Why does Indian military's imaginary enemy shift to China?

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According to US media 13 July, Squadron TACDE (Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment) of India's Air Force, which carries out missions of playing as imaginary enemies of Indian, has replaced its MiG-27ML fighters with Su-30MKI with the purpose of imitating tactics of Chinese Su-30 fighters in exercises and strengthening Indian fighter pilots' combat skills.

It's reported that Indian Air Force learn air combat tactics from US Air Force. This June, totally 8 Su-30MKI fighters are delivered to India, and the pilots have 800-hour experience of flying Su-30MKI and are well acquaint with kinds of flying tactics.

Indian media say Squadron TACDE of Indian Air Force studies especially air-combat tactics of potential enemies and trains its pilots how to counter their attacks. This squadron is established in 1971, and it originally sets Pakistan Air Force for its mocking target. MiG-21 and MiG-27 fighters have been the main forces in this squadron for years, which are suitable for playing as Pakistan Air Force. As Indian Air Force's worry of the modernization of Chinese Air Force is growing, India now uses the most advanced Su-30MKI fighters to play the role of China's 3rd generation fighters in their exercises.


India's Su-30MKI fighter


China's Su-30 fighter

However, not only Indian Air Force, but also the overall Indian military strategies set China as India's imaginary enemy, which is thought to pose serious threats to India. Why is Indian military's imaginary enemy always China?

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Why is India always pursuing military purchase beyond its national strength?


India's Shishumar class diesel-electric patrol submarines

If you thought the 9 billion US dollars project to procure 126 multi-role fighters for the IAF was the "mother of all defence deals", think again. The stage is now being set for an even bigger project—this one worth over 11 billion US dollars for six new-generation submarines for the Indian Navy.

The Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC), chaired by defence minister A K Antony, has finally decided that three of the six submarines will be constructed at Mazagon Docks (MDL) in Mumbai and one at Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) in Visakhapatnam, with the help of a foreign collaborator.

"The other two submarines will either be imported from the foreign vendor directly or constructed at a private shipyard in India," a source said.

Under the programme—called Project-75 India (P-75I)—apart from stealth, land-attack capability and the ability to incorporate futuristic technologies, all the six new submarines will be equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems to boost their operational capabilities.

Conventional diesel-electric submarines have to surface every few days to get oxygen to recharge their batteries. With AIP systems, they can stay submerged for much longer periods, narrowing the gap with nuclear-powered submarines which can operate underwater for virtually unlimited periods.

Navy has reasons to be worried. By 2015 or so, it will be left with just half of its present fleet of 15 ageing diesel-electric submarines—10 Russian Kilo-class, four German HDW and one Foxtrot. Moreover, it has been hit hard by the almost three-year delay in the ongoing Project-75 for six French Scorpene submarines at MDL, under which the vessels were to roll out one per year from 2012 onwards.

Though India does not have nuclear submarines and SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) capabilities at present to complete its "nuclear triad", it hopes to move forward by inducting the Akula-II class attack submarine K-152 Nerpa on a 10-year lease from Russia in October this year, and then the first indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant by early-2012.

Pakistan, incidentally, already has its first Mesma AIP-equipped submarine, PNS Hamza, the third of the French Agosta-90B submarines it has inducted since 1999. It is now looking to induct three advanced Type-214 German submarines with AIP. China, in turn, has 62 submarines, with 10 of them being nuclear-propelled. (From Times of India)

According to a Chinese naval expert, India owns a fairly strong power of aircraft carriers. India's purchase of 6 new-generation submarines will be bound to affect the regional military balance.



India's INS Vikramaditya light aircraft carrier. The INS Vikramaditya light aircraft carrier will operate the MiG-29K naval aircraft. The Vikramaditya is expected to be commissioned and transferred to the Indian Navy by 2012.



Scorpene submarine

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ISI Bomb CIA in Afghanistan



ความลับแตก สหรัฐจอมแหลอ้างพลเรือนโดนระเบิดตายในอัฟกัน ที่แท้เป็นพวก CIA

CIA plot to Invade Pakistan

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India ‘Looks East’ as history

July 17th, 2010
Author: Sandy Gordon, ANU

India’s Look East policy was initiated out of failure: the failure of India’s Cold War strategy of ‘playing both ends against the middle’ while at the same time attempting to adopt a pro-Soviet ‘tilt’; and the failure of India’s command economy, which by 1990 had managed to command only 0.4 per cent of world trade – insufficient to cushion India from the 1989-90 oil shock. While the collapse of the Soviet Union was no fault of India, it left New Delhi searching for an alternative set of economic and strategic approaches. The ‘Look East’ policy seemed to fit both needs.

India, however, initially had a hard job to claw its way back into those parts of Asia to its east. ASEAN itself was borne out of concern about an encroaching communist bloc and tempered in the fires of the Vietnam War. It viewed India’s still clunky economy and former Soviet bloc ‘tilt’ with suspicion.

India also took some time to learn Asian diplomatic mores. In 1994, in a major address in Singapore, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao expressed surprise at the title of the speech he had been given – India’s ‘new’ relationship with Asia. Rao pointed out India’s influence in Asia was hardly ‘new’ – indeed Indian religion and culture lay at the heart of today’s South East Asia. True enough, but to miss the point from ASEAN’s perspective. The ASEANs were a bunch of hard-nosed pragmatists intent on getting on with the job – and the job was making money and development.

