Cole. [Associated Press, 6/20/2001;
Associated Press, 6/20/2001; Newsweek, 7/22/2001; Washington Post, 9/11/2001] Intrest in the videotape
will grow in the Muslim world in the months before the 9/11 attacks (see September 9, 2001).

June30-July 1, 2001: New York Times Reporter Told Al-Qaeda Is ‘Planning
Something So Big the US Will Have to Respond,’ but Fails to Publish
Warning


The three authors of the book Germs, Judith Miller (left), Stephen Engelberg (top), and William Broad (bottom).
This was the book Miller was working on before 9/11; it was published several weeks after 9/11.
[Source: Publicity photo]

New York Times reporter Judith Miller learns her government counterterrorism sources are worried that
al-Qaeda is going to attack a US target on the Fourth of July holiday. There has been an increase in chatter
about an impending attack. In 2005, Miller will recall, “Everyone in Washington was very spun-up in
the counterterrorism world at that time. I think everybody knew that an attack was coming—everyone
who followed this.… I got the sense that part of the reason that I was being told of what was going on was that
the people in counterterrorism were trying to get the word to the president or the senior officials through the press,
because they were not able to get listened to themselves.”
Conversation Overheard - She has a conversation with a still-anonymous top-level White House source
who reveals there is some concern about a top-secret NSA intercept between two al-Qaeda operatives.
She explains, “They had been talking to one another, supposedly expressing disappointment that
the United States had not chosen to retaliate more seriously against what had happened to the [USS] Cole.
And one al-Qaeda operative was overheard saying to the other, ‘Don’t worry; we’re planning something
so big now that the US will have to respond.’ And I was obviously floored by that information.
I thought it was a very good story: (1) the source was impeccable; (2) the information was specific,
tying al-Qaeda operatives to, at least, knowledge of the attack on the Cole; and (3) they were warning that
something big was coming, to which the United States would have to respond.
This struck me as a major page one-potential story.”
Not Printed - Miller tells her editor Stephen Engelberg
about the story the next day. But Engelberg says, “You have a great first and second paragraph.
What’s your third?” Miller finds only one other source to confirm these details.
Yemen Connection - She later learns from her first source that the conversation occurred in Yemen.
Though the telephone number is never disclosed, some circumstances suggest one of the parties taking part
in the call may have been at the al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, that is monitored
by US intelligence. One of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, lives there with his wife and children
(see Late August 1998), and communicates there will be forthcoming attacks to at least one family member
(see Late October 2000-July 4, 2001). The hijackers in the US apparently call the Yemen hub around this time
(see (August 2001)). On July 3, the CIA will request the arrest of Djamel Beghal (see July 3, 2001),
an al-Qaeda operative whose calls to the hub are apparently being monitored at this time (see Before July 3, 2001).
Regrets - Miller later regrets not following through more because she “had a book coming out”
as well as other stories and that there wasn’t a “sense of immediacy” about the information. In 2005,
Engelberg will confirm Miller’s story and agree that he wanted more specifics before running the story.
Engelberg also later wonders “maybe I made the wrong call,” asking, “More than once I’ve wondered
what would have happened if we’d run the piece?” The New York Times has yet to mention the warning
in all of their post-9/11 reporting and the 9/11 Commission has never mentioned anything about the warning either.
In 2005, Miller will spend 85 days in jail for refusing to reveal a source and then leave the New York Times
after widespread criticism about her reporting. [Columbia Journalism Review, 9/2005; AlterNet, 5/18/2006;
Editor & Publisher, 5/18/2006]

[Unknown]

July 2001: Jordan Warns that Al-Qaeda Is Planning Attack Inside US

In February 2002, it will be reported on the ABC News program Nightline that in July 2001,
“Jordanian intelligence picked up an… alarming threat. ABC News has learned Jordan told US officials
al-Qaeda was planning an attack on American soil.” [ABC News, 2/19/2002] It has been reported elsewhere
that in late summer 2001, Jordan warns the US that aircraft will be used in a major attack inside the US,
but it is not known if that is a separate warning or the same as this one (see Late Summer 2001).
Also in late July, Jordan will offer the US to send its elite troops to Afghanistan to attack al-Qaeda,
an offer the US turns down (see July 24, 2001).

July 5, 2001: Bush Asks for Reports on Domestic Terror Threats

In 2002, Newsweek will report: “The White House acknowledged for the first time, [President] Bush was privately
beginning to worry about the stream of terror warnings he was hearing that summer, most of them aimed
at US targets abroad. On July 5, five days before the Phoenix memo (see July 10, 2001), Bush directed
[Condoleezza] Rice to figure out what was going on domestically.” [Newsweek, 5/27/2002]
In 2004, President Bush will explain why he requested this: “[T]he reason I did is because there had been
a lot of threat intelligence from overseas. And part of it had to do with the Genoa [Italy] G8 conference
that I was going to attend.” [US President, 4/19/2004] Though he does not mention it, the chief security concern
at the late July 2001 conference he mentions is intelligence that al-Qaeda plans to fly an airplane into the conference.
This threat is so widely reported before the conference (with some reports before July 5 (see June 13, 2001 and
Mid-July 2001) that the attack is called off (see July 20-22, 2001). For instance, in late June, Time magazine mentioned
a German intelligence report of an Osama bin Laden plot “to fly remote-controlled model aircraft packed with
Semtex into the conference hall and blow the leaders of the industrialized world to smithereens” (see June 20, 2001).
Bush will later claim that this request is specifically for the later-famous August 6, 2001 briefing entitled,
“Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001), although the CIA analysts who draft it will deny this
(see July 13, 2004). [US President, 4/19/2004]

July10, 2001: CIA Director Gives Urgent Warning to White House of Imminent,
Multiple, Simultaneous Al-Qaeda Attacks, Possibly within US


Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet in the White House. This picture is actually taken on October 8, 2001,
and President Bush is elsewhere in the room. [Source: Eric Draper / White House]

CIA Director George Tenet finds the briefing that counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave him earlier in the day
(see July 10, 2001) so alarming that he calls National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice from his car as he heads
to the White House and says he needs to see her right away, even though he has regular weekly meetings with her.
[Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Tenet and Black let a third CIA official, Richard Blee, who is responsible for Alec Station,
the CIA’s bin Laden unit, brief Rice on the latest intelligence. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley
and counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke are also present. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006]
'Significant Attack' - Blee starts by saying, “There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks
or months!” He argues that it is impossible to pick the specific day, saying Osama bin Laden “will attack when
he believes the attack will be successful.” He mentions a range of threat information including:

A warning related to Chechen leader Ibn Khattab (see (July 9, 2001)) and seven pieces of intelligence
the CIA recently received indicating there would soon be a terrorist attack (see July 9-10, 2001);
A mid-June statement by bin Laden to trainees that there would be an attack in the near future
(see Mid-June 2001);
Information that talks about moving toward decisive acts;
Late-June information saying a “big event” was forthcoming;
Two separate bits of information collected “a few days before the meeting” in which people predicted
a “stunning turn of events” in the weeks ahead. This may be a reference to intercepts of calls in Yemen,
possibly involving the father-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar (see June 30-July 1, 2001).
Multiple, Simultaneous Attacks in US Possible - Blee says that the attacks will be “spectacular,”
they will be designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities and interests, there may be multiple,
simultaneous attacks, and they may be in the US itself. He outlines the CIA’s efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda
by spreading incorrect word that the attack plans have been compromised, in the hope that this will cause
a delay in the attack. But he says this is not enough and that the CIA should go on the attack.
Blee also discounts the possibility of disinformation, as bin Laden’s threats are known to the public in
the Middle East and there will be a loss of face, funds, and popularity if they are not carried out.
Blee urges that the US take a “proactive approach” by using the Northern Alliance. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 151-4]
Author Bob Woodward will later write: “Black emphasize[s] that this amount[s] to a strategic warning,
meaning the problem [is] so serious that it require[s] an overall plan and strategy. Second, this [is]
a major foreign policy problem that need[s] to be addressed immediately. They need […] to take action
that moment —covert, military, whatever—to thwart bin Laden. The United States ha[s] human and
technical sources, and all the intelligence [is] consistent.” [Woodward, 2006, pp. 80; Washington Post, 10/1/2006]
Richard Clarke expresses his agreement with the CIA about the threat’s seriousness, and Black says,
“This country needs to go on a war footing now.”
Rice's Response - There are conflicting accounts about the CIA’s reading of Rice’s response. According to
Woodward: “Tenet and Black [feel] they [are] not getting through to Rice. She [is] polite, but they [feel]
the brush-off.” They leave the meeting frustrated, seeing little prospect for immediate action. Tenet and Black
will both later recall the meeting as the starkest warning they gave the White House on al-Qaeda before 9/11
and one that could have potentially stopped the 9/11 attacks if Rice had acted on it (see July 10, 2001)
and conveyed their urgency to President Bush. (Tenet is briefing Bush on a daily basis at this time,
but he will later say that Rice has a much better rapport with the president.) Black will say,
“The only thing we didn’t do was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head.”
[Woodward, 2006, pp. 80; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Rice says that Bush will align his policy with
the new realities and grant new authorities. Writing in 2007, Tenet will say that this response is
“just the outcome I had expected and hoped for,” and recall that as they leave the meeting, Blee and Black
congratulate each other on having got the administration’s attention. Nevertheless, Rice does not take
the requested action until after 9/11. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 153-4]
Rice Concerned about Genoa - Clarke will recall in 2006 that Rice focuses on the possible threat
to Bush at an upcoming summit meeting in Genoa, Italy (see June 13, 2001 and July 20-22, 2001).
Rice and Bush have already been briefed about the Genoa warning by this time (see July 5, 2001).
Rice also promises to quickly schedule a high-level White House meeting on al-Qaeda. However,
that meeting does not take place until September 4, 2001 (see September 4, 2001).
[McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] Rice also directs that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
Attorney General John Ashcroft be given the same briefing, and they receive it a short time later
(see July 11-17, 2001). Meeting Not Mentioned in 9/11 Commission Report - The meeting will not be
mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report (see August 4, 2002), and there will be controversy when
it is fully revealed in 2006 (see September 29, 2006, September 30-October 3, 2006, and October 1-2, 2006).

July 13, 2001: CIA Reexamines Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit but ‘Major League Killer’ Is Not Put on Watch List

Tom Wilshire, a CIA manager assigned to the FBI who expressed interest two months earlier in surveillance photos
from the al-Qaeda Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000), now finds a cable he had been looking for regarding
that summit. The cable, from January 2001, discusses al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash’s presence at the summit.
Wilshire explains later that bin Attash’s presence there had been troubling him. He writes an e-mail to
the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), stating, “[Khallad] is a major league killer, who orchestrated the Cole attack
(see October 12, 2000) and possibly the Africa bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998).”
Yet Khallad is still not put on a terrorist watch list. Wilshire asks that the FBI be passed this information,
but the FBI will not actually be given the information until August 30, a week after it learns future 9/11 hijacker
Khalid Almihdhar is in the US. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 298 ]
Although the CIA managers that receive this e-mail are not named, Richard Blee, in charge of the CIA’s
bin Laden unit and Wilshire’s former boss, appears to be one of the recipients: According to an endnote to
the 9/11 Commission report, on the very same day Wilshire sends this e-mail, Blee writes his own e-mail entitled
“Identification of Khallad,” which is sent to another CIA officer. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 537]
An FBI analyst assigned to the CTC is given the task of reviewing all other CIA cables about the Malaysian summit.
It takes this analyst until August 21—over five weeks later—to put together that Khalid Almihdhar had
a US visa and that Nawaf Alhazmi had traveled to the US. Yet other CIA agents are already well aware of these facts
but are not sharing the information (see August 22, 2001). Working with immigration officials, this analyst then
learns that Almihdhar entered and left the US in 2000, and entered again on July 4, 2001, and that Alhazmi appears
to still be in the US. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 298 ]

July 16, 2001: British Spy Agencies Warn Al-Qaeda Is in The Final Stages of Attack in the West

British spy agencies send a report to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other top officials warning that
al-Qaeda is in “the final stages” of preparing an attack in the West. The prediction is “based on intelligence
gleaned not just from [British intelligence] but also from US agencies, including the CIA and
the National Security Agency,” which cooperate with the British. “The contents of the July 16 warning would
have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall sources confirmed.” The report states there is “an acute awareness”
that the attack is “a very serious threat.” [London Times, 6/14/2002]

Late July 2001: Egypt Warns CIA of 20 Al-Qaeda Operatives in US; Four Training to Fly; CIA Is Not Interested

CBS later reports, in a long story on another topic: “Just days after [Mohamed] Atta return[s] to the US
from Spain, Egyptian intelligence in Cairo says it received a report from one of its operatives in Afghanistan
that 20 al-Qaeda members had slipped into the US and four of them had received flight training on Cessnas.
To the Egyptians, pilots of small planes didn’t sound terribly alarming, but they [pass] on the message to
the CIA anyway, fully expecting Washington to request information. The request never [comes].”
[CBS News, 10/9/2002] This appears to be just one of several accurate Egyptian warnings from
their informants inside al-Qaeda.