Of course, ASEAN was only part of India’s Look East policy. Vietnam and Burma had not yet jointed the Association. India had a friendship with the first and was already rivals with China over the second. And Japan was being eyed off as a source of technology and Direct Foreign Investment as early as the birth Sanjay Gandhi’s ‘Indian’ Maruti in 1981 – which was, of course nothing more than a semi-knock kit of a Suzuki.

But in Asia – and especially ASEAN – nothing succeeds like success. ASEAN only really sat up and took notice of India once the latter appeared (before the GFC) to be locked into 8-9 per cent growth, a pattern now seemingly to have resumed. India is now much more highly regarded in ASEAN than in the 1990s. It is part of the ARF, ASEM and the EAS. Not yet in APEC, it has good prospects there too. It has extensive defence dealings with Singapore, Australia and Japan and defence relationships with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Yet for all this recent success, the India-ASEAN Free Trade Association was extremely hard-won. India’s farmers were committing suicide at unprecedented levels over supposedly unbridled agricultural imports caused by globalisation. The FTA, when it finally emerged in 2009, was not only intensely criticised in India but also highly protective of Indian agriculture, especially edible oils. It took over six years to negotiate and will not be fully implemented for non-sensitive goods till 2016 (later for poorer countries, and India).

Moreover, ironically, at the very time India has gained significant traction in ASEAN and other East Asian forums, those venues are being overshadowed by larger, and some would say ominous, regional developments. ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN plus 3, the EAS and even APEC are no longer the only games in town – if they ever were.

Increasingly the debate has devolved onto the growing strategic, diplomatic and financial critical mass of China. Kevin Rudd saw this early on and tried to hone Asian security architecture to accommodate a rising China and provide it with a forum to be, if not first among equals, then equal among equals. The profound implication of this purpose was that all major powers should be part of that architecture, not least India.

Increasingly, however, it looks as if the horses have fled from this particular stable. Rudd lost interest in his Asian architecture in favour of the G20 –perhaps correctly in the context of the GFC – but nonetheless unfortunately. More importantly, the rise of China and to a lesser extent India has ‘gone around the edges’ of existing Asian architecture. Not that architecture is irrelevant in the debate about rising China, but rather that any architecture that might evolve is likely to provide a venue for other systems of power relations such as a ‘concert of powers’ or ‘power balancing’ rather than critically shaping those systems.

This de-emphasising of security architecture leaves us with a different kind of debate and, potentially, a different kind of role for India.

Initially at least, it looks as if China holds the key. How China chooses to rise to power in Asia will be the seminal factor in the future of Asian security. And further, how Sino-US relations unfold – especially in the Asian context – will be seminal to the process of how China rises.

India is definitely there in the equation but not till some way down the track. Meanwhile, it is the Sino-US relationship that will define the character of China’s rise more than any other single factor excepting, of course, the innate character of the Chinese polity.

So where does India fit?

The US knows it will lose power in Asia and even globally to China over the longer-term. Hence the ‘strategic’ quality of the India-US relationship, the fact that the Indo-US deal nuclear deal was intended above all to enable the US to provide strategic military assistance (read hi-tech weapons) to India, and that Washington remains unabashed that its intention is to build India over this century as a major strategic factor in Asia. Read for this, traditional power balancing against China.

At the moment India is especially weak vis à vis China. China can play virtually at will in India’s South Asian backyard . For all India’s economic success, the Chinese economy and its defence spending are still growing more rapidly. That is to say, a China that is already far more powerful than India is actually pulling away.

China’s great long-term enemy is, of course demography. Not only will India be larger by 2030 but more significantly, it will have a higher proportion of young people than China. But to take advantage, it needs to set in place labour and infrastructure policies to position it to become the new labour-intensive workshop of the world. And despite India’s long-term demographic advantage, China may well ‘do a Japan’ and use its enormous capital reserves to substitute for labour.

While Sino-US relations will initially hold the key, Sino-Indian relations will emerge as increasingly important as India gains in strength, increasing the prospect of an emerging ‘strategic triangle’ between China, the US and India. At present, the US and India each uses the other as a ‘hedge’ against a difficult rise for China in Asia. Thus what may one day become a ‘strategic triangle’ cannot yet be accorded that label.

Such a negative prospect depends both on how Sino-US and Sino-Indian relations develop. In terms of the Sino-Indian relationship, the most favourable term that could be used is ‘ambiguous’. On the negative side, China has changed its position in relation to the border issue – now resolutely sticking to its claim to Arunachal Pradesh, populated with 1.1 million Indians, located below the strategic barrier of the Himalayas and source of much of the water of Bangladesh and India’s north east. China is actively involved in the South Asian countries surrounding India, which is Beijing’s way of hedging against the possibility its vital energy SLOCs might one day come under pressure in time of high tension or conflict.

This is profoundly unsettling for India, whatever it may say publicly about blossoming people-to-people relations and trade – the positive side of the ledger. Anyway, trade is a double-edged sword for India, with India being heavily in deficit in the US $57 billion trade.

Seen in this light, there is a depressing prospect of a slide from the idea of a ‘concert of powers’ in Asia to traditional power balancing. Were this to occur (and virtually nobody, including the key players, would want it to happen), Dick Cheney’s ‘Quadrilateral’ could actually be revived as a strategic entity.

Certainly, New Delhi would rather India were part of a concert of powers in Asia. Although India will continue to get what it can from the US and Israel on hi-tech such as space, computation and anti-ballistic missile technologies, New Delhi believes India is too large ever to be any other country’s ally. India will also seek to have a range of relations with other large powers, including Russia, the EU, Japan and China. It avidly seeks to engage more successfully in resources competition in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

But in either case – that of a concert of powers or of power balancing – it seems that The ‘Look East’ policy may retreat to a moment in history – a moment when a tentative India was feeling its way, a relationship on the rebound, as it were.

That is not to say, of course, that South East Asia will not remain extremely important to India in the strategic and to a lesser extent the economic spheres. In the strategic context, the two share interests and responsibilities in the North East Indian Ocean – a region beset by non-conventional security challenges. India has a growing role in the Andaman Sea and is expanding its naval capacities centred on Port Blair. ASEAN also has important responsibilities for security in the Straits of Malacca.

It is to say, rather, that South East Asia will be only one of many regions of importance to a rising, global power such as India.

Professor Sandy Gordon is with the Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), RegNet, Australian National University. He has worked both in government and as an academic and spent extended periods in India.

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Than Shwe's July Visit to India
By ZARNI MANN

NEW DELHI — Burma's military leader, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, will visit India from July 25 to 29, his second visit in six years.

According to a source in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the 5-day sojourn will start with a visit to Buddhist centers at Bodh Gaya and Kushinagar in central India before he meets with India's President Pratibha Patil, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and other senior government ministers in New Delhi.

“He will first go to Bodh Gaya before coming to New Delhi. After two days of meetings with the President and Prime Minister, he will go to Hyderabad to see pharmaceutical projects,” said the MEA official, requesting anonymity.

Than Shwe salutes from a podium as he reviews troops
during a military parade marking the country's 65th Armed Forces Day
at a parade ground in Naypyidaw on March 27. (Photo: Getty Images)

“This is just routine development of relations between governments of neighboring countries,” he said, adding the visit was like other meetings with heads of state from nearby countries such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

Reportedly, the two sides are likely discuss issues relating to the insurgent groups operating along their common border, cooperation on economic development, pharmaceutical projects and trading.

Sources from the Burmese Embassy in New Delhi refused to give details, however, only confirming that Than Shwe's detailed itinerary was known and that well-planned security arrangements were in place.

During Than Shwe's first visit in October 2004 accompanied by ministers from industry, communications, energy and rail, he met with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi and reportedly discussed cooperation on economic development and trade.

As the world’s largest democracy, India used to support Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, and democracy movements in Burma during and after the 1988 uprising.

But since the 1990s, India's “Look East Policy” has led to a dramatic increase in cooperation with the Burmese military regime to solve its insurgency problem along their shared border.

India started to develop the relationship by increasing economic cooperation including trade in information technology support and armaments.

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Conjectures on India's diplomacy with China

By Li Hongmei

India's Defense Minister lately maintained that India was not overly concerned over “recent actions" by China and believed that bilateral ties between the two countries were on the road to improvement, and in particular, he denied India being “paranoid" over its relations with China, in a clear response to the charges made earlier by Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh that the home ministry was discriminating against Chinese telecom investors in India.

Although Defense Minister A.K. Antony admitted that there were the longstanding border disputes between the two neighbors, it was a conscious decision on the part of the government of India to undertake "very cordial and friendly" ties with China, as well as with all its other neighbors, he said while speaking to The Times of India.

Contending ideas and remarks over China-India ties arising from India's high-profile officialdom might be something of a bellwether for India's diplomacy with China in future. In actuality, developing in twists and turns, the bilateral relations has been hobbling along towards a more mature and more pragmatic direction, since the brief but bloody border war in 1962.

When Jairam Ramesh, the then India's commerce minister, coined the term Chindia some time in 2005, hopes were running high that a new era of amity was about to dawn between the two emerging powerhouses of Asia. Above all, the argument aside, he believed Chindia would come into being through closer economic co-operation and expanding trade ties.

Sure enough, by the end of 2009, two-way trade was valued at $43bn, in spite of a fall of 16 per cent on 2008 levels. China replaced the US as India's largest trading partner in 2007.

However, the warming-up ties abruptly derailed while the economic cooperation was roaring along the sound track. The Indian government recently imposed restrictions on imports from China after concerns arose over the presence of Chinese telecommunications equipment located along the sensitive Indo-China border.

Besides, New Delhi's clumsy restrictions on the import of Chinese skilled labor, for example, amid mutterings about the security risk to strategic installations, have forced Chinese companies to suspend construction of power plants that India needs to plug its crippling energy deficit.

Back to the subject of Chindia, China and India indeed have a lot in common, weather it be political term or to-be reality. In diplomacy, for instance, the two countries jointly put forward “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", and for decades, both have adhered to non-alignment policy maintaining independence and keeping initiative. More over, neither of the nations have the intention to be entangled in the Western Camp.

On top of that, both China and India are seeking to lead the development of Asian Continent, and both are expected to change the world's chessboard and usher in a new global economic order, and both are viewed as heavy-carrying players in the region.

Presumably, when Ramesh coined the term Chindia, what crept into his mind was, perhaps, the common ground China and India share and the common prospect both are striving for, despite the fact that a broader rapprochement remains distant then and now.