August 1, 2001: FBI Reissues Warning That Overseas Law Enforcement Agencies May Be Targets

With the approaching third anniversary of the US embassy bombings in Africa
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), the FBI reissues a warning that overseas law enforcement agencies
may be targets. It notes that although most reporting indicates a potential for attacks on US interests abroad,
the possibility of an attack in the US cannot be discounted. [CNN, 3/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260, 534]

August2, 2001: Federal Reserve Governors Encourage Banks to Review Suspicious
Activity Reports, Possibly Due to Heightened Terrorist Threat

The Federal Reserve Board of Governors issues a non-routine supervisory letter to Federal Reserve banks,
emphasizing the need to continue monitoring suspicious activity reports (SARs). The letter gives no explanation
why it has been sent out at this particular time, but states, “Reserve banks must continue to conduct a thorough
and timely review of all material SARs filed by supervised financial institutions in their districts.” It adds,
“A periodic, comprehensive review of SARs will assist Reserve banks in identifying suspicious or suspected
criminal activity occurring at or through supervised financial institutions; provide the information necessary
to assess the procedures and controls used by the reporting institutions to identify, monitor, and report violations
and suspicious illicit activities; and assist in the assessment of the adequacy of anti-money laundering programs.”
[Spillenkothen, 8/2/2001] While the letter does not say if there are specific reasons why the banks should currently
be watching for suspicious activities, William Bergman, an economist who works at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago from 1990 to 2004, will later point out, “Intelligence warnings on terrorism were rising significantly
in mid-2001.” He will therefore question whether, “with terrorism and its financing already recognized
as an important element of the national money laundering strategy,” this letter is “related to these warnings.”
He will also point out, “negotiations between the Taliban and representatives of the United States over energy
production issues in Afghanistan ended on August 2, 2001” (see August 2, 2001), and that, “Four days later,
President Bush received a ‘PDB’—a presidential daily brief—with a headline warning that bin Laden was
‘determined to strike in US,’ and the body text of the PDB referred to ‘patterns of suspicious activity’”
(see August 6, 2001). [Sanders Research Associates, 1/4/2006] When, in December 2003, Bergman asks
the Board of Governors staff why it issued the August 2 letter, and if the letter was related to intelligence
about heightened terrorist threats, he will receive no reply and subsequently be told he has
“committed an egregious breach of protocol in calling the Board staff and asking the question.”
[Veteran Affairs Whistleblowers Coalition, 5/14/2006] Also around this time, between June and August 2001,
there is an unexplained surge in the amount of US currency in circulation (see June-August 2001).
[Sanders Research Associates, 9/16/2005]

August 4-30, 2001: Bush Nearly Sets Record for Longest Presidential Vacation

President Bush spends most of August 2001 at his Crawford, Texas, ranch, nearly setting a record for
the longest presidential vacation. While it is billed a “working vacation,” news organizations report that
Bush is doing “nothing much” aside from his regular daily intelligence briefings. [ABC News, 8/3/2001;
Washington Post, 8/7/2001; Salon, 8/29/2001] One such unusually long briefing at the start of his trip is
a warning that bin Laden is planning to attack in the US (see August 6, 2001), but Bush spends the rest of
that day fishing. By the end of his trip, Bush has spent 42 percent of his presidency at vacation spots or
enroute. [Washington Post, 8/7/2001] At the time, a poll shows that 55 percent of Americans say Bush is taking
too much time off. [USA Today, 8/7/2001] Vice President Cheney also spends the entire month in
a remote location in Wyoming. [Jackson Hole News and Guide, 8/15/2001]

August 6, 2001: Bush Receives Briefing Titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’


President Bush at his Crawford, Texas, ranch on August 6, 2001. Advisors wait with classified briefings.
[Source: White House]

President Bush receives a classified presidential daily briefing (PDB) at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that
Osama bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The PDB provided to him is entitled,
“Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The entire briefing focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside
the US. [New York Times, 5/15/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002] The analysts who drafted the briefing will say that
they drafted it on the CIA’s initiative (see July 13, 2004), whereas in 2004 Bush will state that he requested
a briefing on the topic due to threats relating to a conference in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001,
where Western intelligence agencies believed Osama bin Laden was involved in a plot to crash an airplane into
a building to kill Bush and other leaders (see April 13, 2004). The analysts will later explain that they saw
it as an opportunity to convey that the threat of an al-Qaeda attack in the US was both current and serious.
[9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260] The existence of this briefing is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002,
causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). While National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice will claim
the memo is only one and a half pages long, other accounts state it is 11 1/2 pages instead of the usual two or three.
[New York Times, 5/15/2002; Newsweek, 5/27/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] A page and a half of the contents
will be released on April 10, 2004; this reportedly is the full content of the briefing. [Washington Post, 4/10/2004]
The briefing, as released, states as follows (note that the spelling of certain words are corrected
and links have been added):

Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate bin Laden since 1997 has wanted to conduct
terrorist attacks in the US (see December 1, 1998). Bin Laden implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998
that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and
“bring the fighting to America” (see May 26, 1998).
After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, bin Laden told followers he wanted to retaliate
in Washington, according to a -REDACTED-service (see December 21, 1998).
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told -REDACTED- service at the same time that bin Laden
was planning to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.
The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of bin Laden’s first serious attempt to
implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived
the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself (see December 14, 1999), but that bin Laden lieutenant
Abu Zubaida encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaida was
planning his own US attack (see Late March-Early April 2001 and May 30, 2001).
Ressam says bin Laden was aware of the Los Angeles operation.
Although bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998
(see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not
deterred by setbacks. Bin Laden associates surveyed our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993
(see Late 1993-Late 1994), and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested
and deported in 1997.
Al-Qaeda members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years,
and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks (see January 25, 2001).
Two al-Qaeda members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our embassies in East Africa were US citizens
(see September 15, 1998), and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s (see November 1989 and
September 10, 1998).
A clandestine source said in 1998 that a bin Laden cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth
for attacks (see October-November 1998).
“We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from
a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that bin Laden wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of
‘Blind Sheikh’ Omar Abdul-Rahman and other US-held extremists” (see 1998, December 4, 1998, and May 23, 2001).
[9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 223] According to the Washington Post, this information came from a British service. [Washington Post, 5/18/2002]
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country
consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings
in New York (see May 30, 2001).
The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full-field investigations throughout the US that it considers
bin Laden-related (see August 6, 2001). CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our embassy in the UAE in May
saying that a group or bin Laden supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives (see May 16-17, 2001).
[9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 223]
In retrospect, the briefing is remarkable for the many warnings that apparently are not included (see for instance,
from the summer of 2001 prior to August alone: May 2001, June 2001, June 12, 2001, June 19, 2001, Late Summer 2001,
July 2001, July 16, 2001, Late July 2001, Late July 2001, Summer 2001, June 30-July 1, 2001, July 10, 2001, and
Early August 2001).
According to one account, after the PDB has been given to him, Bush tells the CIA briefer,
“You’ve covered your ass now” (see August 6, 2001). Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that
after being given the briefing, Bush “[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing.”
[New York Times, 5/25/2002] In 2002 and again in 2004, National Security Adviser Rice will incorrectly claim
under oath that the briefing only contained historical information from 1998 and before (see May 16, 2002
and April 8, 2004).

August 6, 2001: Bush Tells CIA Regarding Bin Laden Warning, ‘You’ve Covered Your Ass, Now’

According to journalist and author Ron Suskind, just after a CIA briefer presents President Bush with
the later infamous PDB (Presidential Daily Briefing) item entitled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”
(see August 6, 2001), Bush tells the briefer, “You’ve covered your ass, now.” This account is from Suskind’s
2006 book The One Percent Doctrine, which is based largely on anonymous accounts from political insiders.
In the book, after describing the presentation of the PDB, Suskind will write: “And, at an eyeball-to-eyeball
intelligence briefing during this urgent summer, George W. Bush seems to have made the wrong choice.
He looked hard at the panicked CIA briefer. ‘All right,’ he said. ‘You’ve covered your ass, now.’”
[Suskind, 2006, pp. 2; Washington Post, 6/20/2006]

August 6, 2001: Bush Misled on Number and Extent of FBI’s Bin Laden Investigations

The CIA’s Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) given to President Bush on this day (see August 6, 2001)
contains the important line, “The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout
the US that it considers bin Laden-related.” Bush will state in 2004 that, based on this, “I was satisfied that
some of the matters were being looked into.” National Security Adviser Rice will explain that since the FBI had 70
“full-field investigations under way of cells” in the US, “there was no recommendation [coming from
the White House] that we do something about” the large number of warnings coming in. However, the number
and content of the FBI investigations appears grossly exaggerated. The FBI later will reveal that the investigations
are not limited to al-Qaeda and do not focus on al-Qaeda cells. Many were criminal investigations,
which typically are not likely to help prevent future terrorist acts. An FBI spokesman will say the FBI does not know
how that number got into Bush’s PDB. The 9/11 Commission will later conclude, “The 70 full-field investigations
number was a generous calculation that included fund-raising investigations. It also counted each individual connected
to an investigation as a separate full-field investigation. Many of these investigations should not have been included,
such as the one that related to a dead person, four that concerned people who had been in long-term custody,
and eight that had been closed well before August 6, 2001.” [Newsday, 4/10/2004; Associated Press, 4/11/2004;
9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 262, 535]

August 6, 2001: Bush Later Recalls His Reaction to ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Memo


Bush being briefed at his ranch on August 6, 2001. [Source: Associated Press]

On April 29, 2004, President Bush will testify before the 9/11 Commission, but almost no details of what he said
will be publicly released. He testifies with Vice President Cheney, in private, not under oath, is not recorded,
and the notes that the commissioners take are censored by the White House (see April 29, 2004).
However, the 9/11 Commission will release a one paragraph summary of how Bush claims he responded to
the Presidential Daily Briefing of August 6, 2001, entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US”
(see August 6, 2001). The Commission recalls, “The President told us the August 6 report was historical in nature.
President Bush said the article told him that al-Qaeda was dangerous, which he said he had known since he had
become President. The President said bin Laden had long been talking about his desire to attack America.
He recalled some operational data on the FBI, and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70 investigations
were under way (see August 6, 2001). As best he could recollect, [National Security Adviser] Rice had mentioned
that the Yemenis’ surveillance of a federal building in New York had been looked into in May and June,
but there was no actionable intelligence (see May 30, 2001). He did not recall discussing the August 6 report
with the Attorney General or whether Rice had done so. He said that if his advisers had told him there was
a cell in the United States, they would have moved to take care of it. That never happened.”
The 9/11 Commission will conclude that they could find no evidence of any further discussions or
actions taken by Bush and his top advisers in response to the briefing
(see Between August 6 and September 10, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 260]

Between August 6 and September 10, 2001: ’Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ Memo Is Not Acted Upon

The 9/11 Commission will later state that after the now famous “bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” memo
is given to President Bush on August 6, 2001 (see August 6, 2001), “We have found no indication of any further
discussion before September 11 among the president and his top advisers of the possibility of a threat of
an al-Qaeda attack in the United States.” [Newsweek, 4/28/2005] 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey will later
state to CNN,
“y the way, there’s a credible case that the president’s own negligence prior to 9/11
at least in part contributed to the disaster in the first place.… [I]n the summer of 2001,
the government ignored repeated warnings by the CIA, ignored, and didn’t do anything to
harden our border security, didn’t do anything to harden airport country,
didn’t do anything to engage local law enforcement, didn’t do anything to round up INS
and consular offices and say we have to shut this down, and didn’t warn the American people.
The famous presidential daily briefing on August 6, we say in the report that the briefing officers
believed that there was a considerable sense of urgency and it was current. So there was a case
to be made that wasn’t made.… The president says, if I had only known that 19 Islamic men would come
into the United States of America and on the morning of 11 September hijack four American aircraft,
fly two into the World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and one into an unknown Pennsylvania
that crashed in Shanksville, I would have moved heaven and earth. That’s what he said. Mr. President,
you don’t need to know that. This is an Islamic Jihadist movement that has been organized since
the early 1990s, declared war on the United States twice, in ‘96 and ‘98. You knew they were in
the United States. You were warned by the CIA. You knew in July they were inside the United States.
You were told again by briefing officers in August that it was a dire threat. And what did you do?
Nothing, so far as we could see on the 9/11 Commission.” [CNN, 11/8/2004]

August 17 and 31, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Briefs President Bush; Fails to Mention Moussaoui

CIA records show that CIA Director George Tenet briefed President Bush twice in August—
once in Crawford, Texas, on August 17, and once in Washington, on August 31. [Washington Post, 4/15/2004]
In Tenet’s 2007 book, he will briefly mention that “A few weeks after the August 6 PDB
[titled ‘Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US’ (see August 6, 2001)] was delivered, I followed it to Crawford
to make sure the president stayed current on events. That was my first visit to the ranch.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 145]
Later asked about what he told Bush at this meeting, Tenet will only say, “I held nothing back from the president.
He understood our concerns about threats. He understood what we were doing around the world at the time.”
[MSNBC, 5/7/2007] By the time of the second briefing, Tenet has been briefed about Zacarias Moussaoui’s
arrest (see August 23, 2001), but, apparently, he fails to tell Bush about it. [Washington Post, 4/15/2004]
In April 2004, Tenet will testify under oath before the 9/11 Commission that he had no direct communication
with President Bush during the month of August. [New York Times, 4/15/2004]
This is quickly discovered to be untrue. A CIA spokesperson will then claim, “He momentarily forgot
about the briefings]” (see April 14, 2004). [Washington Post, 4/15/2004] Tenet will personally brief
Bush six more times before 9/11 and will still apparently fail to mention Moussaoui to him (see September 1-8, 2001).