Paranoid over China might be somewhat overstated, but an undeniable fact is that India has long kept a wary eye on China. In the mean time, India has been perturbed by the dual worries that the alliance of US and Europe would press its maneuvering space in the international community and, the oft-hyped G2 involving the U.S. and China would come true and influence its surrounding environment.

It is the particular mentality and the conditioning that would plunge India into a swirl of inexpressible dread and put it under the constant illusion of being intruded by others.

Fortunately, there are always wise personalities with insight and far-reaching vision in both India and China, and they are pinned on the hope to piece together history, restore the truth and plan for the future.
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After 19 years working for China Daily and its website, Li Hong moved to english.people.com.cn in March 2009.

Li has been a reporter and column writer, mainly on China's economy and politics.

He was graduated from Beijing Foreign Studies University, and once studied in University of Hawaii and the Poynter Institute in Florida.

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Don't Even Think About It (FP）

The Cold War was scary enough. Now try to imagine a nuclear arms race between China and India.

Europeans and Americans, who have dominated world affairs for so long, are understandably fascinated by the recent rise of China and India. It's obvious that the rapid economic resurgence of these two great Asian powers fundamentally alters the global rules of the game.

China and India have built up a $60-billion-per-year trading relationship, and for years they've insisted that they want to work more closely on a variety of fronts. Yet that expressed desire for collaboration co-exists uneasily with a long-running strategic rivalry. Parts of their mutual border remain in dispute. China has long supported Pakistan, India's main enemy, while the Indians have often befriended competitors of the Chinese (be it Moscow or Washington). Lately Beijing has been cultivating relationships among countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean -- including Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka -- to protect the flow of commerce and access to supplies of natural resources. That has the Indians fearing encirclement.

Lately, though, another element is threatening to complicate the strategic calculus: the nuclear factor. In themselves, of course, nuclear weapons are nothing new to either country. China has been a nuclear power for decades, while India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (though most outsiders tend to think of 1998, when New Delhi conducted a series of underground explosions designed to establish its bona fides as a genuine nuclear power). Although both countries have sworn off first use, both have built up formidable deterrents designed to retaliate against any attackers.

So what's new? A lot. Concurrent with their rising economic might, China and India have set about modernizing their militaries to lend extra muscle to their growing strategic ambitions -- and given their complicated history, that can't help but spark worries. "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world," noted one U.S. report. "China's ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles." China's Dongfeng long-range missiles boast independently controlled multiple warheads, mobility, and solid fuel (meaning that they can be fired with little notice). That's just one of many areas in which the Chinese have demonstrated their advanced technological capabilities. In January China shot down one of its own satellites with a missile -- once again demonstrating, as it did with a previous test in 2007, that it's well down the path toward a ballistic missile defense system.

That test unnerved the Indians, who saw the prospect of Chinese space weapons as a potential threat to the credibility of their own nuclear deterrent. The Indians, meanwhile, have been hard at work on a new generation of long-range missiles of their own. The Agni-5, which is set for a test flight by the end of this year, has a projected range of 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers -- meaning that it would be able to hit even the northernmost of China's cities. The Indians are also conducting sea trials of their first ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant, which could be ready for deployment within another year or two.

It is undoubtedly true that the two countries mainly have other potential enemies in mind. China is primarily concerned about deterring potential attacks by the world's leading nuclear power, the United States, while India's strategic calculations focus on the threat from Pakistan. Yet strategic logic is creating the potential for direct friction between Beijing and New Delhi on several fronts. The two countries are already engaged in a naval arms race as they jockey for influence in the waters around South Asia. Tensions have also been mounting over the two countries' border disputes -- especially the one involving the disputed area of Arunachal Pradesh (which is controlled by the Indians). The Indians complain of a rising number of Chinese incursions into the area; a remark by the Chinese ambassador to India a few years ago, when he claimed the territory as China's, stirred up public outrage. The Chinese, who regard Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet, worry in turn about a buildup of Indian troops in the region.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan of the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi notes one concern. Starting in 2007, the Chinese military began a major upgrade of its missile base near the city of Delingha in Qinghai province, next to Tibet. In addition to the intermediate-range missiles already stationed in the region, Rajagopalan says there are indications the Chinese may have beefed up the force with long-range DF-31s and DF-31As -- thus threatening not only northern India, including Delhi, but targets in the south as well. It's entirely possible, she acknowledges in a 2007 paper, that the Chinese move could be aimed primarily at countering Russian missiles stationed in Siberia, but warns that "what the Chinese may consider a routine exercise may send a wrong signal and have serious implications." For his part, former U.S. diplomat Charles Freeman says that he regards Indian fears of a Chinese nuclear buildup as exaggerated, but worries that a fateful mismatch of perceptions could already be spurring both countries toward a genuine nuclear arms race.

The extent to which the two militaries are getting on each other's nerves became apparent in a bit of high-ranking trash-talking earlier this year. India's chief military science officer, V.K. Saraswat, declared that new advances in his country's ballistic missile technology meant that "as far as cities in China and Pakistan are concerned, there will be no target that we want to hit but can't hit." That prompted a retort from Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaozhong of China's National Defense University, who pointedly derided the "low level" of Indian technology. "In developing its military technology," Zhang said, "China has never taken India as a strategic rival, and none of its weapons were specifically designed to contain India." If that was meant to console anyone south of the border, it doesn't seem to have worked.