(9:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Clarke Orders US Embassies Closed and Military Bases to Raise Alert Level

Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, who is in the White House Situation Room, instructs that US embassies
overseas be closed and that US military bases raise their alert level. According to his own recollection,
just after he has spoken to the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers
(see 9:28 a.m. September 11, 2001), Clarke is thinking about the simultaneous attacks on the US embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). As he describes,
“There was the possibility now of multiple simultaneous attacks in several countries.” He therefore issues
instructions to the State Department and the Department of Defense: “We have to assume there will be
simultaneous attacks on us overseas. We need to close the embassies. Move [Department of Defense] bases
to combat Threatcon.” [Clarke, 2004, pp. 5-6] (“Threatcon” is short for “terrorist threat condition.”
[Slate, 9/12/2001] ) According to CNN, all US military forces will be ordered to the highest alert level at 10:10 a.m.
(see (10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [CNN, 9/4/2002] But the 9/11 Commission Report will state that
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld only orders the US armed forces to Defcon 3, an increased state of readiness,
at 10:43 a.m. (see (10:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 326 and 554]
The State Department will tell US embassies to make the decision whether to close based on their own
local security requirements. Around 50 US embassies or consulates around the world will therefore close,
though at what time they do so is unstated. [US Department of State, 9/12/2001]

[Unknown]

http://aconstantineblacklist.blogspot.com/2008/02/adnan-khashoggi-richard-perles-narco.html

Friday, February 15, 2008


ADNAN KHASHOGGI - RICHARD PERLE'S NARCO-TERRORIST BUSINESS PARTNER

By Alex Constantine (Repost)

Also see: "Khashoggi Network & a Global Trail of Money Unravelling in Mumbai"


Richard Perle with cookie


The House hearings on Iran-contra culminated in 1987 with a report that deftly mentioned
Richard Secord's plan to construct an enterprise of his own in the bulk manufacture of
"opium alkaloids."1

Opium?

This curious detail floated by without comment, eventually drowned in a flood of perjury
and hot air.

The committee didn't bother to follow up on that one. Better late than never to ask:
"Opium alkaloids ... ah, as in the base compound for the production of heroin?"
It's doubtful we'll ever know the answer. And the explanation could be innocent,
to be completely fair - Secord may have invented a cure for peptic ulcers or
sexual impotence ... but then heroin would appear the likeliest explanation ...
given the cost of global conquest these days ...

Even Adnan Khashoggi has financed wars with drug profits, the gist of a report written
in 1991 at the Pentagon - declassified in July 2004 by the National Security Archives
in Washington - of 104 "more important Colombian narco-terrorists contracted by
the Colombian narcotic cartels for security, transportation, distribution, collection
and enforcement of narcotics operations in both the U.S. and Colombia."

Pablo Escobar is on the list. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe is also on it.

Uribe, according to the document, is a "Colombian politician and senator dedicated
to collaboration with the Medellin cartel at high government levels." He was
"linked to a business involved in narcotics activities in the U.S. His father was
murdered in Colombia for his connection with the narcotic traffickers." He has
"worked for the Medellin cartel," according to the DoD report, and "is a close
personal friend of Pablo Escobar Gaviria.... He has participated in Escobar's political
campaign to win the position of assistant parliamentarian to Jorge [Ortega]..."

Adam Isaacson, a scholar at the Center for International Policy (CIP) in Washington,
cast doubt on the Pentagon's intelligence. After all, the CIP scholar explained,
Adnan Khashoggi's name was on it - so the list must be in error...

But the National Security Archives responded that the document as "accurate and
easily verifiable. It is evident that a significant amount of time and energy went into
compiling this report."

Remember, the word used by the Pentagon to describe the traffickers listed in the report,
including Khashoggi, was "narco-terrorist." So Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense
under Bush, a business partner of Khashoggi's at TriReme Corp., was in business with
a narco-terrorist, according to the Pentagon's own records.

President Uribe also denied the allegations regarding himself - not so easy to explain away,
however, was the 1984 seizure of his father's helicopter by Colombian police on narcotics
charges, or his brother's telephone number, stored in the memory bank of a cell phone
belonging to Escobar.2



Ignoring the Pentagon's own intelligence on the narco-presidenté, President Bush
paid Uribe a call in August 2003. Anti-war activist-reporter Jim Lobe
reported: "The administration of President George W. Bush on Monday rallied behind
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe in the face of allegations contained in a 13-year-old
Pentagon intelligence report that he was a close personal friend' of drug lord Pablo Escobar
and had worked for his Medellin drug cartel."

"We completely disavow these allegations about President Uribe," said State Department
spokesman Adam Ereli. "We have no credible information that substantiates or corroborates
these allegations that appeared in an unevaluated 1991 report, linking President Uribe
to the narcotics business or trafficking."

Isaacson said, "It's something the left has been trying to pin on him for awhile, and this
gives them new ammunition." However, he acknowledged, "in the big picture, almost
everybody in Colombia's ruling class was mixed up in drugs until [former U.S. President]
Ronald Reagan declared war on drugs in the mid-1980s."3

Narcotics have fuelled the flames of revolution and regime change, political assassinations
and bomb plots, the "war on drugs" notwithstanding.

Another drug runner in this underground empire was Henry Asher, founder of DataBase,
the ChoicePoint appendage. In a report by the Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement,
Asher admitted to smuggling drugs in 1982. Police developed "corroborating information"
that "during 1981 and 1982, Asher piloted five to seven plane loads of cocaine from
Colombia to the United States."

Asher admitted that he had shown "a lack of judgment," according to the report.
The remorseful millionaire cooperated with the FBI and agreed to be a federal "informant."

He was freed and went on to set up a "Total Information Awareness" surveillance
operation ...4

Yet another drug pilot on contra supply missions was Frank Moss who, according to
the Kerry Report, "has been under investigation as an alleged drug trafficker since 1979.
Moss has been investigated, although never convicted, for narcotics offenses -
by ten different law enforcement agencies.

In addition to flying contra supply missions through SETCO, Moss formed his own
company in 1985, Hondu Carib, which also flew supplies to the contra death squads,
including weapons and ammunition purchased from R.M. Equipment, an arms company
controlled by Ronald Martin and James McCoy.

The FDN's arrangement with Moss and Hondu Carib was pursuant to a commercial agreement
between the FDN's chief supply officer, Mario Calero, and Moss, under which Calero was to
receive an ownership interest in Moss' company. The Subcommittee received documentation
that one Moss plane, a DC-4, N90201, was used to move Contra goods from the United States
to Honduras. On the basis of information alleging that the plane was being used for
drug smuggling, the Customs Service obtained a court order to place a concealed transponder
on the plane.



"A second DC-4 controlled by Moss was chased off the west coast of Florida by
the Customs Service while it was dumping what appeared to be a load of drugs,
according to law enforcement personnel. When the plane landed at Port Charlotte no drugs
were found on board, but the plane's registration was not in order and its last known owners
were drug traffickers. Law enforcement personnel also found an address book aboard the plane, containing among other references the telephone numbers of some Contra officials and
the Virginia telephone number of Robert Owen, Oliver North's courier. A law enforcement
inspection of the plane revealed the presence of significant marijuana residue.
DEA seized the aircraft on March 16, 1987."5



Cable network opinion-shapers Ann Coulter and David Corn may insist that the CIA only
"looked the other way" when its assets have been caught moving narcotics to finance
assassinations, foreign coups, etc., but Khashoggi, Armitage and Asher weren't the only
drug runners in the "family."

William Casey, CIA director under Reagan, created several large off-the-shelf' networks
to finance illicit covert operations. The first, dependent on opium profits, supported the
Afghan Mujhaddin, with the CIA running funds through Pakistan's ISI and BCCI.
The second channel, to support the Nicaraguan contra war, ran through BCCI, too.
This channel also began with drug proceeds and ended in hot pockets of the Cold War.
The same organizational chart - of CIA proxy armies funded by drug proceeds -
was evident in KLA operations in Bosnia, complete with raping, pillaging, bomb-
tossing al Qaeda radicals.6

As a result, these networks, according to Peter Dale Scott, "have all aligned the US on
the same side as powerful local drug traffickers. Partly this has been from realpolitik -
in recognition of the local power realities represented by the drug traffic. Partly it has been
from the need to escape domestic political restraints: the traffickers have supplied additional financial resources needed because of US budgetary limitations, and they have also provided
assets not bound (as the U.S. is) by the rules of war."

The impact of all this trafficking in drugs, of course, is devastating. "These facts,"
Scott writes, "have led to enduring intelligence networks involving both oil and drugs,
or more specifically both petrodollars and narcodollars. These networks, particularly in
the Middle East, have become so important that they affect, not just the conduct of
US foreign policy, but the health and behavior of the US government, US banks and
corporations, and indeed the whole of US society."7

NOTES

1) Jefferson Morley, "Iran-Contra's Unasked Questions, or the Case of the $400,000 Hamburger,"
Los Angeles Times, November 29, 1987.

2) Jim Lobe, "Bush Rallies Behind Colombian President, Despite Drug Allegations," August 3, 2004.

3) Ibid.

4) Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, June, 2003.
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-1&q=hank+asher+and+cocaine+and+biography

5) "Selections from the Senate Committee Report on Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy," chaired by Senator John F. Kerry. http://www.webcom.com/pinknoiz/covert/contracoke.html#fn39

6) See: Peter Dale Scott, Drugs, Oil, and War; John Cooley, Unholy Wars.

7) Peter Dale Scott, "Afghanistan, Colombia, Vietnam: The Deep Politics of Drugs and Oil,"
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/qov.html

Posted by Alex Constantine at 9:14 AM

[Unknown]

Saudi CIA drug lord/businessman Kashoggi--money front 9-11 truth infiltration

http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2006/10/348293.shtml

The 'Genesis' of the Adnan Khashoggi Wing of the 9-11 Truth Movement (infiltration)

author: hopsicker with commentary

This is an interesting assortment how many of the false 9-11 truthers like Ruppert (and surprisingly, Barry Zwicker gets later caught up in John Gray money ("Men are from Mars" book ), and John Gray money and his book's popularity came from international drug lord Kashoggi's operations). Thus below is a summary of the twisted tale of the "Genesis" of the infiltrated side of the 9-11 Truth Movement, the Genesis named operations in a convoluted money trail of Adnan Kashoggi. Kashoggi's organizations have simultaneously taken to hawking "anything that needed to be hawked" for psyop purposes from John Gray's "Men are From Mars" books (with its Kashoggi connections), to perhaps (...Hopsicker leaves this open, though it would make intuitive sense for the 'genesis' of this branch of hawking as well) various other PGI Corporation connections to Ruppert ("perhaps the largest tax fraud scam in U.S. history"), to, of all things, the Hale Bopp Comet Cult itself--keyed off by 'false reportage' of the same 'Genesis' connected network off Kashoggi. Second, there is interesting information on the SAN DIEGO and TAMPA aspects of the false flaggers--which had Kashoggi networks around them as well as traitorous FBI networks as well in San Diego, according to the FBI Investigation of itself! The main theme is the implanted artificial culture industry and its main vehicle--under Kashoggi networks? With a different 'subsidiary' for each operation, each named "Genesis" Something? Read on. "...let's begin our journey with a visit to the psy-ops murk of 'Saudi Genesis'."

originally a comment at Jeff Wells' "Rigorous Intituion 2.0" website:
http://rigint.blogspot.com/2006/10/just-drive-by.html#comments


PREFACE

bin Laden ---> Kashoggi/bin Mafouz --> Thomas Kean of the 9-11 "investigation" Kean is business partner with bin Mafouz; bin Mafouz is brother in law of bin Laden family; Kashoggi and bin Mafouz connection


In the 1970s, Saudi-born businessman Adnan Kashoggi did trade in billions of dollars of arms and aircraft sales. He was never convicted (despite guilty, in the U.S.), but may be talking again, with one of the Pentagon's top advisers: Richard Perle. Adnan Khashoggi is wanted in Thailand, where he was convicted for fraud in absentia; is currently being sued, in a major and well-publicized case in Federal Court in Minneapolis for what may turn out to be criminal fraud; reportedly, he is also currently the subject of a massive investigation being conducted by the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles.

His businesses friends have been banned for getting U.S. governmental contracts due to illegal Iran arms sales in the 1980s as well. And the U.S. government calls Kashoggi in 1991 one of the top 100 international drug dealers--though he seems quite at home moving loosely in the U.S. intelligence circles of the world for whatever is required of him--in what DOJ gagged Sibel Edmonds would call U.S. political corruption and global U.S. intelligence run international drug trade networks responsible for the 9-11 events.