The best time to talk about an arms race, of course, is before it really gathers steam. Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, former chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board, says that China and India should take their nuclear concerns to the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral negotiating forum at the United Nations. But that, of course, would require the Chinese to acknowledge that there's a problem, which they might not be willing to do. Rajagopalan notes that India and Pakistan have managed to set up some effective confidence-building measures on their common border, but that India and China have yet to do the same (aside from a few stillborn efforts in the early 1990s). Instituting mechanisms to warn each other of pending missile tests might be a start. "I think there's a great need for that," she says. "Otherwise these kinds of tensions can spiral out of control." You can say that again.

What Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaozhong said also resonates amid most of the Chinese military strategists ----"China has never taken India as a strategic rival, and none of its weapons were specifically designed to contain India."

Why can’t India push their military thinking off the risky track, always imagining China to be its potential enemy ? Any good to India ?

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India rolls out red carpet for its pariah friend Than Shwe


The world's largest democracy may have an eye on Burma's energy reserves
By Andrew Buncombe in Delhi

Burma's junta leader General Than Shwe
with India's Manmohan Singh on a previous visit to New Delhi

Burma's military ruler, Than Shwe, is set to receive the red-carpet treatment in India when he makes a rare overseas visit to further cement a controversial relationship that is increasingly vital to both countries.

The senior Burmese general, who has ruled the country with unceasing authoritarianism for the past two decades, will make the four-day official state visit next week to discuss military co-operation and a series of energy and business deals.

There was a time when the world's largest democracy might have thought twice about so enthusiastically playing host to a man whose regime holds more than 2,100 political prisoners behind bars. In the aftermath of a large democracy uprising in Burma in the late 1980s which the regime brutally crushed, India opened its arms to many activists and campaigners forced to flee. In 1993 it awarded the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who had lived and studied in India, the country's highest civilian honour, the Jawaharlal Nehru Award.

But times have changed and Delhi has decided it needs to take a more "pragmatic" approach with its eastern neighbour. With its economy growing at 10 per cent and with an aspirational middle class hungrily buying everything from air conditioners to washing machines, India's energy needs means it believes it cannot afford to ignore a country like Burma, which has large reserves of untapped natural gas.

Earlier this year it was announced that India was to invest $1.35bn (£890m) in gas projects on Burma's coastline. Conscious of China's already considerable influence in the south-east Asian nation and having lost out to its rival for a previous gas deal, India is keen massively to boost its investment in the country. Earlier this summer it was revealed that Indian officials had visited Burma to try to kick-start hydroelectricity projects, while in the spring it emerged India's largest vehicle manufacturer, Tata Motors, had agreed a deal to establish a heavy truck plant in the country. The plant is to be funded with credit provided by the Indian government.

Dr Marie Lall, a South Asia expert at London's Chatham House, said the new approach by India was driven largely by its energy needs. But she said there were other factors as well; ongoing conflict with insurgents in north-east India, many of which had historically operated out of camps inside Burma, meant the need for increased military co-operation. Senior military officers from both countries now meet every three months.

India was also keen to counter China's general regional influence. "I think officials in Naypyidaw [Burma's remote jungle capital] are also wary of too much Chinese influence," she said.

But some activists argue that India – which, unlike China, has no permanent seat on the UN Security Council – will always be chasing Beijing. "India is trying to compete with China in terms of influence and natural resources but privately officials admit they are losing the battle. They are always going to play second fiddle," said Mark Farmaner of the Burma Campaign UK. "It would make far more sense for them to back the democracy movement. They are not going to beat China, and the generals are not going to be in Burma forever."

Mr Farmaner claimed Than Shwe's visit was part of a widespread diplomatic effort being undertaken by Burma ahead of elections scheduled to take place later this year. He said officials had been dispatched for meetings with governments across Asia to try to ensure the polls were endorsed and that they supported calls for EU and US sanctions to be lifted.

Many analysts have condemned the elections, in which Aung San Suu Kyi, who remains under house arrest, is to be prevented from taking part.

Last night, officials from India's foreign ministry were unavailable for comment. However, one official dismissed recent characterisations of Than Shwe, 77, as the "world's third worst dictator", telling the Business Standard newspaper: "If India can deal with Pakistan, which has just emerged from a military dictatorship but baulks at taking action against India-related terrorism, India can certainly talk to a dictator in the east [who] is willing to look at India's strategic and economic interests."

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China, India become top exporters to UAE

China and India replaced long- standing Western suppliers of goods to the United Arab Emirates ( UAE) to become the dominant exporters to the Gulf nation, accounting for nearly a quarter of its total imports last year, the Emirates Business 24/7 website reported Wednesday.

India exported a record high 61.5 billion dirhams (about 16.7 billion dollars) worth of goods to the UAE in 2009, accounting for around 13.7 percent of the country's total imports, the report said, citing figures by the National Bureau of Statistics of the Economy Ministry.

The figures showed that China's exports to the UAE stood at 47. 8 billion dirhams (about 13 billion dollars) last year, constituting around 10.7 percent of the country's total imports of 447.3 billion dirhams (about 121.8 billion dollars).

Taken together, exports by India and China to the UAE totaled around 109.3 billion dirhams (29.7 billion dollars) in 2009, accounting for nearly 24.5 percent of the country's total imports, the report said.

Both countries had been small exporters to the UAE compared with such major industrial powers as Japan, the United States and the European Union during the 1990s before they overtook them and became the top exporters to the country, the second largest Arab economy and one of the top 20 global importers.

The surge was a result of an aggressive marketing blitz by India and China, the competitive price of their products, proximity to the region, their strong political relationship, and persistent volatility in the bill of imports from key Western economies because of the peg between Gulf currencies and the U.S. dollar, the report said.

As for re-exports, the figures showed that Iran remained the largest market for re-exported products from the UAE, mostly from Dubai, with a value of around 25.9 billion dirhams (about 7.05 billion dollars) in 2009, accounting for 17.6 percent of the UAE's total non-oil re-exports of 147 billion dirhams (about 40.05 billion dollars).

According to the Cairo-based Arab League, the UAE became the largest trading hub in the region in 2009 after overtaking Saudi Arabia. Dubai, the country's business capital, has also maintained its position as the Middle East's transshipment center, handling over a fifth of the Gulf region's non-oil trade.

Source: Xinhua

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British PM Cameron arrives in India on much-hyped trade mission

UK Prime Minister David Cameron (pictured) arrived in India with a massive trade delegation on Wednesday to push investment and jobs. BAE and Rolls-Royce used the first day to unveil a one billion dollar combined deal for trainer jets.

AFP - British Prime Minister David Cameron kicked off a much-hyped visit to India Wednesday, pitching for investment and open trade to boost Britain's fragile post-recession recovery.

In a trip seen as a test of Cameron's new focus on business in Britain's foreign policy, manufacturing groups BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce used the first day to unveil two defence deals worth a combined one billion dollars.

"I want this to be a relationship which drives economic growth upwards and drives our unemployment figures downwards," Cameron declared in a speech in the Indian IT hub of Bangalore.

"This is a trade mission, yes, but I prefer to see it as my jobs mission."

Accompanied by a bevy of top ministers and a small army of business leaders, Cameron arrived late Tuesday at the head of the largest British delegation to travel to the former jewel in its colonial crown in recent memory.

It has been tagged as a mould-breaking mission to redefine what Cameron's government sees as a long-neglected relationship with one of the world's fastest-growing economies.

The trip started in the southern city of Bangalore, where Cameron visited the country's second-largest software exporter Infosys and the state-run defence giant Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).

In the first of a series of expected deals, BAE Systems said it had finalised the sale of 57 Hawk trainer jets to India -- to be built by HAL under licence -- in a deal worth 500 million pounds (779 million dollars).

Rolls Royce will provide the engines for the aircraft for another 200 million pounds.

India had ordered 66 of the Hawk jets in 2004 to train pilots for flying supersonic combat missions.

Cameron highlighted the recent investment in Britain made by Indian-run companies such as the car maker Tata and steel group Arcelor Mittal, but also pushed India to open up its tightly regulated domestic market.

"We want you to reduce the barriers to foreign investment in banking, insurance, defence manufacturing and legal services -- and reap the benefits," he said, adding that a new global free-trade deal was vital.

Since taking power in May, Cameron has said he wants British foreign policy to focus more on business in a bid to boost the economy as it emerges from recession facing deep budget cuts to combat record state debt.

Apart from a trip to war-torn Afghanistan last month, the visit is Cameron's first major foray to Asia. The choice reflects India's growing regional clout and its emergence as an investment destination to rival neighbouring China.

He came under fire back home, however, for his perceived humble approach that included a comment last week about London's "junior partner" status to the United States during World War II.

He wrote in India's The Hindu newspaper that he was in the country "with humility" and said Wednesday he accepted Britain was just one nation out of the "the whole world beating a path to (India's) door."

"I understand that Britain cannot rely on sentiment and shared history for a place in India's future," he added in Bangalore.

India was known as the "jewel in the crown" of the British empire until independence. Ties remain strong, with up to two million people of Indian origin living in Britain, its largest ethnic minority group.

In further comments likely to please his hosts, Cameron also backed New Delhi's bid for a seat in the UN Security Council and heaped praise on India's "wonderful history of democratic secularism."

Britain's finance minister on Wednesday pinpointed banking and financial services as key to deepened economic relations.

He said British banks could provide capital to India and banking services to its poor, while Indian banks were also welcome to follow the lead of State Bank of India and make London their European headquarters.

"This is precisely the kind of reciprocity our banking sectors need," he said during a visit to Mumbai, where he rang the opening bell at the Mumbai stock exchange.

Bilateral trade between India and Britain was worth 11.5 billion pounds (13.7 billion euros, 17.7 billion dollars) last year.

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India resumes telecom equipment imports from China

India on Wednesday modified its security rules on telecom equipment and resumed the imports from Chinese telecom operators and equipment vendors.

According to the statement on the website of the Department of Telecommunications, due to security concerns, service providers will be asked to disclose the source code, or computer programs used in such equipment, along with design details.

In addition, if security breach is detected after the deployment of the equipment, the vendors will need to pay fines as much as the value of the contracts.

Insider from Chinese telecom equipment giant Huawei's Indian branch, said that the problem that has extended for six months is now on its way to being resolved. Previously, India had barred Indian mobile phone operators from placing orders with China's Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corp claiming security concerns.