Even Khashoggi's guru has CIA connections, we learned: the vastly rich swami has been under official suspicion in the assassination of Indian Premier Rajiv Ghandi, and was even arrested by Indian police for currency fraud.

Add to that the recently declassified American intelligence report from 1991 listing the top 100 drug traffickers and associates. It included lawyers, right-wing paramilitary fighters, a Peruvian rebel commander, a Colombian singer, a pre-dead Pablo Escobar, a pre-jailbird Manuel Noriega... and Adnan Khashoggi.

Well now. That makes this relationship interesting:

INTRODUCTION

Kashoggi --> money to John Gray (pumped his book "Men are from Mars" made him famous) ---> (Kashoggi?)/John Gray ---> money to Canadian TV's Barry Zwicker, one of the earlist 9-11 truth popularizers

No wonder false denials of impropriety in accepting money from Khashoggi's business partner John Gray were so quick from so-called 9.11 disinfo wing of the "Truth Movement" principals who are readily accepting Kashoggi money.

Thus what we are about to get into might be called

"The 'Genesis' of the Adnan Kashoggi Wing of the 9-11 Truth Movement":

Back in the early 90's satirical magazine "Spy" launched an operation to find "the world's cheapest man," and they sent checks for 64 cents to a couple dozen friends of 'The Donald' (Trump that is).

Those that cashed the checks got another check from Spy, this one for 32 cents. If they cashed that check they got one for 16 cents.

Adnan Khashoggi was the last man standing.

The billionaire cashed a check for 32 cents.

Any quick look at the "Saudi arms dealer" shows his notoriety stems from more than just singing too loud in church, or mosque...he's involved as the front for the organizations infiltrating the 9-11 truth movement.


full article(s):


9-11 insider Nicholas Rockefeller ---> Nick Matzorkis (discovered the dead bodies of the Heaven's Gate cult which was likely a "terminated" MKULTRA operation; hired and paid the cult members) ---> Matzorkis sold production rights of the story of their death ---> to Adnan Kashoggi's Genesis subsidiaries

9-11 insider Nicholas Rockefeller ---> 3 different links to Matzorkis



And just who is Nicholas Rockefeller? A 9-11 terrorist insider, certainly one more remove inside the 9-11 planning network--the network that Kashoggi money is fronting to protect by infiltrating the 9-11 movement


Nicholas Rockefeller Predicted "Event" To Trigger War Eleven Months Before 9/11

Hollywood director Russo recalls remarkable "forecast" of coming attack

Paul Joseph Watson/Prison Planet.com | October 28 2006

Hollywood director and documentary film maker Aaron Russo, currently receiving a wave of plaudits for his latest release, America: From Freedom to Fascism [watch for free at Google Video], told The Alex Jones Show that Nicholas Rockefeller had personally assured him there was going to be an "event" that would trigger the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq eleven months before 9/11 took place.

Saying he had been approached many times by the Rockefellers and other members of the CFR elite in an attempt to recruit him, Russo recalled a conversation that would come home to roost on September 11, 2001.

"Here's what I do know first hand - I know that about eleven months to a year before 9/11 ever happened I was talking to my Rockefeller friend (Nicholas Rockefeller) and he said to me 'Aaron there's gonna be an event' and he never told me what the event was going to be - I'm not sure he knew what the event was going to be I don't know that he knew that," said Russo.

Russo related how Rockefeller knew precisely what the event would lead to and which countries would be militarily targeted by the elite.

"He just said there's gonna be an event and out of that event we're gonna invade Afghanistan so we can run pipelines through the Caspian sea, we can go into Iraq to take the oil and establish bases in the middle east and to make the middle east part of the new world order and we're going to go after Venezuela - that's what's going to come out of this event."

"Eleven months to a year later that's what happened....he certainly knew that something was going to happen."

"In my relationships with some of these people I can tell you that it's as evil as it really gets - this is it - this is the game," stated Russo - also relating how members of the elite were routinely obsessed by creating a world identification society where people had to carry ID cards and prove who they were at all times.

http://prisonplanet.com/articles/october2006/281006rockefellerpredicted.htm

For those who are unaware of the 'first family' of the United States, even this lighthearted and hardly indepth History Channel documentary (and sometimes I'm yelling bullshit at the screen) and in the History Channel's own words were "reshaping America" is informative:

History Channel
53 min 37 sec - Oct 24, 2006
profiles.yahoo.com

The Rockefellers - pt1
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=7052472452312817723

The Rockefellers - pt2
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-915024472844529739

The Rockefellers - pt3
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3334238675533333791

Part two, the juicy bits are censored and the link has been down ever since the link was live..

And who is Nicholas Rockefeller? This gets positivity Wellsian so while Jeff is ill, read this by Hopsicker as a substitute, and what a substitute it is:

According to Hopsicker:

"The story of the auto thief Nick Matzorkis from Cleveland who discovered 39 dead bodies in Rancho Santa Fe Ca. in March of 1997 in the Heaven's Gate cult mass suicide is a reflection in a fun house mirror of America's secret history of freakish cults, financial fraud, and the occasional member of the Rockefeller family, all of which helped make possible today's 9.11 cover-up.

October 13 2004-Venice,FL.
by Daniel Hopsicker

After finding the bodies of 39 members of the Heaven's Gate cult on a balmy afternoon in Southern California, arrayed in neat rows and wearing brand new Nikes, Nick Matzorkis became instantly famous.

Soon he'd sold rights to the story of the cult suicide to the Hollywood entertainment company for which both he and some of the dead cultists worked. It was a smart move.

But fame can be a two-edged sword, and Matzorkis wound up suffering the twin fates common to people in certain circles in L. A.: a short-lived production deal, and jail time.

A probation officer saw him on national television, and 'made' him as a wanted felon who'd skipped out on his sentence.

Carl Icahn ---> Adnan Khashoggi

He was jailed and returned to Cleveland, coincidentally the home of financier Carl Icahn, who will figure later in our story for allowing his name be used to prop up Adnan Khashoggi and John Gray's Genesis Intermedia in an announcement he'd extended the company a $100 million credit line even as company principals were filling their pockets with pens and staplers on their way out the door.

Nothing was left behind...except thousands of angry investors.

Carl Ichan from Cleveland--Rockefeller home town originally--strangely, also figures peripherally in the Heaven's Gate saga: when the cultists threw themselves a final going-away-to-Hale Bopp party in January of 1997, they held the bash at Icahn's Stratosphere Casino in Vegas, which he was then in the process of purchasing out of bankruptcy.

A 10-year old girl, looking out to sea

We were first tipped to the interesting Mr. Matzorkis by researcher Kelly Cooke, adding a human dimension to a story that otherwise sometimes seems to take place in the 13th Dimension.

Sadly for Ms. Cooke, both of whose parents committed suicide under the influence of the group, it didn't.

After the mass suicide, a Marin County, Ca. newspaper reported, "Michael Sykes of Modoc County, a former owner of Point Reyes Books, remembered the couple fondly. "Nick was an artist and philosopher and very much a conversationalist, talking late into the night," he said. "Suzanne was lively, animated, and interested in the arts."

"Sykes... recalled she took Kelly with her to Washington State to plant trees for a timber company. It was upon her return that she started following a group that preached of heavenly UFOs, he said.

"I thought they went off the deep end," said Susan Deixler of Inverness Park, whom they asked to take care of their daughter.

Recalling their determination to leave, Deixler said: "They seemed hypnotized. You would come up against the wall when you tried to talk to them about this. It was strange."

Mathewson and her ex-husband eventually accepted responsibility for Kelly. "It all happened very quick, and there wasn't much time for an explanation," she said.

"Charlie Morgan of Inverness recalled 10-year-old Kelly "standing on the corner [in Point Reyes Station] looking bewildered and alone because her parents were off with the space people."

While following the often-convoluted story, the memory of this image provided a simple illustration of what it is about.

Auto thieves drinking with 'the swells'

We became suspicions of Matzorkis after reading a neighbor of the cult, businessman Anthony Demopoulos, recall that the cultists seemed slow-talking, deliberate, almost robotic in their actions.

"They were not normal people," he stated flatly. "Something was done to them."

Pretty astute.. Demopoulos noticed that one cultist [the agent-handler of the cult], John Craig, known as "Brother Logan," held sway over the others. "He would never let them even be on the phone alone to talk to me. They couldn't breathe without him."

"In contrast, Beverly Hills computer businessman Nick Matzorkis [who "discovered" the cult's bodies], who employed about a dozen cult members to design World Wide Web sites, had the impression that they were not being coerced. His employee Richard Ford, or "Rio," is the former cultist who discovered the bodies," read a wire service account. "The one thing that's been made very clear to me in conversations with Rio is that anyone was free to leave at any time," Matzorkis said.

Mohamed Atta's erstwhile lunch-mate Rudi Dekkers never saw anything amiss, either.

[Unknown]

Were they working from the same playbook?

Matzorkis ---> Hale Bopp death cult
Matzorkis ---> 9-11 Insider Nicholas Rockefeller

Cultists deaths forgotten, Matzorkis went on to help raise $ 54 million in an Internet initial public stock offering for a heavily-advertised online venture called U.S. Search.com. Two years ago he founded a company in China, GlobalAgora, with a partner with a slightly-more illustrious pedigree, Nicholas Rockefeller--the very person who is friends with Aaron Russo, who told Aaron 11 months before 9-11 some "event" would happen that would allow the Caspian oil pipeline and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The press release announcing their company said the principals were "Nicholas Matzorkis, who in 1994 founded US SEARCH, the number one people locator service in the world, and Nicholas Rockefeller Esq., a leading venture capital counselor. Several years later Matzorkis is hiring Heaven's Gate cult members, and is the one to actually call the police from the ranch where they were found.

Launched only months before 9-11 by Matzorkis/Rockefeller in league with the large state own department store infrastructure of totalitarian China, GlobalAgora is believed to be the "first U.S. company to launch first in the People's Republic."

From auto thief to Beverly Hills businessman and partnered in an international company with a scion of the Rockefeller clan...just another heady American success story?

To paraphrase Latin ballplayer Chico Esquella's famous line on Saturday Night Live:

"Heaven's Gate Been Berry Berry Good to Me."

There's no real way to ask the question politely: Are Matzorkis' connections with Nicholas Rockefeller coincidental to his earlier involvement with the Heaven's Gate Cult?

As they say in Hollywood... Let's take a look.

What to Do Do when the Spot Spot won't come Out Out?

The highly-visible campaign spreading ever-more implausible red herrings about the real mysteries of the 9/11 attack owes its existence to a simple fact of human nature.

As far back as the ancient Greeks—and as true today as then—is the idea that crime always shows itself, and is eventually discovered.

Certain news cannot be suppressed.

Truth will come to light.

"Though it hide a year or two, or three," wrote Chaucer, "Murder will out."

Certainly this is a line to send a shiver down the spine of anyone with so far unannounced culpability in the 9.11 attack.

For example, American national security officials conducting 'business as usual' before the attack must have felt they'd gotten caught without a stool when the music stopped. Who wanted to cop to playing "Dialing for Dollars" with the world's Heroin Kingpins Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar before the plane's hit? These two men dominated the world's heroin market, yet there had been no reports in the press of any shortage of heroin during the months before the attack, either in the U.S. or abroad.

Somebody had exposure.

The American people may be forgiving, but what if they had learned that the terrorists presence in the U.S. had been tolerated and even protected by U.S. officials engaged in international trafficking with Atta's paymasters in Kabul?

Picture Jerry Falwell trying to peddle forgiveness for that down the aisles at Liberty Baptist in Lynchburg.

You see the point.

If only figuratively, heads would certainly have rolled.

Clearly, the revelation in "Welcome to Terrorland" that a Lear Jet with 43 lbs of heroin on board belonged to the man whose flight school Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al Shehhi had only recently begun attending was a bit of dashed bad luck for someone.

It didn't help that the plane had been flying weekly milk runs to Venezuela and back for 30 consecutive weeks before getting caught.

That the pilot's day job was as chief pilot on Venezuela's Air Force One only made things worse... .

That the co-pilot was himself reportedly a DEA agent stationed in Guyana was yet more bad luck...

The fact that the flight school owner actually has a close connection with the Reverend Falwell made this a sticky wicket of potential major consequence.

Did someone go a little queasy in the stomach at the discovery that a key player in the 9/11 terrorist conspiracy had been implicated in the biggest narcotics bust in the entire sordid history of Central Florida?

We like to think so.

Because when you're going after people who could be charged with 3000 counts of 1st degree homicide, its important to savor the little victories.

Because when you're waging a 9.11 info war with powerful people with a lot to lose, there may not be any bigger ones.

Especially when they order up a circus:

"Send in the Clowns World Tour '04."

"The 9/11 Truth Movement gives one insight why the term 'conspiracy theorist' came to be shorthand for "discredited whacko" in the invisible guidebook of mainstream media," wrote Sander Hicks. "Suddenly, it's not hard to understand why the obvious anomalies in the JFK assassination never received proper attention in accepted media channels."

"If you have just as many nutty theories about the driver of the limo turning around and shooting JFK as you have honest scientific inquiries about the real probability of multiple shooters, the wheat drowns in the chaff."

However, Sander Hicks himself may be compromised. Sander Hicks is yet another strange case of a potential disinformationalist

Somehow, Hicks--like Ruppert--hit all the elite venues:

Sander Hicks Interview by Mickey Z: "Hicks gained national notoriety when he published Jim Hatfield's controversial Dubya biography, "Fortunate Son." The scathing, well-documented expose of the Bush dynasty resulted in near financial ruin for Soft Skull, a brilliant film documentary ( http://www.hornsandhalos.com), and Hatfield's tragic suicide--or murder....Sander Hicks has reported on 9/11 issues since 9/2001 [<--- interesting...] for Guerrilla News, Long Island Press and INN World Report, a TV news show on the Dish Network. Hicks is founder of Soft Skull Press, Inc and Vox Pop/Drench Kiss Media Corporation. He has spoken publicly about 9/11 alongside Scott Ritter, the UN arms inspector. How in the world did he get sponsored for that? He was recently interviewed by Janeane Garafalo about 9/11 on nation-wide radio network [rut roh! ---> Air America which perhaps happens to be named after the famous CIA narco-airline for spooking the sheep one more time..., and Hicks strangely can even find himself sponsored to address a massive audience at the historic John D. Rockefeller, Jr. built Gothic cathdral in New York City, Riverside Church, on the topic of the "9/11 Cover Up"? Give us a break Sander Hicks. Just as Ruppert can be sponsored as per his 'legend as 9-11 truth activist' by the high elite Commonwealth Club in San Francisco; Just as Gloria Stinem, CIA asset, is sponsored into the eye as "feminist leadership" directly by CIA's Cord Meyers' when he prints and sponsors her articles along in Fortune Magazine. Watch the venues!!!

Today's disinformation offensive on the real questions about 9.11 that must be answered, however, is not the first time Americans have been manipulated...

So there's a paper trail.

This is good news, but first, let's begin our journey with a visit to the psy-ops murk of Saudi Genesis.

What's being lost in the White Noise is the news that evidence constituting inconvenient knowledge about the 9/11 attack continues to seep to the surface...It just isn't being noticed much anymore.

...

Real Clues for Real People

Here's a real clue to unraveling 9/11, a huge gold nugget, in fact, tucked unnoticed in a 9.11 third anniversary recap in the Chicago Tribune:

"Despite his comfortable origins, Atta was notorious for his frugality," says the Sept 12, 2004 story, headlined "Kind teacher to murderous zealot; Acquaintances saw hijacker transform."

"And yet his (Atta's) bank and credit card records show repeated contributions to Islamic charities working in the Balkans, the mark of a devoted Muslim. In what appears to be a more noteworthy act of generosity to someone he barely knew, in 1995 Atta lent a Turkish baker, Muharrem Acar, some $25,000 to help Acar open a bakery."

"Acar told the BKA that Atta didn't even ask for a promissory note when he made the loan.

"I don't know why El-Amir had so much money," he said. "I did not want to know either. I heard later that his father was a lawyer. Maybe his family supplied him well."

***Where did penniless grad student Mohamed Atta get $25,000 in 1995, years before the official story has him joining Al Qaeda?***

Where did Atta get access to so much cash that 25k was no big deal?

Discovering who the terrorist ringleader's paymaster was back in 1995 would be a huge piece of the puzzle. Following a money trail is not brain surgery either...

Government prosecutors find answers to questions like that all day long... when they want to.

This is the essence of the concept of 'the secret history.'

"6 Second Abs & 9.11 Conspiracies Revealed!"

"Ladies and gentlemen of the press, Peak Oil activists worldwide... "

...

Rockefeller's Favorite Martian, Rockefeller Psyops from the 1930s

The Rockefeller family got interested in the reptoids earlier than most, and apparently for different reasons. Most use stories of UFO's for mild amusement. Not the Rockefellers, though. They were interested in using the stories for control.

In fact, if it weren't for the Rockefeller Foundation's previous mass psychology experiments which starred the Martians, today's cover-up effort by American officials might not be proceeding as smoothly as it has.

Here's what happened:

At precisely 8pm on the evening of October 30th 1938, the Mercury Radio Network interrupted the music of Ramon Rachello and His Orchestra for a special news bulletin. A huge flaming object, believed to be a meteorite, had fallen on a farm near Grovers Mill, New Jersey.

Moments later comes a correction...

"Its not a meteorite, no! Incredibly, there are Martian cylinders falling all over the country!"

The famous War of the Worlds broadcast has begun. With its terrifyingly real descriptions of an invasion from Mars, before the night is out a million people will run panicked into the streets.

But what has been--for almost fifty years--a closely guarded secret, is this: Orson Wells' broadcast was no mere show business stunt, but an Experiment in Fear, a psychological warfare test conducted for the Rockefeller Foundation.

Here's a quote from "America Under Attack" A Reassessment of Orson Welles War of the Worlds" by Paul Heyler of Willfrid Laurier University:

"A grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to Princeton University helped create the Princeton Office of Radio Research. The director was Paul Lazersfeld, an Austrian Jewish émigré and a social psychologist whose expertise in quantitative methods was tempered by a humanist leaning. He teamed with two associates, psychologist Hadley Cantrell and CBS researcher Fred Stanton, a PhD in psychology who would eventually become network president."

Paging Jerry Falwell

Pretty smart company. The book continues:

"The broadcast was a psychological warfare experiment conducted by The Princeton Radio Project. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the project in the fall of 1937. An Office of Radio Research was set up with Paul F. Lazersfeld as director, and Frank Stanton and Hadley Cantrell as associate directors.

Using demographic data on the broadcast's audience gleaned from a 10-page interview questionnaire given to 135 people, they created a book, "Invasion From Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic."

The results were available to only a few, apparently, with no talk of any paperback release. Yet more than 12 percent of the American radio audience had listened to the broadcast. More than half that number took it seriously. By sociologist Hadley Cantrell's account, published in a landmark study for the Rockefeller Foundation, more than a million people were frightened by Welles' broadcast.

The strongest currents of fear were among less-educated people and poor Southern folk. (Jerry Falwell took note.)

The emergence of the comet Hale Bopp decades later will mark a resurgence in warnings of catastrophe; insistent messages of doom & gloom; the end of Life As We Know. Remember Y2K?

There were actually people peddling the 'hot tip' that freeze-dried foods would soon attain the status of Kobe beef just after the clock struck "Y2K" and the grid went dark...

Imagine that. Peddling products on a disaster. Or even peddling scam products during fake 9-11 exposures.

Keep that in mind as you learn everything you need to know about the Adnan Khashoggi Wing of the Infiltrated 9-11 Truth Movement

Info on Khashoggi runs the gamut from the ridiculous to the sinister.

To get the serious stuff out of the way first:

"Khashoggi was among a number of prominent Arab businessmen, like Khalid Mahfouz, who agreed to continue what have been described by US intelligence officials as "protection payments" to bin Laden at a meeting in Paris in 1998, said London's Sunday Business Post October 7, 2001.

And business partner with Mafooz networks? Why, the head of the 9-11 Cover-Up, I mean, 9-11 Omission, I mean, 9-11 Commission, Mr. Kean himself, through Amereda Hess Oil Company which has Mafouz connections. And Mafouz is brother-in-law to the bin Ladens, the supposed 'official legend' people of the 9-11 terrorist events are only one remove away from Mr. Kean himself. Remember Max Clelend leaving the "commission" saying "the whole thing is a cover up." He's right. It's more than that its being run by bin Laden/Bush proxies, thus to get into the actual story would implicate themselves, like Mr. Kean, so they had a personal incentive to be quiet about it.

But there's also a fun side to Adnan's slightly-slimier side...

Back in the early 90's satirical magazine "Spy" launched an operation to find the world's cheapest man, and they sent checks for 64 cents to a couple dozen friends of 'The Donald.'

Those that cashed the checks got another check from Spy, this one for 32 cents. If they cashed that check they got one for 16 cents.

Adnan Khashoggi was the last man standing.

The billionaire cashed a check for 32 cents.

Any quick look at the Saudi arms dealer shows his notoriety stems from more than just singing too loud in church, or mosque, or whatever temple roof he and Imelda Marco huddle underneath together with their personal guru.

Even Khashoggi's guru has CIA connections, we learned: the vastly rich swami has been under official suspicion in the assassination of Indian Premier Rajiv Ghandi, and was even arrested by Indian police for currency fraud.

Adnan Khashoggi revealed: He is wanted in Thailand, where he was convicted for fraud in absentia; is currently being sued, in a major and well-publicized case in Federal Court in Minneapolis for what may turn out to be criminal fraud; reportedly, he is also currently the subject of a massive investigation being conducted by the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles.

Add to that the recently declassified American intelligence report from 1991 listing the top 100 drug traffickers and associates. It included lawyers, right-wing paramilitary fighters, a Peruvian rebel commander, a Colombian singer, a pre-dead Pablo Escobar, a pre-jailbird Manuel Noriega... and Adnan Khashoggi.

Well now.

No wonder false denials of impropriety in accepting money from Khashoggi's business partner John Gray were so quick from so-called 9.11 [disinfo wing of the] "Truth Movement" principals [accepting Kashoggi money].

"I asked John Gray personally about what connection, if any, he has or had with Adnan Khashoggi," said Toronto talk host Barrie Zwicker. "John satisfied me that he is aware of the anti-life nature of Khashoggi's activities, that he has not associated with him and would never want to, that he was caught up in the aftermath of dirty dealings by Khashoggi and other dot com crooks and in fact was one of their victims."

The Great 9/11 Bun & Thigh Roller Deception

"A victim of circumstance and "dot com crooks"

Here we do not believe Zwicker is referencing the friendly folks at Pinnacle Quest, a vehicle for international fraudsters endorsed by Michael C. Ruppert on his website.

He also provides them a vigorous defense; perhaps he feels cheating widows and orphans reduces population pressure and so is ultimately all to the good.

Ruppert said, "[Pinnacle Quest] PQI has presented some remarkable information that is totally suppressed in the US. That includes successful treatments for cancer and for many other serious diseases... "

Here we note that self-described "Detective-Journalist" Ruppert has apparently slipped in "Clinician" too, when no one was looking.

We pictured Andy Griffith in the con man classic Elmer Gantry.

Some sample quotes about Ruppert's fraudster friends at Pinnacle Quest:

"[Pinnacle Quest's] Anderson was extradited to the United States a few days ago (December 4, 2002), his brother (Wayne Anderson) was recently sentenced to serve much of the rest of his life in a federal prison, most of his key people have been incarcerated, and his offshore empire has crumbled."

"On March 31, 2002, Global officially went out of business, replaced by--ta da! we can raise the dead when there's a sucker's money to be had!--Pinnacle Quest, International (PQI). At the official introductory gathering at the Hyatt Hotel in Bellevue... "

"A lawsuit has already been filed against Pinnacle Quest in Arizona."

"On April 22, 2002, Squaw Valley California residents Terri Yvonne Lewis (42), and Steven Lyle Anderson (37), each pled guilty in US District Court/Fresno to charges related to conspiracy and obstruction of justice."

"The defendants are children of Wayne Anderson and they were charged with shredding documents and erasing computer files in an effort to thwart a federal grand jury investigation."

"The reality is that Global, much like Investors International, holds seminars in exotic places where the true believers rally round and sing the system's praises to new initiates while (more or less) independent hucksters promote their particular schemes to the attendees."

"North Dakota issued a cease and desist order to keep the company from doing business there."

"On top of the $1,200 audiotape package, Global members are invited to attend seminars in places like Cancun, Mexico and the Bahamas where independent entrepreneurs pay IGP to make their pitch. The cost of attendance: $6,250. For more than 12 hours a day, the attendees sit through one sales pitch after another for real estate prospects, tax avoidance schemes and high-growth investment opportunities."

More that 12 hours a day?

We wondered if it was one of these things where they won't let you pee.

Ruppert said, "Am I aware that some members of PQI have had criminal charges pressed against them? Absolutely! So have many dedicated patriots and whistleblowers throughout our country's history... "

So Ruppert you support "The Paul Revere Ponzi Scheme?"

We tried to picture it. It was a little hard. But "9/11 Flim-Flam Man" was an easy image to conjure up.

Ruppert's PQI, with its fresh start to do right this time, has already been in trouble.

In U.S. Court proceedings filed in Oklahoma against a former PQI consultant, for example, whose actions were described as being part of "perhaps the largest and most notorious tax fraud scheme in history."

The Massachusetts Securities Commission declared Global Prosperity Group (which was closed down in May last year and "re-opened"--ta da!--raised the dead twice!--the next day as PQI) to be "an illegal pyramid scheme."

They were ordered permanently to cease trading in that state.

PQI sales consultants are in New Zealand promoting a "three-stage educational process," we learned.

"First, you buy a set of instructional CDs (cost, $2200). Second, you attend a seminar. The next is in Mexico (cost, $10,800). Then, you attend another seminar on a cruise ship (cost, nearly $26,000). These fees cover entry to the seminar and purchase of the CDs. They do not include airfares, accommodation, food or expenses."