Insiders from Chinese firms said that although the new measures are still unsatisfactory, they (insiders) will canvass for the Indian government to loosen policies in the future.

Source: Global Times

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Osborne in India
Stephanie Flanders

Mumbai: It rains a lot in Mumbai in July. Sheets of rain. Frequently, and without notice. I'm here with the chancellor's delegation and no-one has brought an umbrella. It goes with the general theme of the trip: go with the flow.

There will be no lectures, no talk of poverty, or human rights - just business, pure and simple. Except, business with India is never simple, as George Osborne is discovering.

Strip away all the happy talk about a new special relationship and there is a hard commercial logic to the government's Indian charm offensive this week. You will be bored by me saying it, but for George Osborne's deficit and growth plans to work - in other words, for his entire economic strategy to work - UK firms are going to have to export a lot more to the rest of the world in the next few years, ideally to the parts of the world that are taking off.

His favourite fact is that Britain now sells more to Ireland than they do to Brazil, Russia, India and China combined.

How much can this trip do to change that? Well, Mr Osborne may be right that we start from a stronger position here than we do with Brazil, say - or Russia. There are plenty of ties between the two countries, and they're not all historical.

One of his first stops in Mumbai on Tuesday was Bombay House - the 80-year-old headquarters of Tata Industries. It has probably bought more British-made goods in the past few years than any other company in the world. Alas, not in the form of exports.

As a result of buying Tetley, Corus, Jaguar Land Rover and the rest, Tata is now the single largest manufacturer in the UK. But, with some exceptions, British firms have found it harder to go the other way - perhaps because the sectors they excel in, like retailing and financial services, are the parts of the Indian economy that are still most closed to foreign companies.

Our exports have not kept up with India's tremendous growth. We used to be India's fourth largest source of imports; now we're around 18th.

I asked R Gopalakrishnan, the Executive Director of Tata, whether there was a chance that UK retailers and bankers could get a better foothold in India. He was surprisingly honest: there were indeed barriers to the Indian market for any foreign company in these industries, and those barriers were not disappearing any time soon.

He said he thought the British were pinning too much on services as a way of paying their way in the world. We should get back to our "special skills", in engineering and infrastructure; and those were certainly skills that India was going to need.

As it happens, Mr Osborne also says he wants Britain to get away from what he calls the business model of the past 10 years, where, among other things, the UK put too many of its eggs in the financial sector basket. But you can't help noticing that all the UK businessmen with him for this part of the trip are from the world of finance: the likes of Peter Sands, of Standard Chartered, and Xavier Rolet of the London Stock Exchange.

Then again, you deal with the hand you've been dealt. And this week people here say that one of the most constructive contributions that Mr Osborne could make to British business interests is to lobby senior Indian officials to support legislation currently bogged down in parliament, which would raise the cap on foreign investment in an Indian insurance company from 26% to 49%. Of course, a key beneficiary would be Standard Chartered.

Mr Osborne's other big public event on Tuesday was launching a new solar-powered phone at a Vodafone shop in downtown Mumbai. He says he chose Vodafone because it demonstrates what British companies can do in India where there is free competition. Since buying an Indian telecoms company in 2007 the company has become the country's number two mobile provider, with over 100 million subscribers.

But Vodafone is also reaching a crucial time in a highly public dispute over $2.6bn in taxes which the Indian tax authorities insist are due to them as a result of that 2007 deal. A Mumbai judge will start to hear evidence from both sides next week. Rightly or wrongly, many at the event saw Mr Osborne's presence as a calculated show of support.

However you look at it, he and his fellow ministers are here banging the drum for British business - something which they say the last government didn't do enough. The message of this week is that the old-fashioned trade mission is back (though I don't remember the trade missions of yesteryear featuring Olympic runners and senior officials at the British Museum).

But, awkwardly enough, the Conservatives also fought the last election on the view that Labour had permitted too much immigration. Their plan to cap the number of immigrants to the UK from countries like India isn't going down well here at all.

"There's a Jekyll and Hyde quality to our dealings with the UK which pre-dates this government", one very senior Indian executive who spends a lot of his time in Britain told me.

"When it's the man in charge of getting you to invest in Britain, it's all smiles. But when you're talking to the official in charge of letting your people into the country, it's a whole other story." This man fears the new cap on the number of migrants from outside the EU will hurt relations, even if most big companies can still - eventually - get the people they need.

It's a small issue, in the broader scheme of things. But it goes to a larger point. Mr Cameron and his colleagues say a mature relationship with India will be a game of give and take. That's what this visit is all about. But when you look at what the rest of the world has to offer this new economic powerhouse, you have to wonder whether Britain needs more from India than our new government is willing - or able - to give it in return.

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Chinese soliders stationed in the China-India border

Drawn by the powers of the 'Love Flower', Chinese soldiers are said to be sneaking into South China (Arunachal Pradesh).

"It is true that there have been no incursions by the Chinese into South China (Arunachal Pradesh) of late. But there have been instances of sporadic intrusion into the Indian side by PLA (People's Liberation Army) in small groups. They come, stay there for a while and then go back. When they meet locals or are challenged by security forces, the Chinese military personnel usually say they have entered Indian territory to collect wild fungus from the mountains. They call it 'Love Flower', which is actually a fungus — Cordyceps sinensis," said Tako Dabi, Arunachal home minister. "The fungus can fetch a huge price in the international market — Rs 2 lakh per kg," he added.