The CIA getting useful legal front monies to make its front businesses look more legit?

"Pinnacle Quest International (PQI) is a US company that promises to introduce you to "secret companies" that will provide returns of over 100 percent, and teach you how to avoid ever paying tax again. You'll also be in line for some hefty consultant commissions."

"People like Queen Elizabeth II and Muhammad Ali are involved with PQI. Not many people know this," sales consultants confided.

"As for the secret companies, only the mega-rich have known about them up until now."

Could it all be somehow true?

"The lion will lay down with the lamb...But only one will get back up."

Neither Queen Elizabeth nor Muhammad Ali responded to MadCowMorningNews requests for confirmation of their involvement in secret companies for the mega-rich as touted by PQI.

Could they be hiding something?

Maybe they just don't want the masses in the cheap seats to know about it...

More likely that Ruppert, the self-appointed "pit-bull of 9/11" & the 'Fearless Leader' of the 9.11 'Truth Movement cadre', is all out of credibility except when hawking secret companies at 9.11 cadre functions, during those odd moments when they're not going all out in search for the real truth.

Khashoggi linked John Gray's financing of infomercials touting Zwicker's new 9-11 documentary were vastly more entertaining that Ruppert's thoughts on cancer cures, anyway. Greedy People are as endlessly fascinating as their many schemes; those who have just "Gone Puffy" are only good for a laugh if they can also pull off sticking their hand inside their shirt, Napoleon-like.

Canadian talk host Zwicker's laissez faire attitude towards the controversy had a brazen quality that was not altogether unattractive... "John [Gray] is helping out financially with various aspects of the 9/11 skeptics movement," Zwicker sniffed. "In my own case there are no gifts. The money has to be paid back."

We try to think the best of people.

At least Zwicker wasn't holding forth on curing cancer.

In this crowd that's a plus.

So we prefer to think his motivation for his new 9.11 infomercial reflects nothing more heinous that a desire to meet "Stop the Insanity's" Susan Powter.

As German author Broeckers said dryly, "That a 9.11 conference of investigators probing to learn the truth about the attack could be funded by the very people supposedly being investigated... came to me as quite a surprise."

Unlike the droll Broeckers, some writers use a full wind-up first, before throwing their Khashoggi pitch...

"Adnan Khashoggi's mercenary army of global corporate criminals lives in Mafia mansions, basks in the political limelight, enjoys the privileges of royalty in tyrannical desert dystopias, and sips vodka in the shadow of gleaming Moscow spires," wrote Alex Constantine.

"They are kings, Pentagon officials, priests, S&L thieves, assassins, prostitutes, Nazis, Big Oil executives, metals merchants, New Age cultists, drug barons, boiler-room con artists, mobsters, dictators... and terrorists."

As Dr. John Gray, "Ph.D." himself might put it: "Wow, what a powerful share."

"John-Boy of Arabia"

Constantine's litany of miscreants form the backbone of the organization we call "Saudi Genesis," whose backing and marketing prowess made John Gray a franchise and a household name, we discovered.

Here's what happened: Men Are From Mars was not an instant hit when it was first published. Almost ten months after its release, Gray's flagship book had received little acclaim and climbed no best seller lists.

Enter Adnan Khashoggi and lieutenant Ramy El Batrawi, who, we learned, has also used the nom de guerre "Remy Al-Batswani" while running an air carrier for Khashoggi used in illegal shipments of arms to Iran which was eventually placed on the State Department's list of "unsavory" companies and barred from doing business with any agency of the U.S. Government.( http://pmdtc.org/debar059.htm )

"It took a year to get on the best-seller list," said Jack McKeown, president and publisher of HarperCollins trade group, in an interview.'

John Gray is the beneficiary of a turbocharged marketing campaign, in which the author is an active partner."

So John Gray owes his huge success and resulting fortune to Khashoggi's "Saudi Genesis," an intricate web of rapidly changing corporate fronts and dummy corporations with the word "Genesis" in their name, involved in wholesale criminal fraud that looks to be a textbook example of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise.

Saudi money picked up John Gray's book (and Gray himself) and ran with it; creating infomercials that drove sales of until they became a worldwide publishing phenomenon. Michael C. Ruppert and the phony side of the 9/11 Truth Movement are defending taking money from & owes his fame and success to Saudi money from Adnan Khashoggi, provided through a company incorporated by Barry Seal's attorney, the same man currently suing us [Hopsicker] for 'emotional distress.'

No doubt this is just a freak coincidence.

Gray is even alleged to be involved, in papers filed in a major lawsuit in Federal Court in Minneapolis, in the recent $200 million looting the Genesis principals engaged in while on their way out of town.

His trading account was used in the scheme, alleges the suit.

But apparently that doesn't make him a close associate of Adnan Khashoggi...not at least for purposes of taking money from him.

Not in Michael Ruppert's book

[Unknown]

"The 9-11 false flag boys" from Tampa & L.A.

From their base in Tampa Florida, Khashoggi and El Batrawi controlled a network of companies, all using the word "Genesis" in their name.

Half of the "Al-Queda" funding came out of Tampa as well through Al-Arain, who was a close personal friend of George W. Bush:

"The lawsuit of 2002 that this guy files against Al-Arian--the Tampa, FL 9-11 cell connection--is most interesting. Why is it interesting? Well, because Bush is hard and fast friends with Al-Arain, who has "9-11 terrorist connections" according to the lawsuit. Why settle for treasonous Rove? Get treasonous Bush, who meets with Al-Arian who is currently in federal prison awaiting trial for terrorism connections to 9-11. Bush is conversing with Al-Arain's family merely one month before 9-11; 9-11 terrorist Al-Arian scheduled to meet in the White House with VP Cheney even, though Cheney cancels the meeting."
http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2005/07/321874.shtml

The number of Khashoggi-owned Genesis companies we've found keeps growing. There is, or was, Genesis Aviation, Inc., Genesis Aviation II, Genesis Diversified Investments, Genesis Studio and Production Corp., Genesis Media Group, Genesis Properties, Genesis Intermedia; GenesisIntermedia.com.; Genesis Delaware; Genesis Florida... The list, it do go on. And on.

Versions of the company have traded under a number of stock symbols: GNNX; NTER; BMOO; GMGI; and GENI... What's the purpose? Guess, according to Catherine Austin Fitts...

Clearly this is a difficult company to keep track of...exactly the idea.

One innocent businessman who had a website mistakenly associated with 'the boys' at "Saudi Genesis" posted this desperate explanation for why he had nothing at all to do with them:

"Over the last several weeks, I have put together these facts:

The Scammers might be related to Genesis Media Group, a subsidiary of GenesisIntermedia Inc. GenesisIntermedia is in financial trouble. See the section below about GenesisIntermedia.

The Scammers have a website of www.familyproductsllc.com which is only an email front, there is no "real" website there. You can email customerservice@familyproductsllc.com which is their published email address. Most persons have not gotten a response.

The Scammers may use the following websites: www.ab-energizer-exercise.com, www.ab-fitness-exercise.com, www.familyproductsllc.com. More information about the owners of these websites follows in this email (Including address and phone numbers).

The Scammers may use the following phone numbers: 1-800-457-0825, 1-800-801-6130, 1-888-602-7878, 1-818-902-4100 fax: 123 123 1234, 1-888-255-2525..." [if you call those or invest in companies particularly with these last numbers, how did you get money to invest in the first place?]

"The proof is in the patterns! And so are the trading profits!"

The "Saudi Genesis" companies specialized in marketing to the masses, through infomercials and on the internet. Everything from Plastic Surgeons Crème to ab-energizers to fraudulent get rich quick schemes like "Trade Your Way to Riches," created after arms dealer and friend of Khashoggi, Ramy El-Batrawi of Genesis, approached Jake Bernstein at a seminar in Burbank, California about the possibility of marketing Bernstein's futures trading products through the creation of an infomercial.

Jake Bernstein billed himself as the world's foremost authority on pattern recognition and cycles and author of over 25 trading books.

(He must be pretty good at recognizing when its time to leave town, at least, cause he hasn't gone to prison recently.) Bernstein website: "Jake found an easier way to get rich. Instead of trading futures he would trade on investor gullibility," wrote a whistleblower.

Bernstein starred in an infomercial that aired on 400 TV stations, hyping a video course called Trade Your Way to Riches.

A farmer named Harold Henkel told viewers how well Bernstein's approach has worked for him.

Henkel later admitted he lost money trading using Bernstein's products. We hope his "endorsement fee" made up for it.

Critics were unkind to Jake.

"There's one born every minute. Seasonal Suckers is the cold truth about Jake Bernstein's futures theories."

"Jake Bernstein has a lousy record trading futures but has made plenty trading on investor gullibility"

The boys at Genesis Intermedia made out like bandits.


The C'mon Back Scandal Revisited

And then there's the Genesis Communications Network.

(And here's where the double "Genesis Communications Network" name gets hairy. Pay Attention.)

There's actually two of them, seemingly unrelated, but they're so extremely similar in the fraud department to each other and to "Saudi Genesis" that the relationship appears strongly familial.

We're still uncertain as to how close they all are; kissing cousins, at the very least.

The first GCN is a so-called "patriot" network hosting Alex Jones and Dave Van Kliest, the latter, the, ah, the individual fronting for the latest See the Flash extravaganza, advertisements for which are spamming the Internet at a rate that must be causing concern among conservationists of our digital landscape of '1's and ' 0's.'

VanKliest is our pick for Disinfotainer of the Year... an especial honor, considering that there was some fierce competition.

Of course, "See the Flash Dave" from the powerhour, like Alex Jones, is part of the GENESIS Communications Network. ( gcnlive.com ) ( genesis radio hosts )

[Interesting...]

He reminds us of Tattoo from Fantasy Island, pointing and shouting "De Plane! De Plane!"

When we fingered this checkered crew in last week's story for involvement in what we termed the "C'mon back scandal," we hadn't meant it literally... So we clearly underestimated them, because they're not above personally getting behind the wheel when the opportunity arises to "to back up a truck."

They're [Kleist?] involved in an internecine scandal, documented on the web at some length by "Christians" for whom time must hang heavy during the long Montana winter... "Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Matthew 7:15," their screed began.

"Christian Media has repeatedly sought to expose the treachery at the Genesis Communications Network... They stole their original equipment from another patriot network named Republic Radio. Fraudulently claiming they had purchased the network, the management of Genesis literally backed up a U-Haul, and loaded up the broadcasting equipment while the rightful owner was out of town!"

Lily Tomlin, Prophetess of Our Times, said, "No matter how cynical I get I just can't keep up."

The actual story there is still unknown.

Welcome Back to "Honk-if-You-Love-Jesus World."

GCN programming "broadly ranges from provocative politics to gardening, health and pop culture, and targets specific audiences with useful guidelines for surviving & prospering in an increasingly complex and challenging political and socio-economic environment."

The Exec VP at Genesis Communications Network in Minnesota is Michael@midasreport.com ( Midas Report ) We noticed the address at the bottom. Mike with the "Midas Touch" shares the same address as another website called "BRIDGES FOR PEACE," where you can "VISIT ISRAEL WITHOUT LEAVING YOUR COMPUTER."

Bridges For Peace is a Jerusalem-based, Bible-believing Christian organization supporting Israel and building relationships between Christians and Jews worldwide through education and practical deeds expressing God's love and mercy...

Whatever these people think they're doing its clear their mind is on only one thing: TAKING THE RUBES FOR A RIDE. WARNING: The following links should not be clicked on by anyone with difficulty metabolizing sugar, or who are allergic to gagging...

celebratelove.com

mymasterytvnet.com
mymasterytvbiz.com

celebrateintimacy.com
authorsandspeakersnetwork.com

Take a peek at Larry, for example.

"Larry James - Internet secrets revealed! Larry reveals what he considers to be the most important key to shameless self-promotion on the Internet. This article has loads of shameless examples! This article appears in the book, "Confessions of Shameless Internet Promoters" by Debbie Allen. Now available in Larry's Book Store in the Author/Speaker Section."

We appreciated that they didn't make a cheap buck commercializing the 9.11 tragedy in every sentence. Just in every other sentence...

"Midas Resources has a fully trained team of professionals with decades of experience in the coin and metal markets. We are here to assist you and to provide you with personal service and attention. We specialize in U.S. semi-numismatic coins. Coins of historical significance to collectors that derive a substantial portion of their value from their underlying gold or silver value... The new U.S. $20 dollar bill contains hidden pictures of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks!"

...

The Florida version of it is the front version:

The weird thing about the SECOND Genesis Communications Network--in FLORIDA--is that it doesn't appear that any of their listed websites were real websites!

They look like ghost websites...Most have no links to them... at all.

Some look like commerce sites, but they don't appear to sell 'nothin to nobody.'

They reminded us of a fake street front at Universal Studios Check a few out, then click the Alexa tag.

syncpac.net

bizbanc.net

ecommxpress.com
alexa details

alexa details

alexa details

They were like website "Ghost ships."

consumer1st.com

advancedscientifichealth.com

savethe-usa.com
businessownersinstitute.org

commissionsoft.com

fsicorporate.com alexa details


It was spooky. And then we read something about the SECOND Genesis Communications Network in Florida that made out heart grow cold... or at least cold-er.

In the July 23, 2001 South Florida Business Journal was a story called "Florida's tech leader under investigation." And he just happened to be associated with Gov. Jeb Bush.

"The state's chief information officer is under investigation for grand theft. Roy Thomas Cales Jr., 39, has been accused of using a forged letter to obtain a loan from the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Tallahassee on which he later defaulted," the story started. The story said, "Cales was on a Latin American trade mission trip with Gov. Jeb Bush and was not available to discuss the investigation."

We got a picture of "trade mission" that looked like a couple of guys bringing girls back to the hotel.

But then, we're not trained Remote Viewers. But we saw something much more serious.

"Cales had complete decision-making authority over what kind of computers each state agency purchases, who gets hired to take care of them and what they do with them."

The next line made some sense of the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida: "The current investigation on Cales is not his first brush with the law."

"When Bush was elected Florida's governor in 1998, he vowed his administration would bring honesty, integrity and truthfulness to state government. A key aspect of that quest has been the use of technology, such as the state's MyFlorida.com Web site, to provide full information to the public.

"The point person behind the effort had been Cales, whom Bush has publicly referred to as his "chief tech dude."

"Point dude" had full authority as the state's chief information officer to do pretty much anything he wanted.

In a controversy surrounding a fishy no-bid computer sales, newspapers around Florida reported that EMC2, a Boston-based computer company, had sold $4.3 million in computer equipment to three state agencies without having to go through competitive bidding.

Financing for the deals at all three agencies, it turned out, was worked out by [Gov. Jeb Bush co-trade mission "chief tech dude"] Cales.

We really really really wanted to know if they'd used the computers in the states' election efforts...

But we were frankly too afraid to find out to read further.

Everybody has their limits. We'd just reached ours.

...

Like the attack itself, the story of the secret network involved in a coordinated and apparently government-sponsored cover up of the 9/11 attack sprawls across the widest canvas imaginable.

"It involves a fugitive arms dealer, two convicted drug dealers (one reportedly murdered by a Colombian cocaine hit squad), the CIA, and golden oldie (operatives) from the Iran/Contra scandal," wrote business journalist extraordinaire Christopher Byron in an article about Genesis called "Kiosks, Cocaine, and Khashoggi."

Its a succinct summation, and we'd be tempted to let it stand, except to mention added elements including, the Power Hour, the Solar Temple, the Heaven's Gate cult, dozens and dozens of shell corporations and dummy front companies...

Start with this scene from the Heaven's Gate story.

The world first learned something was amiss with Hale Bopp on the Art Bell Show. A beautiful and fiery display in the heavens, Hale Bopp was wowing all...

Then one evening in November the Art Bell program received a call from ***Chuck Schramek,*** an amateur astronomer from (predictably) Houston, home of John Gray and much of the U.S. oil occult intelligence networks.

Schramek said he'd been "imaging" the comet with his telescope and a camera, and had taken a photo of what appeared to be another body close to the comet with a "ring like" form.

Schramek called it a "Saturn Like Object." The frenzy began. [And a 1930s Orson Wells smiled, "got them again."]

People wondered: "What on earth could that Saturn-like image be to the right of the comet?"

Following Schramek as a guest on Bell's show [conveinently] was Professor Courtney Brown -- a tenured political science professor at Emory University in Atlanta, author of a book called "Cosmic Voyage," and president and owner of Farsight Institute, a company specializing in the CIA's speciality, "scientific remote viewing."

Their remote viewers, they claimed for the Art Bell audience (tho a lie, read on, "War of the World's, Part Two," it seems set up for the Hale Bopp Cultists out there listening...) had found the mysterious "companion" object to be larger than Earth, hollow and "under intelligent control" -- a kind of planetary spaceship hitching a ride on the comet.

Now people really wondered.

But we discovered that Prof. Brown may have been experiencing something of a "personal crisis" at the time, when we found this quote he'd spoken the year before in a profile...

"Following the discovery of life on Mars, Professor Courtney Brown of Emory University, Atlanta, has revealed that civilization there is dying, so the aliens have established an underground colony in New Mexico," the piece read.

"All the prestige I've got is resting on whether there is anything in this," Brown revealed. "I'd be crazy if I went public without being certain."

A Mello Yellow Mars & Venus

For ourselves, we wish he'd held that thought somewhat longer.

Because when Brown appeared again on Bell's program, he brought along a plant on the show named Prudence Calabrese, his 'assistant,' who told Bell's audience that a well-known astrophysicist at a "top ten university" had sent Brown information confirming Farsight's remote-viewing results.

This astrophysicist, she went on, had taken several hundred photographs of the luminous object, which was not only real, but emanating "unambiguous radio signals."

More significantly, the unnamed gentleman from the prestigious university planned to hold a press conference in a week to announce his findings.

Meanwhile, he'd sent three rolls of undeveloped film, one of which had "very good astronomical photographs," in Calabrese's estimation.

Hale Bopp MKULTRA cultists, connected to Matzorkis, would have been going wild by now, and passing out the plastic baggies and putting their passports in their front pockets...

This is where it gets really interesting.

Calabrese today heads a commercial venture called Transdimensional Systems in—where else—San Diego.

She claims to have been part of the CIA's onetime effort to learn more about the Soviets via extrasensory perception (ESP), in a project channeled through (or by) California's formidable Stanford Research Institute.

But guess what's she's doing now?

If you said "Protecting the Homeland in the fight against terrorism" you could probably get a job there yourself... Or at least a gig working for the San Diego FBI, which retained the services of her firm's 14 employees to assist their efforts to guess where the terrorists will strike next.

This required, she told reporters, "thinking out of the box."

So that's three people in our story making their way in the world with the help of the San Diego FBI: The Unnamed Saudi, our Iranian friend Sam the Sham, and a woman who can see things a really really loooooog ways off. This is a curious crew, and makes one wonder what can be gleaned from it about the San Diego FBI's criterion for employment.

Moreover, some of the "Al-Queda hijackers" actually roomed with San Diego FBI connections" for a while:

"The FBI internal report examines the three best-known episodes in which the bureau, which is the lead agency for counterterrorist activities within the United States, missed or ignored important signals of the coming terrorist attacks. Two of the cases involved local FBI agents who voiced suspicions that were disregarded or suppressed by FBI headquarters. In the third case, the CIA deliberately kept the FBI in the dark--with the assistance of certain FBI officials.

"The first instance is the electronic memo of July 10, 2001 from Kenneth Williams, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, noting the number of students with ties to radical Islamic fundamentalists enrolled at local aviation training schools, and suggesting that a nationwide canvass of these schools be carried out to determine if there was a pattern.

"The second is the bureau's response to the arrest of Zaccarias Moussaoui, an Islamic fundamentalist who was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service after his attempts to obtain training on a Boeing 747 aroused suspicions at a Minneapolis-area flight school. Moussaoui was detained on immigration charges in early August 2001, but FBI headquarters blocked efforts by Minneapolis agents to pursue an investigation that could have identified other Al Qaeda operatives at US flight schools.

"The third is the case of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, believed to have participated in the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77, which hit the Pentagon on 9/11. Despite being on a CIA watch list because of connections to Al Qaeda, the two lived openly in San Diego, California for a year or more. The CIA only notified the FBI of their presence in the US on August 27, 2001, 20 months after their arrival, and only two weeks before September 11."

[from: FBI inspector general's report: more evidence of government complicity in 9/11 attacks
author: wsws
http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2005/06/319577.shtml ]

Guess that remote viewing failed to work for the FBI, or it just turned up pictures of the FBI helping the terrorists, as the U.S. Gov't's own report noted above.

Fast forward: The mysterious astronomer never turned up. The photos turned out fake. A cleverly manipulate photo taken from the university of Hawaii website, reversed and rotated to conceal its origin. And according to a sci-fi zine called Ansible, Schramek had used his tech skills for hoaxes before.
www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/SF-Archives/Ansible/a117.html+%22gregory+frost%22+%22Cult+connections%22&hl=en" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">link to 216.239.39.104

"The thing is, Charles Schramek and I went to high school together," said Gregory Frost. "We occasionally cooked up batches of helium, filled dry cleaner bags with it, attached pie tins containing flares to the bottoms, then sent the bags off into the night... .we would call the local airport and report having sighted UFOs. Now and then, especially when other people saw our little flare balloons and called in, too, we made the local papers."

"I was on hand on one occasion when he ran his voice through a filter that made him sound like Sonar the Warp Master while he communicated with some gullible ham radio operators elsewhere. Chuck convinced a whole flock of them that he was a space alien from Venus."

Chuck was an inveterate prankster, a ham radio operator, and deviously technological. Just like John Gray, who'd called himself a computer programmer at one time. We wondered if they knew each other. We're pretty sure 'mum's the word' with Gray; and Schramek is dead and can't tell us, either, unless we can cough up enough money for a Ouiji board.

The last apple of the barrel they had to use, I guess, for this government psyop operation, was Schramek:

Said his high school buddy: "He told us one night that he had pulled a great prank on a neighbor who numbered among the believers by dressing all in black and wrapping his head in aluminum foil, then peering into the windows of the neighbor's house. So when I discovered that the UFO dogging comet Hale-Bopp had been photographed by one Charles Schramek, and that this "discovery" was making a splash in national news, I had a lot of trouble sitting upright for awhile."

"Chuck was the only person I ever knew who'd actually tried smoking banana peels. It gave him a headache."

This was the final straw. Maybe we'd just see too much for one day.

We'd slipped on an electrical banana peel on the way to the Level Above Human, and fallen, and now we can't get up.

We wondered idly if "The Clapper" was a Khashoggi deal. It probably doesn't matter...

There is no fiction to match these times. We've all been Overtaken by Events.

It was time to turn on television.

...

Probably we will always be being sued, given the current state of America's "not too damn free anymore" press. Please help us continue by making a donation directly into our defense fund.

http://www.madcowprod.com/MC6812004.html

[Unknown]

http://www.terrorism-illuminati.com/book/dollarsforterror.html
Dollars for Terror

Houston, Texas

In 1999, the French Parliament commissioned an extensive and thorough investigation of global money-laundering. After publishing reports on Liechtenstein, Monaco and Switzerland, it also produced a report titled, The City of London, Gibraltar and the Crown Dependencies: Offshore Centers and Havens for Dirty Money, part of which was an addendum titled, The Economic Environment of Osama bin Laden. The report concluded that up to forty British banks, companies and individuals were associated with bin Laden’s network, including organizations in London, Oxford, Cheltenham, Cambridge and Leeds.^[1] In introducing the report, Arnaud Montebourg, a French Member of Parliament concluded, “Tony Blair, and his government, preaches around the world against terrorism. He would be well advised to preach to his own bankers and oblige them to go after dirty money... Even the Swiss co-operate more than the English.”^[2]

Bush and Crown Prince
Adbullah of Sauid Arabia

Implicated in the report was Khalid bin Mahfouz, the largest shareholder of BCCI, and important figure within the Saudi government, with extensive business ties to the Bush family and the CIA. Nevertheless, representatives of bin Mahfouz later managed to argue that the report was in fact prepared by Jean-Charles Brisard, author of Forbidden Truth, and not French intelligence. Bin Mahouz has begun libel proceedings against Brisard, claiming that he has made unfounded and defamatory allegations.^[3]
Similarly, bin Mahfouz has also successfully acquired retractions from Fortune Magazine, the Washington Post and USA Today, for allegations he had ties with terrorist financing. James Woolsey, former Director of CIA, testified to a congressional sub-committee, that Khalid Bin Mahfouz was bin Laden’s brother-in-law, but when it was found that he had mispronounced the name, he was forced to retract his statement, claiming that he was no longer sure if the information he was provided was accurate.
Nevertheless, the authors of Forbidden Truth provide the following information which is accurate:

Khalid bin Mahfouz

Khalid bin Mahfouz was a key figure in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or BCCI, affair. Between 1986 and 1990, he was a top executive there, holding the position of operational director. His family held a 20 percent share in the bank at the time. He was charged in the United States in 1992 with tax fraud in the bank’s collapse. In 1995, held jointly liable in the BCCI’s collapse, he agreed to a $245 million settlement to pay the bank’s creditors, allowing them to indemnify a portion of the bank’s clients. The specific charges against the bank were embezzlement and violation of American, Luxembourg and British banking laws.^[4]

Salem bin Laden

In 2002, an investigation did find that charitable contributions had been made by bin Mahfouz for the purpose of funding bin Laden.^[5] Nevertheless, bin Mahfouz had maintained close business relationships with the Bush family. First of all, during the 1980’s, bin Mahfouz’s banking syndicate performed major CIA-inspired banking operations for such former CIA assets as Osama bin Laden, as well as for Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega and other drug dealing generals, such as in Pakistan.^[6]
However, when Salem bin Laden, head of the wealthy Saudi Arabian family, and one of seventeen brothers to Osama bin Laden, died in 1988, Khalid bin Mahfouz inherited his interests in Houston. Salem was described by a French secret intelligence report as one of two closest friends of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, who often performs important missions for Saudi Arabia.^[7] Salem’s sole U.S. business representative had been James Bath, who then ran a business for bin Mahfouz, and joined a partnership with he and Gaith Pharaon, BCCI’s frontman in Houston.

Ghaith Pharaon

James Bath had extensive ties both to the bin Laden family and major players in the BCCI. Time magazine described Bath, in 1991, as “a deal broker whose alleged associations run from the CIA to a major shareholder and director of the Bank of Credit & Commerce.”^[8] Bath was recruited in 1976 by then CIA Director, George Herbert Bush, to create offshore companies to move CIA funds and aircraft between Texas and Saudi Arabia.^[9]
One of James Bath’s former business partners, Charles W. “Bill” White, a former Annapolis graduate and United States Navy pilot, claimed that Bath was involved in a secret conspiracy to funnel Saudi money into the United States. He also claimed that, since 1976, Bath had worked as a CIA liaison to Saudi Arabia. Until the early 90s, Bath was also involved with Bin Mahfouz in their company, Southwest Airport Services, refuelers of the presidential plane, Air Force One, when the president was in Houston.^[10]

James Bath

Bath also operated Skyway Aircraft Leasing Ltd., an aviation business based in the Cayman Islands, owned by bin Mahfouz. First, within a month of its incorporation, the temporary board at Cotopax named Bath as company president, changed the company name to Skyways and then resigned en mass, leaving Bath as a sole director. One of the original subscribers to Cotopax, a company called Cayhaven Corporate Services, Ltd., was also a subscriber to “I.C., Inc.”. In reality, IC Inc. was the same entity as ICIC, which is the International Credit and Investment Corporation of Grand Caymans, termed BCCI’s “bank-within-a-bank” in the Kerry Committee report. Thus, James Bath’s Skyways Aircraft Leasing is an enterprise related to Mahfouz’s BCCI via “IC Inc.” The company was found by investigators to be at the very center of a chart found in Oliver North’s White House safe, showing the banking network of the Iran-Contra operation.^[11]

Willilam Colby

Bath was a close family friend of George W. Bush. In the early 1970s, the two flew fighter jets together in the Texas Air National Guard. In 1979, Bush’s first business, Arbusto Energy, obtained financing from Bath. As one of many investors, including Bildeberger George Ball, Bath gave Bush fifty thousand dollars for a five percent stake in Arbusto. In the Outlaw Bank, Beaty and Gwynne suggest that Bath’s investment in Arbusto may have belonged to bin Mahfouz, since young George Bush “had no substantial money of his own at the time.”
After several transformations, Arbusto emerged in 1986 as Harken Energy Corporation. The father of Harken’s chairman, Alan Quasha, was Manila-based attorney William Quasha, who advised executives of the defunct and scandal-ridden Nugan Hand Bank in Australia, which had employed a number of former high-ranking CIA and Pentagon officials. According to a 1983 Australian government report, and the Wall Street Journal, Nugan Hand Bank was involved in money laundering for international heroin syndicates and secretly aided U.S. covert activities, while former CIA director, William Colby, was its attorney. Some of the persons interacting with Nugan Hand Bank executives in the 1970s were later to become central figures in the Iran-Contra affair, such as Richard Secord, Casper Weinberger, who was later pardoned by former President Bush.^[12]

Caspar Weinberger

In 1987, when Harken ran into trouble, a 17.6 percent share was purchased by Saudi Sheik Abdullah Taha Bakhsh, a business partner with Pharaon, while his banker was bin Mahfouz.^[13] Though Bush told the Wall Street Journal he had “no idea” BCCI was involved in Harken’s financial dealings, the network of connections between Bush and BCCI is so extensive that the Journal concluded by stating: “The number of BCCI-connected people who had dealings with Harken ­ all since George W. Bush came on board ­ raises the question of whether they mask an effort to cozy up to a presidential son.”^[14] Or even the president: Bath finally came under investigation by the FBI in 1992 for his Saudi business relationships, accused of funnelling Saudi money through Houston, in order to influence the foreign policies of the Reagan and first Bush administrations.
In 1987, the original plan for Harken Oil and Gas was to obtain 25 million dollars in investment capital from the Banque de Commerce et de Placements (BCP), a joint venture between the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) and BCCI, as the controlling interest. The managing director of BCP was Dr. Hartmann. The financing was brokered by Dr. Hartmann and Bruce Rappaport. The InterMaritime Bank of Geneva and New York, which was affiliated with a global network of many Mahfouz-connected banks, around the Saudi National Commercial Bank, was also involved in multiple covert CIA operations. Rappaport, a golfing buddy of then CIA director William Casey’s, was deeply implicated in the BCCI affair, involving secret accounts for illegal arms sales to Iran, partnered with Oliver North.^[15]

Richard Secord

Dr. Hartmann was also the chairman of the Swiss affiliate of yet another criminal bank, the Italian Banco Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). According to the Congressional Record in 1992, BNL was alleged, by U.S. House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzalez, to have secured billions of dollars in illegally-used, weapons-directed loans from the first Bush administration to Saddam Hussein just prior to Desert Storm.^[16]
Harken’s financing by BCP was structured by Jackson Stephens of Little Rock, which, according to the Asian Wall Street Journal, apparently did not comply with U.S. banking regulations. Finally, in the course of restructuring the deal, UBS decided to sell off its shares. Stephens found a new buyer for the UBS’s shares, Sheikh Abdullah Bakhsh.^[17]
According to the 1992 Senate BCCI investigation, however, the Bush Justice Department went to great lengths to block prosecution of BCCI. The Senate probe determined that federal officials repeatedly obstructed congressional and local investigations, and for three years impeded attempts by Robert Morgenthau, Manhattan district attorney, from obtaining critical information. The Senate investigation concluded that, in 1990 and 1991, the Bush Department, with Assistant Attorney General Robert Muller taking the lead, consistently put forward the mistaken impression that they were aggressively moving against the bank. However, the probe said the Justice Department was actually interfering with “the investigation of others through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from not making witnesses available, to not returning telephone calls, to claiming that every aspect of the case was under investigation in a period when little, if anything, was being done.”^[18]

Prince Turki al-Faisal

More incriminating is the fact that, in 1996, French intelligence secretly monitored a meeting of Saudi billionaires at the Hotel Royale Monceaus in Paris, with the financial representative of al Qaeda, a key Saudi prince, and joined by Muslim and non-Muslim arms dealers, to determine by how much to pay off bin Laden. According to the author of Forbidden Truth, Jean-Charles Brisard and reporter Greg Palast, Sheikh Abdullah Bakhsh and Khalid bin Mahfouz were among approximately twenty people at the meeting, in addition to Prince Turki al Faisal, and Iran-Contra operative Adnan Khashoggi. Representatives of Mahfouz, however, deny his involvement, and that he has ever attended a meeting with representatives of al Qaeda. But again, Mahfouz has begun libel proceedings against Mr. Brisard, claiming his allegations are unfounded.^[19]
The deal was that bin Laden not attack Saudi Arabia. This is an arrangement that purportedly dates back to 1991. In Why America Slept, Gerald Posner claims that a still classified US intelligence report describes that this secret arrangement had been established between bin Laden and Saudi intelligence minister, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the Saudi Intelligence Minister.^[20] The participants also agreed that bin Laden should be rewarded for promoting Wahhabism in Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, and other places.^[21]
The supposed “pay-off” is obviously an excuse to reward bin Laden for a “job well-done”. In this way, bin Laden can save face among his followers for failing to address the problems in Saudi Arabia, despite the egregious extremes of the royal family, and instead focus his invectives away from them, against the American “crusaders”. Bin Laden has therefore had to alter his rhetoric so as not to appear entirely hypocritical. As noted by Stephen Schwartz, in The Two Faces of Islam, of the content of his “Declaration of War Against America”, bin Laden’s complaints about the Saudis were “those of a critic, not a revolutionary enemy.” He continues:

Throughout bin Laden’s writings, one had the sense of someone going out of his way not to say certain things. Those things involved the personalities of the Saudi rulers. Since bin Laden continued to draw on financial resources in the kingdom while living in Afghanistan and was in no physical danger from Saudi hands, he could only be observing a policy of discretion, not expressing fear. Bin Laden was not a major strategist; he was an opportunistic improviser in the style of Hitler or Stalin. Calling for action by the Saudi populace to expel U.S. troops, he advised murdering Americans. But when he summoned Saudi citizens to correct the policies of their government, he never called for killing or other forms of terror against the Saudi rulers. Rather, he praised the drafting of petitions to the king and he recommended that Saudi women boycott American consumer goods. He was aggrieved by the failure of the Saudi Army to serve ably in the Gulf War, but also by the destruction inflicted on Iraq, which he exaggerated. Unlike the Saudi and other Arab governments, he called for lifting the U.N. sanctions on Saddam Husayn.^[22]

If bin Laden were sincere, he would not accept pay-offs from a cast of characters that not only hold close ties with the most culpable of American “crusaders”, but who are the principal instigators of the Lucifarian conspiracy to overthrow Islam. Rather, Adnan Khashoggi, who is among the richest men in the world, and the arms merchant at the center of the entire Iran-Contra operation, has been a life-long friend of the bin Laden family. Adnan Khashoggi’s father was the physician to Mohammed bin Laden, and got his start in business by arranging a large truck import deal for Salem bin Laden. In 1985, bin Mahfouz’s Saudi National Commercial Bank had loaned Khashoggi 35 million dollars to purchase weapons to sell illegally to Iran, at the behest of Oliver North.^[23]

The Neo-Nazis


Khashoggi had forged an association with Sheik Kamal Adham, the front-man for BCCI, and the CIA, with the incorporation of Barrick Gold, a Canadian company he founded with Peter Munk. Barrick Gold was itself a spin-off of Barrick Resources International (BRI), the nascent firm founded two years before, by Kermit Roosevelt, to serve as a dummy business front for the CIA. The company’s seed investors were Saudis with CIA ties, including Shiek Kamal Adham, Adnan Khashoggi, and Prince Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz, a major investor in Barrick, code-named “Tumbleweed” by his CIA contacts. Khashoggi distanced himself from Barrick shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal broke, but held onto his stock, tied up as collateral for North’s arms transfers to Iran.^[24]

Youssef Nada

Prince Turki al-Faisal is also head of Faisal Islamic Bank of Saudi Arabia, which has been named by Luxembourg banking authorities as being directly involved in running accounts for bin Laden. Faisal Bank was founded by Youssef Nada, naturalized Italian, and a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Gama al Islamiya. Nada was another valued World War II Nazi. As a young man, he had joined the armed branch of the “secret apparatus” of the Muslim Brotherhood, and then was recruited by German military intelligence. When Grand Mufti el-Husseini had to flee Germany in 1945, as the Nazi defeat loomed, Youssef Nada is rumored to have been personally involved in arranging through the SS his escape via Switzerland back to Egypt and then Palestine.^[25]

Ahmed Huber

Nada served as president of Al Taqwa, an international banking group. Al Taqwa, which literally means “Fear of God,” had been channeling funds to Muslim extremist organizations around the world, including Hamas in Palestine. Serving on the board of Nada Management, a component of Al Taqwa, was Ahmed Huber, a neo-Nazi, and a former journalist who converted to Islam, and changed his first name from Albert. A well-known figure in European neofascist circles, Huber “sees himself as a mediator between Islam and right-wing groups,” according to Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution.^[26] Huber is also a member of a group calling itself Avalon, which claims to be based on the “great Celtic tradition”, and at every solstice he meets under the moon, in a forest grove, with a few hundred European Druids, with whom he is preparing the “end of our decline”. With the Thule Society, he works for the restoration of “greater Germany”.^[27]
Nada was appointed president by Francois Genoud, who is believed to have founded and directed al Taqwa in its support of terrorism, including Bin Laden.^[28] Described by the London Observer as “one of the world’s leading Nazis”, Genoud played a key role in the continuation of the Nazi Islamist relationship.^[29] He was a former associate of Otto Skorzeny in Algeria, and supposedly helped finance the ODESSA network through his management of the hidden Swiss treasure of the Third Reich, which had been stolen from Jews. Genoud is also believed to have masterminded the 1972 hijacking of a Lufthansa flight from Bombay by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP).^[30]

Yeslam bin Laden

In addition, Mahfouz’ Saudi Investment Corporation (SICO) is partnered with the Saudi BinLaden Group. SICO was covertly involved in supporting the Mujahideen in Afghanistan during the late 1980’s, in connection with the BCCI-controlled National Bank of Oman. Those responsible for arranging SICO’s financing of Osama bin Laden were the top two InterMaritime Bank executives, Alfred Hartmann of Harken and Bruce Rappaport, in addition to William Casey.^[31] The company is chaired by Yeslam bin Laden. Board members are Beatrice Dufour, Baudoin Dunant and Tilouine el Hanafi. Lafour is Yeslam bin Laden’s sister-in-law. She is of Iranian origin and is married to a Swiss financier. Baudoin Dunant, one of French-speaking Switzerland’s leading lawyers, is on the boards of over twenty companies in Geneva, Fribourg, Morges, Nyons, etc. He received international publicity in 1983, when he represented Nazi banker Francois Genoud.^[32]