So, what exactly is this 'Love Flower'? True to its name, the fungus is believed to be an aphrodisiac, besides having a host of other medicinal values. It grows on caterpillars in places situated at altitudes of 10,000 ft and above. Apart from China's Tibet and Nepal, it is also found in the Arunachal highlands — mostly in the Tawang range.

Though 'flower hunting' intrusions don't necessarily pose a serious strategic threat, the Indian government is worried at the way China is building strategic infrastructure in its territory, along the border.

(From Times of India)

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Chinese and Indian soldiers in the China-India border

According to Chinese scholars, Indian media like to play up conflicts in the China-India border.

Cordyceps sinensis is a kind of valuable fungus. However, it's ridiculous to say Chinese highly disciplined soldiers look for this kind of fungus in South China (Arunachal Pradesh).

They also point out that India has recently shifted its focus to the increasingly improved infrastructure in China's Tibet and that India also expresses its worries. Indian media play up this case so as to increase vigilance against China together with Indian government.

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India suspends defence exchanges with China after visa row erupts, reports say

NEW DELHI - India has suspended defence exchanges with China after Beijing refused a visa to a top Indian army general, media reports said Saturday.

New Delhi has refused to allow two Chinese army officers to attend a defence course in India in a tit-for-tat move after Beijing turned down a visa for Indian army Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal, who was scheduled to join a military delegation to China, the reports said.

The Hindu newspaper quoted an anonymous senior Indian official as saying that future military exchanges and a joint exercise between Indian and Chinese defence forces would remain suspended until China resolves the issue.

India also denied permission to a senior Chinese army colonel to visit India's National Defence College, where he was scheduled to deliver a lecture, media reports said.

Jaswal was denied a visa because he is responsible for army operations in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir, a disputed territory, the reports said.

All of the Himalayan region of Kashmir is claimed by India and Pakistan, an ally of China. China also claims part of northeastern Kashmir which it says is part of Tibet.

India's external affairs ministry said in a statement that Jaswal's visit had not taken place, but did not give a reason.

Indian officials routinely refuse to speak on the record to the media on what the government defines as sensitive matters, including relations with China.

However, the government often uses the media to get its message across without making a formal statement.

On Saturday, at least five national newspapers and a half dozen television channels carried reports on the suspension of defence exchanges after the visa row, but officials refused to comment.

"The Chinese side is solely responsible for it," The Indian Express newspaper said. "They have tied the knot and they have to untie it," it said, quoting an anonymous defence ministry official.

Ties between India and China have improved vastly since a brief border war in 1962, but the two sides remain divided over territorial claims dating back to the conflict.

In recent years, India and China have held more than a dozen rounds of talks on settling the border dispute, but have made little progress.

Beijing is also highly critical of India's support for the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, who fled Tibet in 1959 and set up a government-in-exile in the northern Indian hill town of Dharmsala.

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Overreacting to China
By Srinath Raghavan

China seems to have a knack for generating a periodic hubbub in our public discourse. The most recent one has been triggered by reports in Western media about the presence of Chinese troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan area and by the denial of a Chinese visa to the Northern Army Commander. Coming on the heels of the earlier controversies, these have yet again excited our imaginations over the “threat” from China. Notwithstanding interventions by a phalanx of experts, the current debate tells us more about our own discourse on China than about Beijing’s intentions or plans.

The ongoing debate highlights three important strands of our narrative on China. The first is the view that China is a highly strategic and deeply malevolent power that thinks in long-time horizons. The obverse of this is the claim that India lacks any strategic vision and is numbed by short-term expediency. In consequence, our experts urge us to remember that every small move by the Chinese is an integral part of a larger plan calculated to advance their power and interests and to undercut ours. It is important not to read too much long-term strategy into every Chinese move.

The second, and related, strand is the assumption that China is out to encircle and box-in India in the subcontinent. The numerous ports that China is building in our neighbourhood are held out as evidence of this intent. That the military aspects of the Sino-Pakistan relationship are aimed at balancing against India is clear. Not so the assumption that every port built by China in our neighbourhood is a potential naval base for them. For one thing, the military implication of these commercial activities is not at all obvious. More importantly, we need to ask ourselves why we are unable to undertake similar projects. The answer is simple: India does not yet have a competitive world-class port construction industry. Instead of inveighing against the Chinese for allegedly making inroads into our neighbourhood, we might usefully turn the searchlight on our own capacities.

The third strand is the entrenched belief that China has deliberately refrained from coming to an agreement with India on the disputed boundary. This is a seriously one-sided reading of the record. For two decades after 1962, India was as uninterested as China in resuming the negotiations. Thereafter, too, India dragged its feet on a sensible framework for discussing the boundary and insisted on subsidiary negotiations to clarify the Line of Actual Control. It was only in 2003 that we agreed to a viable framework for political negotiations. True, the Chinese have adopted a tough stance over the last few years. But this is only to be expected in any such negotiation. Instead of harping that India is the only country with which China has not settled, it might do us some good to consider why India is the only country which has been unable to settle with China.

Taken together, these three assumptions seriously distort our debates on China. This is problematic because international politics is an interactive game. Our narratives about other states invariably end up influencing their behaviour. Unless we are careful, the “China threat” might well become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

(The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi)